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ABSTRACT

Postmodern American Sociology: A Response
to the Aesthetic Challenge
by
Jongryul Choi
Dr. David R. Dickens, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Sociology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Over the past two decades, American sociologists have debated about the postmodern
and what we might call “postmodern American sociology' began to emerge at the turn of
this century. This dissertation examines the nature o f the postmodern in general, and
postmodern American sociology in particular, in terms o f three models o f knowledge;
science, morality, and aesthetics.
This dissertation pays close attention to the fact that science, morality, and aesthetics
began to be differentiated from religion in the modem era, which posited two problems:
the problem of legitimacy o f knowledge and the problem o f figuring out the relationship
among science, morality, and aesthetics. It sees the modem as a specific way to address
these two problems. About the first problem, the modem derived legitimacy
o f knowledge from the idea o f progress: progress in science and technology will lead to
the improvement in material well-being as well as the moral perfection o f individuals and
societies. About the second problem, the modem presented two positions. The
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Enlightenment tried to reintegrate science, morality, and aesthetics into society according
to scientific laws while the Counter-Enlightenment did so according to moral laws. In this
sense, the modem is defined as the scientization and moralization of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded from the 17th century to the early
1960s in Western societies.
This dissertation also observes how the process o f dedifferentiation, a process o f
social entropy leading to the collapse o f boundaries, is changing the two issues associated
with the modem. It is increasingly difficult to derive legitimacy o f each knowledge from
the idea o f progress because science and morality become contested arenas mainly by the
implosive impact of electronically-mediated culture industry on ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics. The process o f dedifferentiation also makes the problem o f
integration o f science, morality, and aesthetics into society outdated by refiguring them in
terms o f the state o f incommensurability. In this sense, the postmodem is defined as the
aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from
the early 1960s on in advanced Westem societies.
This dissertation examines the nature o f postmodem American sociology by situating
it within this general relationship between the modem and the postmodem. It
investigates how sociology has been based on the modem, excluding the aesthetic, how
the postmodem as the aesthetic challenge is threatening the modem discipline o f
sociology, and how some American sociologists, especially critical and interactionist
sociologists, form postmodem American sociology in the course o f responding to the
aesthetic challenge. Finally, this dissertation proposes that postmodem American
sociology needs multi- or trans-disciplinary approaches for addressing the postmodem.
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the core o f which is the synthesis of poststructuralist linguistics and post-Marxist political
economy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, American sociologists have debated about the postmodern.
As a result, what we might call “postmodern American sociology” began to emerge at the
turn o f the century. This dissertation aims to understand the nature o f the postmodern in
general, and postmodern American sociology in particular, in terms o f three models of
knowledge: science, morality, and aesthetics.
These three models o f knowledge stemmed from the long history o f Westem
philosophy, according to which there are three discrete categories o f knowledge based on
three discrete human faculties: theoretical knowledge based on cognitive faculty
(thinking or knowing), practical knowledge based on moral faculty (doing), and aesthetic
knowledge based on aesthetic faculty (feeling). But these three models o f knowledge
were eclipsed by religious “faith” during the medieval age, but the situation
fundamentally changed when science, morality, and aesthetics began to be differentiated
from religion in the modem era. Losing religious foundation, each of them confronted
the problem o f legitimacy o f knowledge, and another problem o f figuring out the
relationship among science, morality, and aesthetics emerged. The modem tried to solve
these two problems. About the first problem, the modem derived legitimacy of
knowledge from the idea o f progress. About the second problem, the modem presented
two positions. The Enlightenment tried to reintegrate science, morality, and aesthetics
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into society according to scientific laws while the Counter-Enlightenment did so
according to moral laws. The postmodern is challenging the modem by embracing
aesthetics as the axial principle to (dis)organize humanity and society.
I believe that the nature o f postmodem American sociology would be better
understood by situating it within this general scheme about the modem and the
postmodem. The postmodem as the aesthetic challenge to the modem calls modem
American sociology into question because its fundamental assumptions about ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics were based on the modem. Postmodem American
sociology has emerged in the course o f responding to this challenge. One o f the main
merits o f my approach is that it might help us see postmodem American sociology not as
a intellectual fad o f the 1980s, but as a sociological response to the emerging
aestheticized world in which the traditional ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics
modem American sociology has embraced do not work well as before. In this sense,
postmodern American sociology is a durable project to investigate a new world in which
aesthetics is the axial principle to (dis)organize man and society.
1 think it will be helpful to the reader to know from the outset the general outlines of
the dissertation. Thus, 1 will briefly describe the postmodem in general and postmodem
American sociology in particular in terms o f the dynamic relationship between science,
morality, and aesthetics. 1 believe that this might be one way to grasp the nature o f the
postmodem in general and postmodem American sociology in particular.
In the modem era, science, morality, and aesthetics (art) were considered to be
separate disciplines. For this separation, Kant’s trilogy. Critique o f Pure Reason,
Critique o f Practical Reason, and Critique ofJudgment, played a decisive role. Kant
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grounded science, morality, and aesthetics on their own foundation. The a priori
principle of the faculty o f cognition could provide a basis for theoretical judgment being
universally valid and binding; the a priori principle of the faculty of doing could provide
a basis for moral judgment being universally valid and binding; and the a priori principle
o f the faculty of feeling could provide a basis for aesthetic judgment being universally
valid and binding. In the early modem era, this Kantian division played a crucial role in
justifying science, morality, and aesthetics as mutually exclusive autonomous disciplines.
Accordingly, science is concemed with tme and false, morality/ethics is concemed with
good and bad, and aesthetics is concemed with beautiful and sublime.
This Kantian division sounded reasonable to modem thinkers because it was
connected with the substantial process o f differentiation of modem society, in which new
institutions of science, morality, and aesthetics were relieved from the control o f the
traditional institution o f religion and specialized relative to one another in terms o f their
respective functions. But this process also provoked the problem o f integration: if each
institution has its own specific foundation as well as function, what would be the proper
interrelationship among science, morality, and ethics?
Modem thinkers presented different answers to this question. For the Enlightenment
thinkers who tried to apply Newtonian science to society in order to organize it according
to universal scientific laws, differentiation itself would solve the problem o f integration
because it meant specialization o f functions as well as integration (mutual independence
o f the structurally differentiated parts and coordination o f their functions). In this sense,
specialization o f function entails integration. Thus, science, morality, and aesthetics are
considered to be subsystems equipped with their own specialized functions, which are
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integrated into the whole society. But the Enlightenment thinkers observed that this
optimism did not always come true in the real world. They needed a new encompassing
foundation, like God, to reintegrate differentiated parts into the whole society. The idea
of progress replaced the medieval God: progress in science and technology will lead to
the improvement in material well-being as well as the moral perfection o f individuals and
societies (see Bury 1920; Wright 1997). The main concern is how to organize
individuals and societies according to universal scientific laws. In this sense, the
Enlightenment thinkers believed that science should be the axial principle to functionally
“reintegrate” specialized parts so as to form a highly organic society. The ideal o f the
Enlightenment is the “scientific” organization o f humanity and society.
For the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who objected to the application o f the
Newtonian science to human society and tried to complement the extremity of the
Enlightenment by recovering morality o f the ancient Greeks and the Renaissance
humanism, differentiation meant specialization o f functions as well as fragmentation,
alienation, and dehumanization. The Counter-Enlightenment thinkers claimed that
although progress in science and technology would bring about the improvement in
material well-being o f individuals and societies, it could not automatically lead to the
moral perfection o f individuals and societies. Science could not solve the problem o f
integration. Rather, it was incorporated into the economy or the system and turned into
domination (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). The Counter-Enlightenment thinkers
criticized the modem ideal o f autonomy of science, morality, and aesthetics was false,
because each o f them was under control of its objective experts and specialists detached
from the public. In this sense, science failed to reintegrate science, morality, and
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aesthetics into society. Nevertheless, they basically believed in the idea o f progress.
What is needed is to re-ground science, morality, and aesthetics on the principles o f
morality (see Habermas 1995). According to them, one of the main features o f modem
morality is the separation of “ought” from “is,” which opened both the possibility and the
burden o f autonomy o f the human subject. They believed that human beings should be a
law unto themselves and represent this law for themselves. In this sense, the basic
project o f the Counter-Enlightenment is the “moral” organization o f humanity and
society.
Even though the Enlightetunent and the Coimter-Enlightenment thinkers had different
opinions about differentiation, they shared the same belief that society is one entity into
which science, morality, and aesthetics should be reintegrated. The difference between
them lied in the issue o f which principle should play the main role o f reintegrating them
into society. Science is the main principle for the Enlightenment while morality is the
counterpart for the Counter-Enlightenment. In this sense, both the Enlightenment and the
Counter-Enlightenment shared a nostalgia for the past when religion incorporated all
institutions so as to not allow differentiation.
Some Anti-Enlightenment thinkers such as Sade and Nietzsche resisted this view,
arguing that there is no entity called society. For them, differentiation referred to the
state o f incommensurability in which absolute differences stand without effacing their
heterogeneity. They recognized the historical inevitability o f separating science,
morality, and aesthetics from religion but did not believe that these should be reintegrated
into society.
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The Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment perspectives were two intellectual
pillars o f the modem. By contrast, the Anti-Enlightenment viewpoint was virtually
ignored in the modem. But in the course of the second half o f the 20th century, the
modem project as scientization and moralization began to be challenged by the new
aesthetics associated with poststmcturalism, which shifts the main subject from the
beautiful to the sublime (see Carroll 1987). Embracing the anti-Enlightenment tradition,
the new aesthetics fundamentally challenges the modem project o f autonomy of science,
ethics, and aesthetics, arguing that they all relied on their own foundations or absolute
grounds, which are in fact arbitrary. It argues that science, morality, and aesthetics in the
modem era were all discourses (rational orders of concepts), within which unspeakable
others (the sublime) were repressed or marginalized. The new aesthetics emphasizes that
these unrepresentable others were necessarily at work within and against discourses,
disrupting the mles of representation. As a result, the new aesthetics blurs the boundaries
between the representer and the represented, or the signifier and the signified: they are
not two separated entities in which one represents the other. In this way, the new
aesthetics fundamentally challenges foundational science, morality, and aesthetics,
revealing their dependence on the unspeakable others. All discourses are always
implicated in power and there are no foundations. Modem science as a discourse
depended on nonscientific others such as narrative, rhetoric, myth, religion, subjectivity,
etc. Modem morality as a discourse depended on the unspeakable others such as desire,
sexuality, body, women, etc. And modem aesthetics as a discourse depended on
unrepresentable others such as the sublime, the real, etc. The autonomy o f science.
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morality, and aesthetics is imploded from within, which in turn resulted in the blur o f the
traditional rigid boundaries between them.
The most salient feature o f the new aesthetics associated with the sublime is its
defiance of order. This defiance resonated among the so-called postmodern social
thinkers when it was situated within a substantive process o f dedifferentiation, a process
o f social entropy leading to the collapse o f boundaries (see Lash 1990; Crook, Pakluski
and Waters 1992). For this process of dedifferentiation, the change in system o f culture
is decisive. In differentiation, culture used to be seen as discrete and isolated values,
beliefs, attitudes, etc., whose meanings are firmly located within the institutional fabrics
o f society. Culture also used to be thought to perform integrative functions for the social
system. But in dedifferentiation, culture becomes an aesthetic field of signs whose
meaning is in a state o f infinite regress by way o f a continual deferral to other signs.
Meaning is not located within the social any more; it is scattered in an indefinite
signifying chain. Electronically-mediated mass media play a crucial role in this changing
conception of culture. Electronically-mediated culture industry bombards the mass with
images and signs whose meanings are neutralized or “imploded.” As a result, any stable
structure of meaning is virtually impossible. Modem autonomy of science, morality, and
aesthetics used to presuppose their own foundations on which each discipline was
grounded. What is at issue is that science, morality, and aesthetics have become more
and more aestheticized due to the trend o f new aesthetics increasingly permeating and
dismantling their foundations. Everything has become at length cultural because
everything is mediated by culture saturated with images and signs in the society o f the
spectacle, the image, or the simulacrum. As a result, the distinction between the real and
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the imaginary disappears, which gives rise to a depthless aestheticized hallucination o f
reality (Baudrillard 1983). In this new reality, no stable meaning is possible due to the
ceaseless permutation o f signifiers, which neutralizes meaning. Due to the permeation o f
the sublime into science, morality, and aesthetics, they could not help but accept that
truth, justice, and beauty become contested arenas.
Postmodern social thinkers have different attitudes toward dedifferentiation.
Poststructuralist postmodern social theorists, who adopt aesthetics as the axial principle
o f society, see dedifferentiation in purely cultural terms (for instance, see Baudrillard
1983,1990, 1994). According to them, it is senseless to discern what is not cultural from
what is cultural in a dedifferentiated world. By contrast, critical postmodern social
theorists who adopt morality as the axial principle o f society try to locate the process o f
dedifferentiation within the restless transformative activity of capital acciunulation (for
instance, see Harvey 1989). The attempt here is to produce marketable commodities by
brutal aesthetics o f squalor and shock. In spite o f this difference, both postmodern social
theory camps share the belief that the modem as the scientization and moralization of
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics is being challenged by the postmodem as the
aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Both camps argue that
dedifferentiation neither entail integration nor alienation. Rather, they pay attention to
how dedifferentiation is liquidating the binary opposition of integration and alienation,
and how it is producing the aesthetic condition in which the subject becomes like the
“schizophrenic” who is unable to link signifiers together in a temporal order (Jameson
1984a). To the schizophrenic, the binary opposition of integration and alienation is
senseless because the schizophrenic experiences signifiers as a series o f pure and
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unrelated presents in time (see Lacan 1993). In this sense, the schizophrenic goes beyond
the social.
American sociology was influenced by the historical change o f the relationship
between science, morality, and aesthetics described above. Inspired by scientific model
o f knowledge, which derived fi-om the Enlightenment, modem American sociologists
took for granted the separation o f science, morality, and aesthetics and wanted to make
sociology a genuine “science.” Following the ideal o f the modem, they tried to expunge
morality and aesthetics from its horizon. The scientific model that American sociology
has embraced has two variations: functionalist sociology and positivistic sociology.
Functionalist sociology embraces a theoretical notion of science, which strives to
establish a grand abstract system o f theory deduced from some fundamental axioms.
Positivistic sociology accepts an empirical notion o f science which seeks to achieve an
analytic synthesis o f narrowly-oriented empirical data. As a result, modem American
sociology has become an esoteric science at the cost o f being isolated from the public
(see Agger 2000). Other models such as morality and aesthetics, the two pillars o f the
Counter-Enlightenment, have been marginalized or repressed, even though morality and
aesthetics have challenged the hegemony of science. In fact, the moral notion of
knowledge has challenged science fi*om the start in sociology. Classical European
sociology counterbalanced morality against science. American sociology was not much
different; both interactionist sociology and critical sociology, both o f which adopt
morality as the primary model o f sociological knowledge, have challenged scientific
sociology from the start. Yet it cannot be said that their challenge was greatly successful;
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until now scientific sociology has been considered as mainstream sociology in the United
States.
In this sense, the moral challenge to scientific sociology is not new. What is new is
the aesthetic challenge, which does not necessarily mean that the moral challenge is not
important in the postmodern. The aesthetic challenge described above demands that
American sociologists should refigure what sociology is in an entirely different way. It is
not easy to embrace this demand because o f the aesthetic nature o f the challenge.
American sociology has long excluded the aesthetic from its disciplinary knowledge
because it believes that the aesthetic challenges the fundamental assumptions of modem
American sociology, proposing the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and
ethics/politics. Modem American sociology, like classical European sociology, has
conceived o f the aesthetic as being pre- or anti-social or at least outside the social.
Mainstream sociologists ignore the aesthetic challenge, trying to make sociology into a
genuine science. Nevertheless, some American sociologists, especially critical and
interactionist sociologists, embrace this challenge seriously, but their ways o f embracing
it are distinct. Both critical sociology and interactionist sociology have accepted morality
as the primary model o f knowledge, whose comer stone is its notion of indeterministic
world that allows people to choose their own destinies. But their emphases are different:
critical sociology has emphasized a stmcturally-induced nature o f human practice while
interactionist sociology has highlighted the inderministic nature o f the world. This
difference influences the ways o f embracing the aesthetic challenge. Critical postmodem
sociology embraces the aesthetic challenge from the perspective of morality, trying to
situate the aesthetic challenge within institutional change. By contrast, interactionist
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Il
postmodern sociology embraces the aesthetic challenge from the perspective o f the new
aesthetics, emphasizing the textual construction o f the social and the human subject.

Organization o f the Dissertation
Chapter 2 reformulates the Kantian trilogy into the theoretical, the practical (the
technically practical and the morally practical), and the aesthetic in order to shed light on
the relationship between the modem and the postmodem. Here 1 define the modem as
the “scientization and moralization” of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which
proceeded from the 17*’’ century to the early 1960s in Westem societies. The
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment will be discussed to concretize their
definition. While the Enlightenment proposed scientization of ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics, the Coimter-Enlightenment suggested moralization o f ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
Chapter 3 defines the postmodem as the aestheticization of ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from the early 1960s to the present in advanced
Westem societies. This chapter addresses postmodem social theory, distinguishing
poststmcturalist postmodem social theory from critical postmodem social theory.
Chapter 3 goes on to demonstrate that poststmcturalist postmodem social theory
embraced the aesthetic model of knowledge and that critical postmodem social theory
embraced the morally practical model o f knowledge. Chapter 3 also argues that despite
this difference, these versions of postmodem social theory share, to a greater or lesser
extent, the view that ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics have been aestheticized.
Finally, this chapter argues that this situation is not new, and shows some historical
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12
exemplars such as Gorgias, Sade, and Nietzsche that strikingly parallel the present
situation in terms o f the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
Chapter 4 explains how sociology has developed by expunging the aesthetic from its
horizon, suggests how classical European sociology developed out o f the complex
mixture o f the Enlightemnent and the Counter-Enlightenment, and explains how it
excluded the aesthetic while criticizing individualist approaches to man and society. As a
result of excluding the aesthetic, classical European sociology followed the tradition o f
the modem as the scientization and moralization of ontology, epistemology, and
ethics/politics. Then, a short history of modem American sociology is provided to
explain how this exclusion o f the aesthetic in the establishment o f sociology as a discrete
discipline. Finally, chapter 4 presents some o f the fundamental assumptions that
sociology has preserved, which are now being challenged by the aesthetic.
Chapter 5 shows documents how American sociologists responded to the aesthetic
challenge to the fundamental assumptions in sociology. It also emphasizes that
“marginal” sociologists took this challenge seriously, more precisely, critical and
interactionist sociologists. This chapter 5 distinguishes critical postmodem sociology
from interactionist postmodem sociology. Some critical sociologists, who followed the
realist tradition of pragmatism, did not fully accept the aesthetic as social ontology, but
relatively welcomed the aesthetic as epistemology. Some interactionist sociologists, who
followed the nominalist tradition of pragmatism, embraced the aesthetic as both social
ontology and epistemology. Finally, chapter 5 documents how some mainstream
sociologists responded to postmodem sociology.
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Finally, chapter 6 discusses further implications o f postmodern American sociology.
It argues that multi- or trans-disciplinary approaches are needed for investigating the
postmodern, the core o f which is the synthesis o f poststmcturalist linguistics and postMarxist political economy.
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CHAPTER 2

THE MODERN AS THE SCIENTIZATION AND MORALIZATION OF
ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ETHICS/POLITICS
Many scholars have tried to define the postmodern, and their definitions differ from
one to another. Nevertheless, they have all defined the postmodern in terms o f its
relationship to the modem. I will likewise define the postmodem in comparison to the
modem, but I need to distinguish between some analytic levels in order to compare. I
agree with Dickens and Fontana’s suggestion that any intelligent discussion of
postmodernism should distinguish three dimensions (1996:182; see also Dickens 2000):
(1) As a substantive theoretical category, postmodernism refers to a series
of profound structural transformations in the so-called advanced societies,
such as institutional changes (in the family, polity, economy, religion, etc.)
and changes in conventional forms o f social inequality (race, class,
gender, etc.). This dimension o f postmodemism also refers to alleged
changes in the nature o f interaction in contemporary mass-mediated
societies, transforming our conventional notions o f self and identity.
(2) As a methodological term, postmodemism includes a critique and
reformulation of the epistemology o f the social sciences in general, and
sociology in particular, and a corresponding reworking, a broadening
really, of the appropriate strategies for investigating the social world in a
concrete fashion.
(3) As a normative concept, postmodemism refers to ethical and political
implications, focusing on the nature and direction o f contemporary social
change and the inadequacy o f conventional moral and political theories.
I will rephrase these three categories in philosophical terms as ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics respectively. I define the modem as the “scientization”
and “moralization” of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded firom

14
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the 17“*century to the early 1960s in Western societies. I also define the postmodern as
the “aestheticization” o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded
from the early 1960s to the present in advanced Western societies. What do I mean by
scientization, moralization, and aestheticization? I believe that these notions can be
better grasped when the relationship among scientization (science), moralization
(morality), and aesteticization (aesthetics) is clarified.
The starting point might be in reformulating the Kantian trilogy; the theoretical, the
practical, and the aesthetic. Kant’s notion of the theoretical (pure reason) could be
rephrased into “theoretical science." Kant’s notion of the practical (practical reason)
might be better to be subdivided into two: the technically practical (empirical science)
and the morally practical (morality). Although Kant implicitly divided the practical into
two, he did not give autonomy to the technically practical. In contrast, I believe that one
of the most important features o f modem and postmodern worlds is the predominance o f
the technically practical model o f knowledge, as positivism shows. Thus, I need to
separate the technically practical from the morally practical. Also needed is the
reformulation of the aesthetic. Until recently, the aesthetic has been equated with shared
judgment on beauty. But the notion o f the aesthetic has increasingly become associated
with the notion o f the sublime, something that disrupts ± e system o f representation,
rather than the beautiful.
I believe that this reformulation is crucial for an understanding the postmodern as the
aesthetic challenge, and postmodern American sociology as a response to this. Before
demonstrating this argument, I will first present four models o f knowledge in terms o f
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. It is vital to keep in mind that each model o f
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knowledge I am presenting here is an ideal type. None o f the Western thinkers proposed
these models as such. Nonetheless, each model can be seen as having ideal-typical traits.

Reformulation o f the Kantian Trilogy
1. The Theoretical (Theoretical Science)
According to Kant, pure reason has its own a priori synthetic judgment; pure reason is
concerned with “all knowledge after which it [the faculty o f reason] may strive
independently o f all experience” (Kant 1965:9). Without any experience (i.e., a priori),
pure reason knows, for instance, that concept A is connected with concept B, the
proposition that should be known only by a posteriori experience. As pure reason makes
synthetic judgment without any experience, the knowledge it produces is of necessity and
universal: it is universally true regardless o f any historical contexts. The models o f
knowledge pure reason thinks of are mathematics and physics: they all contain a priori
synthetic judgments as the principle. Following mathematics and physics, Kant tried to
make metaphysics a priori synthetic knowledge. That is why Kant investigated a priori
synthetic elements o f mathematics and o f the pure science o f nature. Using a priori
synthetic faculty o f pure reason as the criterion for the truth o f judgment, Kant tried to
establish objective knowledge, which is universally and necessarily valid.
The knowledge that Kant’s pure reason aims to produce can be translated into the
theoretical model o f knowledge. But the theoretical I am presenting here is different
from the subjectivist interpretation o f Kant’s pure reason, according to which all
universals are fictions that the mind produces. The ability o f Kant’s pure reason to know
truth a priori should entail the existence o f a necessary relation between the structure of
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the mind and its external referents. In this sense, the theoretical ontologically
presupposes a monistic realism that “there exist true, immutable, universal, timeless,
objective values, valid for all men, everywhere, at all times” (Berlin 1976: 251). These
values are “universals.” Regarding the relationship between the universals and the
particulars, the theoretical proposes two positions: transcendentalism and essentialism.
Transcendentalism separates the real world of universals (Ideals, Forms, Essence, etc.)
from the illusory world o f the particulars (realities, matters, appearances, etc.) and
considers the latter as a shadow o f the first world. Essentialism combines these two
worlds into one: the real world o f the universals is embodied in the illusory world. The
universals realize themselves in the particulars. The particulars are moving from
potentiality to actuality.
Epistemologically, the theoretical assumes that the human mind is structured to know
the universals a priori, i.e., without using the structure o f sense organs. Cognitive
capacities and forms o f thought are inherent to the structure o f the mind: they are
immutable, universal, timeless, objective categories. Transcendentalism emphasizes the
capacity o f the mind to ascend from the illusory world o f the particulars to the real world
o f the universals. Transcendentalism aims to produce an abstract and contemplative sort
o f knowledge suitable to a disembodied mind. Transcendentalism is ready to enjoy the
disinterested contemplation o f Truth. By contrast, essentialism emphasizes the capacity
o f the mind to conceive a non-rational arrangement o f the empirical world in rational
terms. Essentialism seeks to find simple and indisputable a priori First Principle from
which necessary derivatives follow. The First Principle is a counterpart o f the First
Cause, the ultimate source o f change, the First Mover, which is itself uncaused and
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eventually unmoved by its own action. Just as the First Cause serves the foundation from
which all beings necessarily follow, so does the a priori First Principle serve the
foundation on which coherent knowledge is built. The truth o f this knowledge is not
subject to empirical verification because it is not apprehensible through the structure o f
sense organs.
The theoretical endorses the linear notion o f temporality, where time is moving in a
progressive way towards the betterment of hiunanity. The ideal o f ethics is to live as a
self-sufficient entity. In order to be self-sufficient, human beings should control
accidental features by their essence. The ideal of politics is a centralized absolutism, in
which a God like center controls all other parts so as to serve the equilibrium of the
whole.

2. The Technically Practical (Empirical Science)
According to Kant, the practical consists o f two worlds o f phenomena (determinism)
and noumena (freedom): the technically practical and the morally practical. The
technically practical emphasizes determinism over freedom: freedom is equated with
freedom o f choice, options among technical variables. In this sense, the technically
practical is subject to the theoretical:
Propositions called “practical” in mathematics or natural science should
properly be called “technical,” for in these fields it is not a question of
determining the will; they only indicate the manifold o f a possible action
which is adequate to bring about a certain effect, and are therefore just as
theoretical as any proposition which asserts cotuiection between cause and
effect (Kant 1993:25).
Like the theoretical, the technically practical assumes that there exist universals
which are inherently organized in an orderly fashion. The technically practical believes
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that the world is characterized by the recurrent, persistent, permanent, uniform patterns
which are empirically observable. It assumes that it is the external world, not the human
mind, that is orderly structured. The technically practical holds that the structure of the
external world exists prior to, or independent of, human experience. It is an immutable,
universal, timeless, objective entity, valid for all men everywhere, at all times. The
structure o f the external world consists of a variety o f particulars which are in a state of
motion. Nothing just happens; all the combinations o f the particulars are made to occur
by prior impact o f the particulars on one another and prior motion of the particulars. In
this way, the world is mechanically, not teleologically, determined. In this stable system,
the relation between input and output is always calculable.
The technically practical has a different epistemology from the theoretical, denying
the capacity o f the mind to know the patterns o f the particulars a priori. The technically
practical holds that what is given to us are a variety o f the particulars from which we
should start to seek the universals. In other words, the technically practical believes that
knowledge must start with sensory experience and end in formulating empirical
generalizations. In this sense, the technically practical gives up the pursuit of the First
Cause, and tries to pursue secondary causes, like natural causes that are found in the
natural world. In this sense, the technically practical is not concerned with “the true” any
more. Rather, the technically practical is concerned with efficiency: it tries to maximize
output (the information or modification obtained) and minimize input (the energy
expended in the process) (see Lyotard 1984:44). Knowledge is valuable only when it
improves performance. In this sense, cognitive statements are subordinate to the finality
o f the best possible performances. The technically practical aims to bring together into a
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unified body o f knowledge the massive quantity o f empirical findings accumulated by
researchers, and believes that a unified body o f knowledge is predicated if all the
variables are known. Knowledge is a derivative o f sensation or experience rather than a
construction o f the mind. Since sensation or human experience might be deceptive,
technological devices are welcome because they can aid human organs to produce more
proof.
The technically practical also accepts the linear notion o f temporality. History is
mechanically determined towards the betterment o f hiunanity. The ideal o f ethics is to
live according to the universal law of the maximization o f pleasure and minimization o f
pain, which governs all individuals. The ideal o f politics is liberalism, in which the
subject is the atomic individual who is fi’eely associated and dissociated with other
atomic individuals according to the law o f maximization o f utility.

3. The Morally Practical (Morality)
To Kant, morally practical reason is synonymous with pure practical reason. Unlike
the technically practical, the morally practical emphasizes freedom over determinism.
The morally practical is subject to the supersensible, “the unconditioned in a causal
series” (Kant 1993: 3). Kant (1951:9) argued that “the morally practical precepts, which
are altogether based on the concept o f freedom, to the complete exclusion o f the natural
determining grounds o f the will, constitute a quite special class. These, like the rules
which nature obeys, are called simply laws, but unlike them do not rest on sensuous
conditions but on a supersensible principle.” A fundamental law of the morally practical
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reason is expressed in the following: “So act that the maxim o f your will could always
hold at the same time as the principle giving universal law” (Kant 1993: 30).
Kant’s notion o f the morally practical should be modified to erase its monistic
implication. Kant argued that there are universal laws that govern the morally practical,
which are fundamentally separate from imiversal laws that govern pure reason. But I do
not believe there are separate universal laws o f the morally practical that have their own
separate realms. Rather, the morally practical presupposes a totally different ontology
from the theoretical. Unlike the theoretical that presupposes a monistic ontology, the
morally practical presupposes a plmalistic ontology: “There are many objective ends,
ultimate values, some incompatible with others, pursued by different societies at various
times, or by different groups in the same society” (Berlin 1991: 79-80). According to
pluralism, “beliefs involving value-judgments, and the institutions founded upon them,
rested not on discoveries o f objective and unalterable natural facts, but on human
opinion, which was variable and differed between different societies and at different
times; that moral and political values, and in particular justice and social arrangements in
general, rested on fluctuating human convention” (Berlin 1979: 2).
The cornerstone o f the morally practical is its notion o f an indeterministic world that
allows the human subject to choose his/her own destiny. Dewey (quoted in Kennedy
1950: 52) argued that we live in “a universe which is not all closed and settled, which is
still in some respects indeterminate and in the m aking.. .an open universe in which
uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties, and possibilities are naturalized.” There are
two types o f the morally practical: the nominalist and the realist. If the nominalist
version emphasizes the indeterministic nature o f the world, the realist version highlights
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the contextuaily-bound nature o f human practice. The nominalist version conceives the
relation between reahty and language as being open, recognizing the constitutive power
o f language in reality. The realist version conceives the relation between reality and
language as being open, recognizing the constitutive power o f reality in language. But
both share the belief in contextualism, according to which both the objects and the
subjects o f the inquiry should be seen as part o f culture and the institutional life o f a
particular society at a specific time.
Epistemologically, the morally practical does not try to reflect or represent pre
existing reality. Rather, the morally practical aims to investigate how reality is
linguistically and socially constructed at a specific time and space. The main standard o f
the validity of knowledge is found in its practical consequences.
The morally practical claims that each society has its own sense o f temporality.
There is no universal direction o f history. Thus, it is important to live within the unique
sense o f temporality that each society has. The ideal o f ethics is to fully participate in a
culturally unified conununal group without loosing individuality. Communication with
other members o f society is the key to negotiating freedom and necessity. The ideal of
politics is participatory democracy, in which individuals and society are in the course of
fashioning themselves.

4. The Aesthetic (Art)
Kant divided the Critique ofJudgment into the critique o f aesthetic judgment and
teleological judgment; and he argued that aesthetic judgment is essential. The aesthetic
“alone contains a principle which the judgment places quite a priori at the basis of its
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reflection upon nature, viz. the principle of a formal purposiveness o f nature, according to
its particular (empirical) laws, for our cognitive faculty, without which the understanding
could not find itself in nature” (Kant 1951: 30). The aesthetic consists o f two parts; the
beautiful and the sublime. ‘T he beautiful in nature is connected with the form o f the
object, which consists in having [definite] boundaries. The sublime, on the other hand, is
to be found in a formless object, so far as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is
represented, and yet its totality is also present to thought” (Kant 1951: 82). Kant’s
analysis o f the sublime has long been ignored because the sublime implies going beyond
the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment. Thus, modem interpreters o f Kant’s
Critique o f Judgment tended to equate the beautiful with the aesthetic. But contemporary
interpretations such as the deconstructionist, the psychoanalytic, and the ideological
emphasize the sublime over the beautiful (Guyer 1993: 187-192). These interpretations
all emphasize the sublime as something beyond representation. Following this line of
interpretation, I will equate the sublime with the aesthetic.
I believe that “the beautiful” and “the sublime” can be rephrased in Lacanian
psychoanalytic terms. Unlike other scientific discourses, psychoanalysis has
concentrated on the irrational and unconscious forces, which go beyond the limit of
discourses (rational orders o f concepts). Freud associated the unconscious with the
primary process in which drives strive to discharge their energy freely. In this
explanation, the unconscious is somewhat mystical. In this respect, Lacan is impressive.
Lacan robbed Freud o f mystical biological determinism by introducing (post)structuralist
linguistics into psychoanalysis: the unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan
1977). In this new definition, both the conscious and the unconscious can be explained in
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terms o f (post)structuralist linguistics. From this, I become to believe that both the
beautiful and the sublime can be explained in terms of (post)structuralist linguistics.
Kant’s notion o f the sublime implies a mystical implication because it cannot be grasped
through rational concepts. Lacan erased this mystical implication of the sublime.
According to Lacan’s scheme, the beautiful and the sublime are not two separate entities
but instances in a signifying chain o f signifiera. The sublime is a matrix o f signification
as well as residing at the points o f impasse in language. In this sense, the rigid boundary
between the beautiful and the sublime imploded (see Fink 1995).
The beautiful follows the pleasure principle, which prohibits incest (oneness with the
mOther) and thus, regulates the distance between the subject and the thing in itself.
Pleasure is the safeguard o f a state o f homeostasis and constancy: “The function o f the
pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject from signifier to signifier, by generating
as many signifiers as are required to maintain at as low a level as possible the tension that
regulates the whole functioning o f the psychic apparatus” (Lacan 1992: 119). Thus, we
can say that the beautiful is about pleasures that are socially allowed because the
prohibition of incest is a symbolic law. If the distance between the subject and the thing
in itself is \ x o \z X s é , jouissance, not pleasure, is evoked. Jouissance is an excessive
quantity o f excitation which the pleasure principle attempts to prevent. The sublime is
related to jouissance, and to Lacan’ notion of the real. The real has two features. First of
all, the real is a world of undifferentiated wholeness: “The real is absolutely without
fissure” (Lacan 1988: 97). The real is “concrete and already full, a brute pre-symbolic
reality” (Ragland-Sullivan 1996:192). Second, the real resides at points of impasse in
language exchange, functioning to make signification possible. The real does not exist
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outside o f signification, and thus, is not das Ding in the phenomenological sense that can
never be reached. Rather, the real is the precondition that makes the chain o f
signification possible as a function o f the link of the chain. The real always tries to return
as a subversive force and reminds o f trauma in language.
Ontologically, the aesthetic defies any existence o f an objectively persistent reality,
let alone the universals. What is existent is natural forces that manifest themselves in the
multiplicity o f phenomena in variegated ways in the process o f their free flowing. Thus,
the distinction between being and non-being is blurred and the aesthetic is oneness in
flux. The aesthetic defies any endeavor to fi-eeze natural forces.
Epistemologically, the aesthetic defies the equation o f thought (logos, language) and
being (thing, nature). There is no correspondence between language and thing. The
thing in itself is always more than language. Thus, any effort to freeze the thing itself in
a form o f language is useless. As a result, it is futile to seek a vantage point fi’om which
the truth o f thing is grasped. Methodologically, the aesthetic aims to have “the real”
symbolized as erupting the symbolic. In this sense, the aesthetic tries to express the
inexpressible. Transgression is the most intellectual activity which tries to express the
inexpressible; to transgress is to pass beyond any limit or boundary o f discrete form and
identity. Transgression demands the complete overthrow of any vestige o f order, because
order itself constrains and dictates only certain possibilities for human action.
The aesthetic does not believe that there is any specific direction in time. There is no
differentiation between the past, the present, and the future. Thus, traditional morality,
which seeks future rewards by controlling present bodily desire, loses its significance.
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The ideal o f ethics is to free oneself from all kinds o f constraints. Anything goes. The
ideal o f politics is anarchism, in which no hierarchical organization exists.

Definition o f the Modem as Scientization and Moralization
From this reformulation, what I mean by “scientization,” “moralization,” and
“aestheticization” may be better understood. It is commonly accepted that the modem
refers to the historical period from the I?'** century the early 1960s, which is intellectually
associated with the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. Intellectually, the
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment are considered the two pillars o f the
modem. These two intellectual pillars stemmed, directly or indirectly, from Renaissance
humanism (Grafton 1991; Tamas 1991; Toulmin 1990).
In my scheme, the Enlightenment embraced science (the theoretical and the
technically practical) as the primary model o f knowledge. The ideal of the
Enlightenment was the scientization (scientific reorganization) of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics. It conceived o f universalistic laws as being similar to
natural laws that are tme across space and time. Based on foundational knowledge, the
Enlightenment tried to clear away uncertainty and ambiguity that might trigger and
intensify social conflict, and to constmct an ideal society, i.e., a conflict-free society in
which completely harmonious relationships among individuals could be established. In
different words, the Enlightenment tried to rationally organize ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics according to universal and etemal laws that are universally valid.
By contrast, the Counter-Enlightenment adopted morality (the morally practical) as
the primary model o f knowledge. The ideal o f the Counter-Enlightenment was the
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moralization (moral reorganization) o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics
according to pluralist laws. The Counter-Enlightenment saw pluralist laws as humanmade laws bound to specific contexts o f space and time, and aimed to embrace
uncertainty and ambiguity as they are even though they might trigger and intensify social
conflict. According to the Counter-Enlightenment, uncertainty and ambiguity make it
clear that some values are incompatible with each other. In other words, the CounterEnlightenment argued that the elimination o f uncertainty and ambiguity would lead to
extreme dogmatism in which everything is evaluated according to one rigid standard.
Instead, the Coimter-Enlightenment believed that proper values for organizing ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics varies from context to context.
As the two intellectual pillars o f the modem are the Enlightenment and the CounterEnlightenment, I define the modem as the scientization and moralization o f ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics, which proceeded from the 17“' century to the early
1960s in Westem societies. In what follows, I will discuss each o f these aspects in tum.

1. The Enlightenment as the Scientization o f Ontology,
Epistemology, and Ethics/politics
The Enlightenment contains a variety of ideas that sometimes contradict each other,
mainly due to its synthesis of seventeenth century rationalism and eighteenth century
empiricism. In fact, the most important feature o f the Enlightenment in the Westem
intellectual history might be its synthesis o f rationalism and empiricism (Zeitlin 1990);
before the Enlightenment, rational philosophy had been antagonistic to empiricism.
“Reason guided by experience” is the achievement o f the Enlightenment. Newton (1642-
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1727) is one o f the first who achieved this synthesis, and the Enlightenment philosophers
are followers o f Newton. Newton found the mathematical method that would describe
mechanical motion, and he applied it universally. Through his overarching laws—the
three laws o f motion (of inertia, force, and equal reaction) and the theory o f universal
gravitation—Newton explained both the celestial and the terrestrial realms. Just as both
the celestial and the terrestrial realms are composed of material substances, so are their
motions impelled by natural mechanical forces. Newton arrived at some fundamental
principles by the analysis of observed facts and then deduced the mathematical
consequences o f these principles. Finally by observation and experiment, Newton proved
that what follows logically from the principle is in agreement with experience. In this
way, Newton gave evidence to the fact that reason and experience do not contradict each
other; the universal law (the law o f gravity) is supported by empirical data. Newton not
only explained the material world by means of relatively few fundamental laws, but also
made it possible to determine the properties and behaviors of every particle of every
material body in the universe with precision and simplicity.
The Enlighteiunent tried to apply this Newtonian science to man and society.
Condorect, one o f the representatives o f the Enlightenment, illustrated this basic project
in his famous book o f 1793, Sketch fo r a Historical Picture o f the Progress o f the Human
Mind: “The sole foundation for belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general
laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and
constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the development o f the
intellectual and moral faculties o f man than for the other operations o f nature?”
(Condorcet 1976:258). The core project o f the Enlightenment thus was to eradicate all
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conflicts prevalent during the times and to rationally reorganize the social world
according to universal laws. As Berlin (1991: 5) summarized well: “The rational
reorganization o f society would put an end to spiritual and intellectual confusion, the
reign o f prejudice and superstition, blind obedience to unexamined dogmas, and the
stupidities and cruelties o f the oppressive regimes which such intellectual darkness bred
and promoted.” As I have argued, the Enlightenment was the synthesis o f seventeenth
century rationalism and eighteenth century empiricism. While this uncomfortable
synthesis consistently manifested itself in the works o f Enlightenment thinkers,
subsequent history showed that this synthesis began to dissolve in the nineteenth century
and was completely dissolved in the twentieth century. Thus, I will analytically divide
the Enlightenment into two versions: the rationalist (or idealist) version, and the
empiricist (or materialist) version.

1-1.

The Rationalist Version o f the Enlightenment:
The Theoretical (Theoretical Science)

The scientific revolution deprived the universe o f its spiritual dimension; everything
was explained in terms o f matter and its movement. The hallmark of the rationalist
version is that it tried to retain the spiritual dimension of human beings while
simultaneously accepting the materialist implication of the scientific revolution. The
rationalist version accomplished this dual task by relying on the notion o f God. The
notion o f God was the real foundation o f the rationalist version. There were two notions
o f God: the Cartesian notion o f God and the Spinozian notion o f God. If the Cartesian
notion o f God is similar to the Platonian notion of transcendental Form, then the
Spinozian notion o f God is similar to the Aristotelian notion o f immanent form.
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Descartes (1596-1650) refuted the Aristotelian God. According to Aristotle, God
does not create, but moves the world. And God moves the world not as a mechanical
force but as the total motive o f all operations in the world. By contrast, Descartes held
that God created the world, and since then He has been entirely removed from His
creation. Thus the world is a fundamental reality that is liberated from the
anthropomorphic God. God moves the world as a mechanical force with mathematical
laws. Thus, all can be explained by mechanical and mathematical laws. In this sense,
Descartes’ God is transcendental. By contrast, Spinoza (1632-1677) borrowed the
Aristotelian notion of God as the immanent cause o f things. Spinoza held that there
exists a Supreme Being, a most perfect or necessary being, which is called “substance.”
All phenomena necessarily derive their being from a Supreme Being. In this sense, all
beings are necessarily coimected to each other.
Relying on God as the foundation, the rationalist version tried to establish an abstract
grand system of knowledge. In this grand system, just as all beings depend on God, so all
propositions depend on the First Principle. In this sense, the rationalist version retained
the medieval Thomistic and Aristotelian ideal o f a body o f knowledge that could be one
great logical system o f the deductive, the universal, and the infallible. The rationalist
version held that both God and the First Principle could be known simply by means o f a
priori reasoning without any appeal to the senses, and aimed to construct a coherent and
all-embracing account o f the universe and man. But without a Supreme Being, this
coherent and all-embracing system o f knowledge would be jeopardized because it
depends on the existence o f a Supreme Being. In this sense, a Supreme Being functions
as the foundation on which an all-embracing system o f knowledge is built.
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Many Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire (1694-1778), Condillac (1715-1780),
and D’Alembert (1717-1789) are, at least partly, indebted to the Cartesian version o f the
rationalist Enlightenment and the Spinozian version o f the rationalist Enlightenment. I
am convinced that these two versions o f the Enlightenment are a revitalization of the
ancient Greek model o f the theoretical; Platonian transcendentalism and Aristotelian
essentialism. But it is the Cartesian version rather than the Spinozian version that
dominated this era. One o f the most important reasons is that until the eighteenth century
mathematical physics rather than biology was considered as the ideal o f science. If the
Cartesian version has a selective affinity with mathematical physics, the Spinozian
version has a selective affinity with evolutionary biology. Thus, in the seventeenth and
the eighteenth centuries the Cartesian version was easily integrated into the empiricist
version o f the Enlightenment that was associated with Newtonian mathematical physics.
In what follows, I will discuss both versions in terms o f three dimensions.
Ontologically, Descartes attacked the Aristotelian view of nature as the “Great Chain
o f Being” in which each being strives to fulfill its purpose of attaining perfection in its
own way (see Lovejoy 1964). Instead, he substituted the mechanical view o f nature as a
great harmonious and mathematically ordered machine. According to Aristotle, there are
many substances such as this man, this horse, and so on, each o f which strives to fulfill its
own substance. But Descartes argued that there are only two discrete substances, mind
(thinking substance) and body (extended substance): “we can clearly perceive the mind,
that is, a thinking substance, apart fi"om the body, that is, apart from any extended
substance. And conversely we can clearly perceive the body apart from the mind (as
everyone readily admits). Therefore the mind can, at least through the power of God,
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exist without the body; and similarly the body can exist apart from the mind. Now if one
substance can exist apart from another the two are really distinct. But the mind and the
body are substances which can exist apart from each other” (Descartes 1984b: 119-120).
According to this dualism, a homogeneous substance (extension) underlies all material
phenomena while another homogeneous substance (thought) underlies all mental
phenomena.
Descartes (1985c: 232) argued that the whole universe is composed o f one matter
“whose nature consists simply in its being an extended substance.” Even though body
contains attributes other than extension, such as the sensual attributes o f colors, tastes,
sounds, etc., only extension is special because body cannot exist without extension while
it can exist without sensual attributes.
[EJxtension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature o f corporeal
substance.. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes
extension, and is merely a mode o f an extended thing.. .Thus, for
example, shape is unintelligible except in an extended thing; and motion is
unintelligible except as motion in an extended space.. By contrast, it is
possible to understand extension without shape or movement.. .(Descartes
1985c: 210-211).
Thus, an extended body contains the geometrical properties such as size, shape, and
motion. In this sense, empirically observable properties such as colors, tastes, sounds,
etc. are not essential. The real essence o f the universe is composed of matter
characterized by geometrical properties. Since geometrical properties such as size, shape,
and motion are the qualities o f nature, the qualities o f nature can be known
mathematically. In this sense, nature is written in the language o f mathematics, and its
characteristics are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures. In this way, nature
becomes physical, quantitative, and mathematical. The mathematical laws o f nature are
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etemal because God created them. God’s own nature prevents Him from changing what
He once freely created. If He changes the laws. He is not God because this change forces
Him to recognize that His creation was imperfect: “God’s perfection involves not only
his being immutable in himself, but also his operating in a manner that is always utterly
constant and immutable” (Descartes 1985c: 240). In this sense, God is transcendental.
After creating the universe. He stepped back to let it operate functionally: “[i]n the
beginning <in his omnipotence> he created matter, along with its motion and rest; and
now, merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and rest
in the material universe as he put there in the begirming” (Descartes 1985c: 240). The
universe is a self-operating machine according to etemal mathematical laws. This view is
directly connected with the monistic nature o f the universe: “the earth and the heavens
are composed of one and the same matter; and there caimot be a plurality o f worlds..
.[T]he matter whose nature consists simply in its being an extended substance already
occupies absolutely all the imaginable space in which the alleged additional worlds
would have to be located” (Descartes 1985c: 232). The universe is static, not dynamic
because God "'always preserves the same quantity o f motion in the universe" (Descartes
1985c: 240).
By contrast, Spinoza tried to retain the Aristotelian view of nature as a “Great Chain
o f Being” while simultaneously accepting the mechanical implication o f the Cartesian
universe. For Spinoza, the universe or nature is the same as God, “an absolutely infinite
entity, that is, a substance consisting o f infinite attributes, each o f which expresses etemal
and infinite essence” (Spinoza 2000: 75). Spinoza defined substance as what exists in
itself and is conceived through itself: “By substance I understand that which is in itself
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and is conceived through itself; that is, that which does not need the concept of another
thing, from which concept it must be formed” (Spinoza 2000: 75). According to this
definition, there is only one substance, God. If there are two or more substances, then
they would be understood in terms o f each other. But this violates the definition of
substance. Spinoza held that substance has an infinite number o f attributes and that all
attributes must necessarily follow from substance. If some attributes do not follow from
substance, they are not substance because they must contain something other than
themselves. Thus, substance or God has an infinite number o f attributes. As Harris
(1995: 23) explained it:
Spinoza was confident that he had shown conclusively why an absolutely
iitfinite Substance must have an infinity o f attributes. Because a thing has
attributes in proportion to its reality or perfection, the more reality it has,
the more attributes must belong to it. Its essence expresses what it is, and
its attributes express its essence; therefore, the more it encompasses, the
more attributes are needed to express its essence. If it is absolutely infinite
it must have an infinity o f attributes.
Concerning particular things, Spinoza, unlike Plato, did not hold that individual
things are no more than illusory appearances o f the one Supreme Being. Spinoza
explained any particular thing in terms o f “mode.”
A mode is any individual thing or event, any particular form or shape,
which reality transiently assumes; you, your body, your thoughts, your
group, your species, your planet, are modes; all these are forms, modes,
almost literally fashions, o f some etemal and invariable reality lying
behind and beneath them (Durant 1935: 188).
This etemal and invariable reality is God. In this sense, God is immanent, not
transcendent: “God is the immanent but not the transitive cause o f all things” (Spinoza
2000:93). God does not stand outside particular things; from God all things follow. In
this sense, God is the organizing principle o f the universe. Each mode has attributes in
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proportion to its reality or perfection. Further, “[e]ach thing, in so far as it is in itself,
endeavours to persevere in its being” (Spinoza 2000:171). And through this endeavour,
each thing also expresses the power of God in a certain way, because the power o f God is
expressed in and through each o f its finite modifications. Thus, the universe is the
hierarchical series o f diversified finite modes that endeavoiu: to persevere in their beings.
What is at stake here is that “mere addition o f finites does not produce the infinite, which
is not an aggregate nor compoimded of separable parts, each independently real” (Harris
1995: 32). The true infinite being, God or the universe, is a single and coherent whole.
Spinoza recognized that there is also a causal relationship among particular things
themselves: “[e]very particular thing, or, any thing which is finite and has a determinate
existence, cannot exist or be determined to operate unless it is determined to existence
and operation by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence”
(Spinoza 2000:98). All this causal activity takes place in God, a single and coherent
whole. Thus, for Spinoza the imiverse is an enclosed and unified system in which the
entire imiverse with all its complexities is a manifestation o f one single reality, God: “In
Nature there exists nothing contingent, but all things have been determined by the
necessity of the divine nature to exist and operate in a certain way” (Spinoza 2000: 99).
Thus, everything that exists exists o f necessity. But this necessity is not a mechanical,
causal necessity but a “logical” necessity. As God’s existence follows logically from the
concept of God, the existence o f all other things follows logically from God’s existence.
To say that God causes all things is to say that all things are a “logical” consequence o f
God. Thus, a logically necessary relationship is a timeless relationship; it is not affected
by time.
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On the nature o f man, Descartes as a Platonian critical philosopher wanted to retain
the spiritual dimension o f human beings by arguing that extension is the essence o f body
and thought is the essence o f mind. According to Aristotle, soul and body are integral to
each other. Soul is to body as form is to matter. But according to Descartes, soul and
body are totally separated. Soul or mind is incorporeal because it is not extended. Put it
differently, the mind does not occupy space, and can exist without body. The mind
contains attributes other than thought, such as feeling and sensation, but only thought is
special because mind cannot exist without thought while it can exist without feeling and
sensation. The Cartesian mind is an active subject whose essence is thought. Since the
senses are not always stimulated, the mind must produce thoughts itself. Thus the
Cartesian mind is free from bondage to sense. The Cartesian mind is the rational,
autonomous and self-contained subject; it needs nothing in order to think or generate
ideas. Thus, Descartes proposed a dualistic worldview that categorically differentiates
mental phenomena and material phenomena. What is at issue here is that Descartes
argued that the human mind can grasp material reality consisting o f matter without any
sensory experience. This dualism posited a fundamental difficulty. As Randall (1954:
269) pointed out: “The picture that the mind perceives in experience and the real world
that physics depicts seemed totally different; how, then, could the mind be certain that its
physics was a genuine knowledge of the world in which man was really living?”
Descartes answered this question by arguing that man is a “thinking thing.” In this sense,
man is exceptional. Only man is a “thinking thing” whose thought is identical to his
body: “I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking”
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(Descartes 1984a: 18). This axiom excludes dimensions o f human beings other than pure
reason and its identical body, such as the unconscious.
By contrast, Spinoza’s concept o f man is that of a living organism which endeavours
to persevere in his own being. Like other finite modes, man is a finite mode o f substance,
a part o f Nature. But man’s essence is characterized by his ability to attain the
intellectual knowledge o f God. This argument seems to be self-contradictory because it
assumes that finite man can know infinite God. Spinoza solved this problem by
proposing that man is the unity o f body and mind. Spinoza rejected Descartes’ dualism
because he believed that if this dualism were true there would be an arbitrary relationship
between mind and body. According to Spinoza, mind and body are one and the same
thing because they are two main attributes o f God: “Thought is an attribute o f God, or,
God is a thinking thing” (Spinoza 2000:114); “Extension is an attribute o f God, or, God
is an extended thing” (Spinoza 2000: 115). God expresses Himself in and through His
attributes such as thought and extension. Thus, matter (extension) and mind (thought) are
attributes o f one substance that is God. The human mind is the idea o f the human body.
Thus, the nature of the human mind depends on the nature o f the human body. Compared
to other bodies, “The human body is composed o f very many individuals o f a diverse
nature, each o f which is highly composite” (Spinoza 2000: 130). Likewise, “The idea
which constitutes the formal being o f the human mind is not simple, but is composed of
very many ideas” (Spinoza 2000: 131). “The human body is capable o f perceiving very
many things, and the more so, the more its body can be disposed in several ways”
(Spinoza 2000:131). And thus, “to the extent that some body is more capable than others
o f doing several things at the same time, or o f being acted on at the same time, to that
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extent its mind is more capable than others o f perceiving several things at the same time”
(Spinoza 2000:125). Accordingly, the human body and the human mind are complex,
and man can acquire knowledge of God’s etemal and infinite essence because God’s
essence is best expressed in and through the most complex body and mind like human
body and mind.
Epistemologically, Descartes as a Platonian critical philosopher revitalized Platonian
apriorism that believes in the possibility o f a priori knowledge of the etemal tmths. This
belief presupposes that there are universal tmths to be discovered and, furthermore, that
all human beings are naturally equipped with the ability to gain access to the etemal
tmths because “God not only created the etemal tmths, he also created our minds in such
a way that we possess an innate capacity to understand them” (Osier 1994: 130). God
guaranteed there is a necessary coimection between etemal tmths and rational human
minds: “what I took just now as a mle, namely that everything we conceive very clearly
and very distinctly is tme, is assured only for the reasons that God is or exists, that he is a
perfect being, and that everything in us comes from him. It follows that our ideas or
notions, being real things and coming from God, cannot be anything but tme, in every
respect in which they are clear and distinct” (Descartes 1985b: 130). Descartes further
held that the etemal tmths are characterized by abstract or pure mathematics. In other
words, physical reality itself is fundamentally mathematical because it consists o f matter
whose essence is “extension.” Mental reality itself is also fundamentally mathematical
because God created human mind in such a way that the human being possesses an innate
capacity to understand mathematical tmths o f the physical world. The necessary
connection between etemal tmths and the human mind is fundamentally mathematical.
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Thus, other empirically observable attributes o f things are not essential because they do
not show mathematical essence of things.
As a method, mathematics is primarily characterized by deduction. Mathematics
provides certainty and clarity because mathematics is concerned with subject matter so
clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted. Thus mathematics starts with a subject matter
(the First Principle), and by indubitably necessary steps develops an abstract grand
system of knowledge that is absolutely certain. Like mathematics, any true science
should start with the First Principle that is simple and certain. Systematic doubt is a first
strategy that aims to achieve the First Principle. From this First Principle, other
propositions should necessarily follow, which should finally establish an abstract grand
system o f knowledge. Thus, Descartes believed in unity o f science, i.e., universal
applicability o f mathematics to all areas o f human inquiry.
Epistemologically, Spinoza did not seem to be much different fi-om Descartes. In his
Ethics, Spinoza, like Euclid, began his work with definitions, axioms, and postulates.
And firom these he claimed to derive, by rigorous logical deduction, a number of
propositions. Thus, many scholars have interpreted Spinoza’s method as mathematical
deduction. But there is a fundamental difference between mathematical deduction and
Spinoza’s deduction on the nature o f the First Principle. If for Descartes the First
Principle is the abstract universal, for Spinoza the First Principle is the concrete
universal, God. Spinozian God is not an abstract transcendental entity but a concrete,
immanent organizing principle o f the universe. Thus, God as the First Principle is not a
simple atomic axiom, but the infinite whole firom which other propositions necessarily
follow. Thus, Spinoza’s “conception o f method is not the linear formal deduction o f
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traditional logic, but is a crypto-dialectical development o f the structural implications o f a
systematic whole” (Harris 1995: 13). The whole development of deduction is implicit
from the start because God as the First Principle is the whole one from which all others
necessarily follow.
In this way, Spinoza believed that this deductive and infallible science would soon
exhaust all experimentation and be able to dispense with every appeal to experience.
This triumphant optimism is based on the core idea o f rationalism, i.e., one that “The
order and connection o f ideas is the same as the order and connection o f things, and
conversely the order and connection o f things is the same as the order and connection o f
ideas” (Spinoza 2000: 290). We can conceive o f substance under the attribute o f thought,
or under the attribute o f extension, but in both we shall find the same order because God
expresses itself in and through both thought and extension. As Spinoza (2000: 118)
explained:
[T]hinking substance and extended substance is one and the same
substance, which is understood now under this and now under that
attribute. So also a mode of extension and the idea o f that mode is one
and the same thing, but expressed in two w ays.. For example, a circle
existing in Nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God,
is one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes.
Thus, Spinoza did not try to analyze the truth o f a proposition in terms o f its
correspondence with facts. Rather, he tried to analyze the truth of a proposition in terms
of the coherence which it has with the total system o f assertions within which it belongs.
Just as any given action or reaction can be fully accounted for only in terms o f its relation
to the structure of the universe as a whole, so any given proposition can be fully
accounted for only in terms o f its relation to the total system o f assertions as a whole.
Thus, truth does not have to appeal to the fallible testimony o f the sense experience.
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On the direction o f history, Descartes believed that history is a progressive process o f
mastering and possessing nature by means o f instrumental knowledge. Descartes did not
believe that the universe is moving toward some final end because the universe is perfect.
Rather, the universe is rationally operating according to eternal mathematical laws. As
such, Descartes believed that human society can be advanced only if human beings know
the eternal mathematical truth o f the universe, and then control it for the welfare o f
human beings.
Through this [practical] philosophy we could know the power and action
of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens and all the other bodies in our
environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts o f our artisans;
and we could use this knowledge—as —e artisans use theirs— for all the
purpose for which it is appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were,
the lords and masters o f nature (Descartes 1985b: 142-143).
Unlike Descartes, Spinoza retained the traditional view that conceived of the whole o f
history as the unfolding of God’s plan to build up the heavenly city until its final triumph
at the end o f the world. But unlike the traditional view, it is human reason that writes the
drama of history as the realization o f human beings, because God is immanent in human
reason. Unlike the traditional drama o f salvation, this drama is “within” the reach of
human reason because God as the organizing principle o f the universe is immanent in
human beings. In this sense, history is the self-realization o f God.
One o f the most important moral implications o f the rationalist version of the
Enlightenment is its monistic notion o f ethics: there is a true universal ethics that is valid
across time and space. According to Descartes, human beings can acquire universal
ethics only when they complete the grand system o f knowledge. Thus, Descartes (quoted
in Morgan 1994:2) defined morals as “the highest and most perfect moral system, which
presupposes a complete knowledge o f the other sciences and is the ultimate level of
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wisdom.” If we want true knowledge, we should eliminate the physical dimension of
knowledge because that is not certain. This necessarily leads to the control o f the body
by the mind. If we complete the grand system o f knowledge through the mathematical
deduction from the first self-evident axioms, then everyday moral problems would solve
themselves.
Spinoza also proposed a monistic notion of ethics. “In so far as,” argued Spinoza
(2000: 249), “men live in accordance with the guidance o f reason, to that extent alone
they always necessarily agree in natiure.” But he also held that “The endeavour to
preserve oneself is the first and unique basis o f virtue” (Spinoza 2000: 242).
Synthesizing the two arguments, Spinoza (2000:243) held that “In our case, to act
absolutely in accordance with virtue is simply to act, live, and preserve one’s being (these
three mean the same) in accordance with the guidance of reason, and on the basis o f
looking for what is useful to oneself’ (Spinoza 2000: 243). This argument is based on his
assumption that all men share a common nature and that, insofar as all men act to benefit
themselves, their actions must be beneficial to other men.
A political implication o f Cartesian rationalism is a kind of conservatism that tries to
preserve the status quo forever. Just as the universe is a self-operating perfect system, so
society should be a self-operating perfect system. Just as the eternal mathematical laws
o f nature regulate the parts so as to keep the total structural pattern constant, so the
eternal mathematical laws o f society should regulate individuals so as to keep the total
structural patterns o f society constant. For this constancy o f society or perfection o f
society is possible only when a few scientists know perfectly the eternal law and apply it
to society. In this way, elitism is inunanent in Cartesian rationalism.
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A political implication o f Spinozian rationalism is a kind o f centralized
totalitarianism. Spinoza did not conceive o f the whole merely as an aggregate of
elements that are regarded as logically prior to and existentially independent of the
whole. Rather, it is the whole that is regarded as logically prior to individuals. Just as
the whole is prior to the part and the principle of its structure is immanent in every part,
so society as the whole is prior to its individual members and the principle of its structure
should be immanent in every individual. For this, the state as the representative o f the
whole should control individuals so as to make them contribute to the whole society: “For
it comes first to be considered that just as in the state of nature that man is strongest and
most his own master (suiJuris) who is guided by reason, so also that state will be most
powerful and most fully suiJuris which is founded on and directed by reason. For the
right o f a state is determined by the power o f a people (multitudo) which is led as if by
one mind. And this union o f minds could by no means be conceived, unless the state
does all it can to aim at what sound reason shows to be good for all men” (Spinoza,
quoted in Harris 1995:122).

1-2.

The Empiricist Version o f the Enlightenment:

The Technically Practical (Empirical Science)
The empiricist version o f the Enlightenment revitalized the ancient Greek tradition o f
the technically practical, which had been long forgotten with the rise o f Christianity (see
Vitzthum 1995). The empiricist version o f the Enlightenment is rooted in the
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiricists such as Bacon (1561-1626), Hobbes
(1588-1679), Locke (1632-1704), and the British and Scottish sensationalists. It also
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flourished in France where French materialists such as Helvetius (1715-1771) and
d ’Holbach (1723-1789) revitalized the ancient Greek tradition o f the technically
practical. Concerning the problem o f God, the empiricist version took a moderate atheist
position. If God exists, it is not the anthropomorphic Christian God but the Cartesian
efficient cause or the Newtonian mathematical God. The empiricist version did not want
to push atheism to the extreme because if it does, the entire universe becomes absurd. It
just put aside the problem o f the First Cause while rejecting the Final cause. While the
empiricist version believed that the universe is rationally operating, it rejected the very
basis o f the rationalist claim to achieve a priori knowledge on the nature o f things
because it did not believe in innatism, i.e., the doctrine that the mind can generate its own
ideas out o f nothing. Rather, it believed that all human knowledge derives ultimately
from sensory experience. In this sense, the empiricist version o f the Enlightenment might
be said to be the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century version o f the technically practical
model of knowledge.
Ontologically, the empiricist version rejected the traditional dualism o f spirit and
matter, holding that only matter exists. D’Holbach represented this view. According to
d ’Holbach, the whole o f reality is matter endowed motion. Matter is not created by the
external agent but is self-existent. Matter has existed from the beginning and will never
cease to exist. But even though matter is eternal, its manifestations and forms have their
beginnings and endings. According to d’Holbach, matter is composed o f primitive
elements, which might be called atoms and which are specifically different from each
other: air, fire, earth, and water. While human beings are incapable o f directly knowing
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the essence of these four elements, they can apprehend the properties o f the elements
only through their effects on human senses. As Pecharroman (1977; 31-32) put it:
These four elements are composed of discrete molecules which differ in
volume, in position in space, and in specific properties. These properties
of extension, mobility, divisibility, solidity, gravity and inert force make
sensible experience possible.
In this sense, matter is all that affects our senses. Those objects o f which man does
not have sensible knowledge do not exist in this scheme. If those objects exist, they are
material. Spirit does not exist. If spirit exists, it is material. Thus, everything can be
explained in terms o f diversified arrangement and combination of these four elements.
There seems to be infinite ways of arranging and combining these four elements since the
elements o f matter are in a state o f constant and reciprocal movement. But the elements
o f matter move mechanically according to the general law o f attraction. Thus, d’Holbach
(quoted in Vitzthum 1995:69) held that “[njature is but an immense chain of causes and
effects, which unceasingly flow from each other.”
Applying this ontology to society, the empiricist version saw society as a mechanistic
machine governed by iron causality. It definitely broke with the Christian
anthropomorphic view in which the universe and society are conceived as an organic
whole that was created and operated by the personal supreme Intelligence. It did not
need a force to set matter in motion because it believed that matter moves by its own
peculiar energies that are inherent in itself. Concerning society, tlie empiricist version
put aside the problem o f the First Cause while rejecting the Final cause. Everything is
mechanically determined through an uninterrupted succession o f causes and effects. In
this scheme, the universe is nothing more than an essentially rational and harmonious
machine. As d’Holbach (quoted in Randall 1954:274) put it:
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The universe, that vast assemblage o f everything that exists, presents only
matter and motion: the whole offers to our contemplation nothing but an
immense, an uninterrupted succession o f causes and effects.. .Nature,
therefore, in its most extended signification, is the great whole that results
firom the assemblage o f matter, under its various combinations, with that
contrariety of motions, which the universe offers to our view.
Applying this ontology to man, the empiricist version refuted the traditional dualism
o f mind and body, considering man as matter endowed with motion. It did not accept
Descartes’ belief that the mind can generate its own ideas, nor did it believe that innate
structures can utilize sense-data in a peculiarly human fashion. Thus, the human being is
not an exception in the natural world. It is Locke who first developed this view. For
Locke the human mind is a blank and empty state at birth, and thus, it is mechanical and
malleable; it can be molded by accumulation and recombination o f the data o f
experience. “The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet;
and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the
memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts
them, and by degrees learns the use o f general names ”(Locke 1928: 99). Following and
modifying Locke, the empiricist version reduced mental activity to the faculties o f
sensation and memory. According to this material psychology, “the judgment is a
mechanical process o f material organs, ‘produced only by the meetings o f all that has
struck our senses’” (Crocker 1959: 117). As a result, it denied the existence o f the soul.
The soul is only an activity of the brain. Through experience, the soul is formed. Thus,
body and soul form an indivisible material unity that ends in death. The empiricist
version also rejected the rationalists’ belief that human beings are bom equipped with
reason. It believed that reason is the most humane faculty, but that it is not given at birth.
Rather, reason is formed through experience. Thus, D’Holbach (quoted in Randall 1954:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

265) held that “the faculty we have of gaining experiences, o f remembering them, o f
calling to mind their effects, constitutes what we designate by the word reason. Without
experience there can be no reason.”
The hallmark of methodology o f the empiricist version is that it does not have to look
for the First Cause o f motion o f matter because it believes that motion forms an allencompassing and eternal circle o f generation and destruction, which has had no
beginning and will have no end. As Pecharroman (1977: 34-35) put it:
[T]here is no need for a Cartesian or external agent to explain motion in
matter since motion derives from the properties o f matter as such. Since
motion derives from the properties inherent in matter, and properties
constitute the essence o f a thing, we can construct mentally the essence o f
things by apprehending their movements which affect our senses.
Instead, the empiricist version proposed reductionism: reductionism reduces complex
data or phenomena to simple terms. Just as all phenomena can be reduced step by step to
simpler phenomena and finally the simplest atoms, all propositions about empirical
phenomena can be reduced step by step the simplest propositions about atoms. The
empiricist version believed that sensations are the first source o f knowledge. Truth
cannot be grasped except through direct experimentation. The empiricist version did not
favor deductive reasoning from the First Principle because it did not decide in advance
what course nature actually follows. It held that only by experimental reasoning can
matters of fact be determined.
Concerning the direction of history, the empiricist version proposed a secularized
version of progressivism. For the first time in Western history, it combined the three
different kinds of progress. This progressivism had some distinctive features. First is a
kind o f technical determinism. Von Wright (1997: 7) called this the “Great Idea o f
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Progress”: “We have distinguished three different kinds o f progress. One is progress in
science and technology. Another is the improvement o f the material well-being of
individuals and societies. A third is moral perfection. The Great Idea of Progress was
the thought that the first type o f progress has an instrumental role in promoting the other
two types—the accumulative and linear nature o f the first being a warrant o f life
becoming progressively easier and manners more civilized.” In this technical
determinism, the cumulative growth of technology and science was itself regarded as
progress. Second is that it is this-world-oriented rather than other-world-oriented
progressivism. The pivotal force that moves the world is human beings, not God.
Paradise is not in the past world that God made, but will be in the fiiture world human
beings are now making. Third is that it is optimistic. The empiricist version believed
that man could “control his own destiny, make his own laws as he pleases, build on
indestructible foimdations, and be fi’ee and wise and rational for ever” (Berlin 1976: 76).
Last is that the Enlightenment view of progress believed that science has a transcultural
(i.e., universal) character. Scientific knowledge is not the exclusive secret o f the Western
people but can be open to anybody who has the requisite training. Thus, the transcultural
diffusion of scientific knowledge and o f technology was considered to be progress.
One o f the important moral implications of this view is a secular hedonism. In the
empiricist version, the concept o f immortality vanished because it believed that there is
no spiritual soul. With the death o f the body, the soul disappears because it is merely an
activity of the brain. This resulted in a definite break with traditional Christian morality,
in which man is supposed to expect postmortem rewards for his spiritual control over
corporeal desires. Thus, the empiricist version confi'onted the following questions: “if
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there was no heavenly reward after death, what was left? Why should any man deny
himself? Why suffer persecution for truth and justice without compensation here or
hereafter?” (Becker 1963:148). It is not surprising that man seeks his happiness “within
this world” where only matter exists. Man is supposed to follow the general law o f
motion o f matter because man is also matter in motion. Just as every matter incessantly
moves in order to maintain itself as matter, so is it natural for man to incessantly move in
order to preserve itself as matter. In this sense, man’s desire to preserve himself is
natural. Thus, D’Holbach identified self-interest or self-love with the good. Human selfinterest is always material since man is simply matter. In this scheme, “the happiest man
is the man with the fewest material needs and the ability to satisfy the needs he has”
(Pecharroman 1977:92).
This secular hedonism is directly connected with utilitarianism. Just as motion o f
matter keeps the mutual interdependence o f bodies alive, so man’s activity keeps the
mutual interdependence of other men alive. Just as motion o f matter aligns itself with the
general motion o f other matter, so man’s activity should align itself with the general
activities o f other men. Even though utility suggests social way of attaining self-interest,
the emphasis is put on self-interest. Utilitarian behaviorism is an eminent expression o f
this: all humans like pleasure and dislike pain, and consequently, human beings act to
maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain. This descriptive law provides a basis
from which a normative law, i.e., one that this law is the only objective that is morally
worthy, derives.
One o f the most significant political implications is a liberal (bourgeoisie) democracy
in which every (bourgeois) individual will enjoy his/her natural right, freedom, which
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was previously violated by medieval institutional arrangements. Democracy bases itself
on an essentialist notion o f a unitary and universal rational agent, the bearer o f universal
rights. The empiricist version justified this concept of human rights on the basis of
natural law. Natural law was the law that nature imposed on all living creatures. For the
human being, the natural right imposed by natural law was the utilitarian principle in
which man acts to maximize his pleasure and minimize his pain. Every individual acts
morally because s/he has universal reason, the capability of calculating utility. This
individual is seen primarily like a merchant. On the social level, the concept o f natural
right also refers to “what must be done if political institutions were to survive, as well as
to what ought to be done if justice were to be secured. If humans were not granted their
natural rights, existing political institutions would inevitably be rent by discord and
overthrown; they should be replaced by institutions that were in harmony with natural
rights” (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 12). Social institutions provided
opportimities for the merchant’s maximization o f utility. Thus the primary social
institution was the market: “Social relationships are therefore viewed as ‘opportunity
structures’ or means which are rationally assessed by each and every individual. It is as
if every member o f the human race, possessing fi'ee will, is in the marketplace with
freedom to choose between various institutions and institutional identities”
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 21).
In short, the Enlightenment was an effort at the scientization o f ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics. This effort largely dominated the imagination o f
modem thinkers who tried to realize this idea at the institutional level. The following
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points summarize the basic ideas o f the Enlightenment as the scientization o f ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
1) The Enlightenment as the scientization o f ontology: Being and essence are
universals that are true regardless o f time and space. Non-being and appearance are
particulars that are copies o f being and essence. This ontology is directly applied to
society and man. The rationalists saw society as the neatly ordered hierarchy of being, all
leading up to one Supreme Being. The empiricists saw society as a mechanistic machine
governed by iron causality. Society is nothing more than a rational and harmonious
machine in which everything is mechanically determined through an uninterrupted
succession o f causes and effects. The rationalists saw man as a rational, autonomous, and
unified subject. Man’s essence is mind, not body, which propels man to move towards
God. The empiricists saw man as a pure, transparent matter that moves according to the
general law of motion o f matter.
2) The Enlightenment as the scientization of epistemology: The Enlightenment
assumed that the order and cotmection o f ideas is the same as the order and connection o f
things. Scientific knowledge mirrors reality. For rationalists, it is the structure o f mind
that mirrors reality. For empiricists, it is the structure of reality that is mirrored in the
receptive mind. Here, language is a transparent tool to reflect reality as it is. In this
scheme, being, language, and knowledge are equated: “being, language, knowledge are
self-evident, neutral and transparent terms. Being can be known and experienced in its
intimacy; language transfers meaning neutrally without interfering in the underlying
thoughts it ‘expresses’; knowledge undistortedly reflects reality in truthful
representations” (Grosz 1989: 28). There is a vantage point from which reality is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

faithfully represented. This vantage point is objective science in which subjective
elements are totally erased for the equation o f being, language, and knowledge.
3)

The Enlightenment as the scientization o f ethics/politics: The Enlightenment had a

linear sense o f temporality, according to which history is moving towards betterment. To
rationalists, this movement is teleologically determined. To empiricists, this movement is
mechanically determined. The Enlightenment believed that there is a true universal
ethics that is valid across space and time. To rationalists, this ethics refers to the control
o f body by mind for the future rewards. To empiricists, this ethics refers to living
according to the universal law of maximization of pleasure and minimization o f pain.
Thus, ethics is reduced to the capability of calculating utility. Politically, the
Enlightenment proposed two positions. Rationalists proposed centralized totalitarianism
in which all beings lead up to one Supreme Being. Empiricists proposed liberalism in
which all individuals, whose nature is the same in regards to utilitarian principle, enjoy
their natural rights. But both o f them believed that all individuals should be totally
integrated into society.

2. The Counter-Enlightenment as the Moralization o f Ontology,
Epistemology, and Ethics/Politics
The Counter-Enlightenment is the term that refers to the counter-forces
against/alongside the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries
(Berlin 1979). Berlin, who coined the term Counter-Enlightenment, used it as a
complement o f dogmatic rationalism (see Berlin and Jahanbegloo 1992: 70). According
to this definition, the Counter-Enlightenment complemented the extremity o f the
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Enlightenment by recovering the morally practical (morality) o f the ancient Greeks and
Renaissance humanism. In this scheme, the Enlightenment and the CounterEnlightenment are partly complementary. The Counter-Enlightenment is rooted in Vico
(1668-1744) and developed in the writings of Hamann (1730-1788) and Herder (17441803) (see Berlin 1976,1979, 1993). Vico distinguished the realm o f human society
from the realm o f nature, and thus was very critical of the application of Newtonian
science to the realm o f human society. Vico believed that human beings can not
understand the world o f external nature because they did not create it. Human beings can
understand only what they create; mere observers can not understand what they did not
create.
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so
remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a
truth beyond all question: that the world o f civil society has certainly been
made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the
modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot
but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the
study o f the world o f nature, which, since God made it. He alone knows;
and that they should have neglected the study o f world o f nations, or civil
world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know (Vico
1968:96).
All human beings could do then is to just observe and to interpret what they did not
create. Only God can fully understand Nature because He made it. Concerning the
existence and nature of God, Vico took an agnostic position: God is beyond the reach o f
human faculties. The nature o f physical nature is also beyond the reach o f human
faculties because it is made by God. Human beings can only know the social world that
they made. In this way, Vico shifted the focus from God and physical nature to human
society. Like empiricists, Vico rejected the very basis o f the rationalist claim to achieve
a priori knowledge o f the nature o f things. But Vico also rejected the very basis o f the
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empiricist claim that all human knowledge derives ultimately from sensory experience.
Rather, Vico situated epistemology in concrete historical situation.
On the nature o f society, Vico tried to give balance to a mechanistic worldview,
retaining and revising the traditional Aristotelian organicist view of the world in which
society is conceived as a whole structure. Vico refuted divine Providence o f the Creator
and proposed a man-made cultural logic which assigned an appropriate function to every
institution. Vico, in fact, did not desert the notion o f Providence but rather revised it.
Vico believed that we can not know the divine Providence o f the Creator until we came
to historically reconstruct historical facts, i.e., “the story of men’s daily lives and
activities on earth, which alone revealed the pattern which determined what men were,
had been and might have been, could and would be” (Berlin 1976: 73). Vico saw society
as a man-made organism, not a transcendental entity. Society is a man-made cultural
community, where people speak the same language, live on the same soil, and possess the
same habits, a communal past and common memories. Thus, men do not create society
from thin air; rather, men create society on a historical pattern that predecessors happened
to make. This historical pattern is not always an invention o f men’s intentional actions;
rather, it is an “unintended result” because men freely act within narrow limits that
predecessors happened to set up. Not everything is predictable, because there is space for
choice even though limits exist. Vico felt that certain structural transformations were
deconstructing the old man-made cultural logic without giving human beings sufficient
time to make a new cultural logic. In this sense, Vico saw his time as a transient era from
the old man-made cultural logic to a new one.
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On the nature o f man, Vico believed that man is a cultural being who participates in a
cultural community. Vico emphasized the negative impact of the structural
transformation o f traditional institutions on people. Vico felt that human beings are
becoming like atomic mechanical matter. Vico held that this does not mean a process o f
achieving freedom and autonomy of individuals but rather a process o f dehumanization
and alienation. This negative position came from the fact that Vico retained the
Renaissance ideal o f the human being as a whole being. Vico secularized this ideal o f the
whole being, arguing that man creates himself by way o f creating society; “for him
[Vico] human nature, in the course o f seeking to satisfy its needs, cannot help
transforming itself, and so constantly generates new characteristics, new needs, new
categories of thought and action” (Berlin 1976: 37-38). Thus, the growth o f man goes
together with the growth o f institutional life of society. The whole being who belongs to
a cultural community is characterized by his/her wholeness within him/herself,
uniqueness and freedom, which is possible only in the process o f his/her communion with
society. According to this tradition, human beings can not be reduced to a part o f a
machine that has only a specific function, because they are assumed to be like a selfsufficient cosmos. Human beings are also assumed to be an integral part o f society;
without society, human beings can not achieve self-sufficiency because it is human
beings who made society. Vico lamented the situation in which human beings are
reduced to atomic matter, robbed of their spirituality, and totally disconnected from the
larger society, and in which they think and act in accordance with the seemingly
universal law o f utility maximization.
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Although Vico also characterized man mainly as a rational being, he did not restrict
the notion o f reason to the universal law o f utility maximization, which exists across time
and space. Rather, Vico extended the notion o f reason so as to imply a dynamic
complexity situated in specific history and tradition in which human beings live, feel,
desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. In this new interpretation o f reason,
reason is seen as a historical product produced in specific historical, social, cultural,
economic, and geographical contexts of each society. Vico was well aware that
contemporary society tended to reduce hiunan reason into a capacity o f calculating utility
and to change the nature o f social interaction between people into a kind o f exchange of
utility. Against this, Vico wanted to use its notion of reason as the source o f identity o f
human beings and to make interaction between individuals into rational as well as nonrational ones based on historically and socially shared values, customs, habits, memories,
etc. Based on a re-evaluation of the medieval and the Renaissance order, Vico
recognized how important tradition, culture, and history are when human beings live,
feel, desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. Thus, every society has its own
reason, because every society has its own specific tradition, culture, and history. Every
individual also has its own reason, but this reason is similar to other individuals’ reasons,
because every individual reason is constructed within the same community.
Epistemologically, Vico distinguished the humanities from the natural sciences.
Human beings are primarily cultural; they feel, think, and act through their common
language, culture, and tradition. Thus, Vico rejected the Enlightenment view of
mathematical language that is assumed to be free o f all contexts. Rather, Vico believed
that “a particular type o f locution, the use and structure o f a language, has a necessary.
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‘organic’ connection with particular types o f political and social structure, o f religion, of
law, o f economic life, o f morality, o f theology, of military organization, and so on”
(Berlin 1976: 51). In place of rationalist or empiricist epistemology, Vico emphasized
the poetic, artistic, intuitive, traditional, historical, and linguistic approaches to life and
knowledge. In the New Science, Vico sought to discover the poetic logic (New Science)
and set it up against the rational logic of the experimental-mathematical knowledge
(natural sciences). For Vico, myth is neither fictional nor as irrational as the rationalists
argue. It is the true narration that people made. As Vico (1968:21-22) put it:
We find that the principle o f these origins both of languages and o f letters
lies in the fact that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of
nature, were poets who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery, which
is the master key o f this Science, has cost us the persistent research o f
almost all our literary life, because with our civilized natures we
[modems] cannot at all imagine and can understand only by great toil the
poetic nature of these first men.
Thus, it can be said that Vico recognized that reality is poetically or discursively
constructed. In this sense, Vico already took a linguistic turn: “Vico, like many modem
interpretive social theorists, could establish his New Science only after he had taken a
linguistic tum: he saw that inasmuch as the world in which men live is a world of
institutions based on language, the task o f the human sciences most resembles, and must
be modelled on, the interpretation o f texts” (Mali 1992:4). Through reading the
collective symbolic figures and myths, we can understand the lives o f the people who
made them.
Vico, who recognized the embeddedness o f reason in culture and history, held that
the diversity and multiplicity of life cannot be completely grasped by abstract and
mathematical reasoning. Absolute objectivity and universal validity o f knowledge that
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the Enlightenment envisioned is impossible because the human subject is always situated
in concrete culture and society. Human reason is not a priori but a historical capacity. In
other words, human reason is part of life and history and, therefore, it is limited by its
own historicity. Various non-rational approaches to knowledge and language shape
consciousness o f human beings, and they are in tum shaped by the stmcture of culture.
Each culture has its own categories and definitions, and thus, it should be understood
internally in terms o f its own cultural categories, values, and standards. Vico, thus,
preferred history to mathematics when he studied the social world. “The nature o f
institutions is,” argued Vico (1968:64), “nothing but their coming into being
(nascimento) at certain times and in certain guises. Whenever the time and guise are thus
and so, such and not otherwise are the institutions that come into being.” Thus, Vico was
very critical o f all theorists who did not understand the systematically developing and
altering succession o f outlooks and motives, such as natural law theorists, social contract
theorists, utilitarians, individualists, materialists, and rationalists. From this perspective,
a comparative-historical method is preferred. The key to all tmth and value lies in
history, rather than in abstract rationality. Knowledge produced by human subjects
situated in their concrete culture and society is always partial and relative.
In addition to this comparative-historical view, an interpretive or sympathetic method
was welcomed for understanding real human beings. Berlin (1999:44-45) summarized
the doctrine o f Hamann, who was one o f the fathers of Romanticism as follows:
[I]f you really wish to enter into contact with human beings, if you really
wish to understand what they think, what they feel and what they are, then
you must understand every gesture, every nuance, you must watch their
eyes, you must observe the movement o f their lips, you must hear their
words, you must understand their handwriting, and then you come to
direct acquaintance with the actual sources of life. Anything less than
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that, the attempt to translate a man’s language into another language, to
classify all his various movements by some anatomical or physiognomical
means, to try to put him into a box with a lot o f other people and produce a
learned volume which will simply classify him as one o f a species, one o f
a type, that is the way to miss all knowledge, that is the way to kill, that is
the way to apply concepts and categories, hollow baskets, to the
palpitating, unique, asymmetrical, unclassifiable flesh o f living human
experience.
On the direction o f history, Vico criticized the “Great Idea of Progress” by
revitalizing the Greek cyclic view of history. Vico saw history in terms o f rise, growth,
decline, and fall o f both the mental life o f men and the institutional life o f society.
Basing himself on his study o f the Greek and Roman societies, Vico argued that all
societies pass through essentially the same stages o f development; Age o f the Gods, Age
of the Heroes, and Age o f Men. But particular societies traverse this path in different
ways and with varying tempo because they have their own individualities. Vico thus
agreed with some arguments of the Enlightenment view on human progress, but he
recognized that achievement has a cost. The Age o f Men is the most developed state, but
it also signifies decadence, which might in tum lead to a beginning o f a new cycle. Vico
recognized the gradual progress o f science and technology and the improvement o f
material life o f individual and society, but he lamented that these sorts o f progress injured
the moral perfection o f men and society. Thus, Vico explained the structural
transformation o f the West in terms of the alienation and fragmentation o f human beings.
In Vico’s eyes, this transformation tended to reduce the whole individual into a mere
function as well as to detach the individual from his/her community with which s/he has
to be in harmony. But Vico was not totally pessimistic; Vico believed that a new cycle
would start again. This new and upcoming society or civilization might be totally
different from the old one. It will have its own life cycle o f rise, growth, decline, and fall
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of both the mental life o f men and the institutional life o f society, operating according to
its own law. Nevertheless, Vico did not believe that the history o f mankind showed the
total diversity o f man. It is rather Herder who argued this: “Only in Herder’s early work
o f 1774 do we find the historicist position formulated in its radical form: the conception
that every age must be viewed in terms of its own immediate values; that there is no
progress or decline in history, but only value-filled diversity” (Iggers 1983: 30).
The moral implications o f this view are partly antithetical and partly complementary
to the Enlightenment view. Unlike the Enlightenment philosophers who tried to compose
universal ethics, Vico, who was well acquainted with anthropological and historical
works, recognized that there is no natural man whose substance is given once and for all.
Rather, there are social men who belong to a variety o f cultural communities, and thus,
there are different ethics based on each specific community. Accordingly, there is no
universal right of the human being and universal ethics valid across time and space;
rather, there are specific morals and ethics which are bound to their specific contexts.
Vico, for instance, severely attacked the seventeenth century natural law theorists who
assumed “a fixed, universal human nature, from the needs o f which it is possible to
deduce a single set o f principles o f conduct, identical everywhere, for everyone, at all
times, and constituting therefore the perennial basis o f all human laws, whatever special
modifications and adjustments might be required by changing times and circumstances.
For Vico there is no static nucleus, no unalterable minimum of this kind” (Berlin 1976:
84).
Thus, Vico was strongly against the Enlightenment utilitarianism in which morality is
equated with utility. Instead, following the Aristotelian and Christian view of human
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beings, Vico envisioned that human beings have their potential capacities as a whole
microcosm. These potential capacities can be differently achieved according to the
development o f a whole society as a macrocosm. In a decadent age when men lose their
wholeness and when hedonistic, utilitarian, and nihilistic trends prevail, morality will be
equated with utility. As critical o f this utilitarian morality o f the Age o f Men, Vico also
criticized the slave morality o f the Age o f Gods. Frightened by terror and fear o f the
uncontrollable nature, primitive men imagined and created external entities o f mysterious
authority and gave their absolute obedience to them. In a word, man is ruled by his selfmade, mysterious Gods. In this age, morality is equated with absolute obedience.
Although recognizing that any morals and ethics are possible according to their contexts,
Vico tended to prefer a kind of pietism that emphasizes spiritual rather than material life.
Vico worried about situations where the technological and scientific achievements rob
individuals o f their spiritual interests. This spiritual life is possible only in a community
in which every individual fully participates; “the spiritual activity o f men—expressed in
art and literature, religion and philosophy, laws and sciences, play and work—consists
not in the creation o f objects, o f commodities or artifacts, the value o f which resides in
themselves, and is independent of their creators and their characters and their purposes—
but in forms o f communication with other men” (Berlin 1976: xxii).
Translated into political terms, Vico envisioned the most desirable state as being a
pluralist democracy. Vico believed that the growth of men comes together with the
growth o f society. Every individual has his/her own purpose in life and s/he
simultaneously shares the same purpose as the community s/he belongs to. “Unity in
diversity” is Vico’s motto; necessity and freedom do not contradict each other. Vico
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projected as ideal society a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order.
What is at stake here is that people are spiritually unified. This does not just mean that
individuals are unified by common sense or a collective sense, but also that every
individual is pious. This pietism does not mean a passive one: “If you cannot obtain from
the world that which you really desire, you must teach yourself not to want it. If you
cannot get what you want, you must teach yourself to want what you can get” (Berlin
1999: 37). Rather, it means active pietism: Even though I can obtain from the world that
which I really desire, I will teach myself not to want it. In this sense, the individuals in a
spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order are the pious artists who have
their own inner lives. This argument seems to be self-contradictory, but it is possible
because a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order is not an object
detached from its makers, i.e., the pious artists who have their own inner lives, but is part
o f a living process o f communication between its makers. Pietism is possible only when
the individual has his own “inner” life. Moreover, self-expression is possible only for the
pious individual. In this sense self-expression is part o f the essence o f the human being
as such. Thus, a spiritually unified, communal, and group-centered order is the selfexpression o f a living process o f communication between its makers. In this way, Vico
presented a new communal order in which every individual will realize his/her potential
capacities as a whole microcosm who recognizes the purpose of the public as his/her
own.
In this society, freedom (voluntary activities of the individual) and necessity
(restrictions o f the social institutions) do not contradict each other any more. But Vico
believed that every society might achieve this goal in its own way. Vico thus did not
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encourage imperialism which aims to eliminate the diversity o f culture over the world,
but rather a pluralism which allows all kinds o f culture to flower; Vico believed that
every culture has its own inner life which would be expressed in a variety o f cultural
forms: “Every culture expresses itself in works of art, of thought, in ways o f living and
action, each of which possesses its own character which can neither be combined nor
necessarily form stages o f a single progress towards a single universal goal” (Berlin
1991:65).
In short, the Counter-Enlightenment, represented most systematically by Vico, tried
to moralize ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics against what it saw as the extreme
Enlightenment version as the scientization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
These ideas o f the Counter-Enlightenment thus criticized the dark side o f the
Enlightenment. The following are the basic ideas of the Counter-Enlightenment as the
moralization of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
1)

The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization of ontology: The distinction

between being and non-being, and between universals and particulars is historically made
by men. Thus, there are many constellations o f distinctions among being and non-being,
and universals and particulars. This ontology is applied to society and man. The
Counter-Enlightenment saw society as a man-made cultural community, where people
speak the same language, live on the same soil, and possess the same habits, a communal
past, and common memories. In this sense, every society has its own values because it
has its own specific tradition, culture and history. An ideal society is characterized by a
spiritually unified, communal, group-centered order. The Counter-Enlightenment saw
man as a historical being who creates himself by way o f creating society. Humans create
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society on the basis o f historical patterns that predecessors happened to make. Humans
behave in similarly patterned ways because they share values, customs, habits, memories,
etc. within communities. Simultaneously, human beings are expressive subjects because
they preserve their own inner life, which is not contradictory to communal life. Rather,
each individual’s inner life is made in the course o f communicating with other
individuals in the community.
2)

The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization of epistemology: The Counter-

Enlightenment also assumed that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things. Although the Counter-Enlightenment believed the
equation of being, language, and knowledge, it claimed that there are many constellations
o f equation o f being, language, and knowledge in the human world. Thus, the form of
the equation o f being, language, and knowledge differs from one to another culture. It is
the practice o f human subjects that construct the equation of being, language, and
knowledge. What is important here is the contextual nature o f the human subject. The
human subject is always situated in and limited by his own culture and society. The
human subject as an epistemological subject is the carrier of the lived experience which is
mediated by his/her specific cultural categories, values, and standards. The CounterEnlightenment claimed that the diversity and multiplicity o f life could not be completely
grasped by abstract and mathematical reasoning only. According to the CounterEnlightenment, absolute objectivity o f and universal validity o f knowledge are
impossible because each society has its own categories and definitions, and thus, it
should be understood internally and in terms o f its own cultural categories, values, and
standards.
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3)

The Counter-Enlightenment as the moralization o f ethics/politics: The Counter-

Enlightenment has a cyclical notion o f temporality, according to which history moves
from rise, growth, decline, and fall of both mental life o f men and institutional life of
society. The Counter-Enlightenment believed that there is a variety o f cultural
communities, each o f which has its own ethics that is bound to its specific contexts.
There is no universal ethics, but the ideal o f ethics is still to live spiritually. This spiritual
life refers to the control o f body by the spiritual life of the community. Politically, the
Counter-Enlightenment presented a pluralist democracy, in which freedom (voluntary
activities of the individual) and necessity (restrictions o f the social institutions) do not
contradict each other because all members are pious artists who have their own inner
lives. In this sense, all individuals should be socialized enough to voluntarily adjust their
individualities to spiritual commonalities of society.
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CHAPTER 3

THE POSTMODERN AS THE AESTHETICIZATION OF ONTOLOGY,
EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ETHICS/POLITICS
I define the postmodern as the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and
ethics/politics, which has proceeded from the early 1960s to the present in advanced
Western societies. Nevertheless, I do not claim that the moralization of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics is not important in defining the postmodern. What I
really referring to is that the moral challenge to science is not new; there was the moral
challenge from the start o f the modem. What is new in the postmodern is the aesthetic
challenge to the modem. The following is a philosophical rephrasing of the postmodem.
(1) The postmodem as the aestheticization o f ontology; The traditional ontological
distinction between “being” and “non-being” is blurred. The ontological privilege o f
“what is” over “what is not” is overtumed. As a result, there is no original. Everything is
a copy o f a copy o f a copy, ad infinitum.
(2) The postmodem as the aestheticization o f epistemology: The traditional
epistemological equation o f being, language, and knowledge is blurred. As “being” is a
copy o f a copy o f a copy, ad infinitum, so are language and knowledge. The distinction
between reality and discourse is also blurred. As there is no vantage point from which
“being” is grasped, “non-being,” which has not been represented in thought, begins to be
represented.

66
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(3)

The postmodern as the aestheticization o f ethics/politics: The traditional notion o f

temporality as a linear progress toward betterment is lost. As a result, the traditional
moral ideal o f self-sufficiency which is based on the control of the body by reason for
future rewards is senseless because there is no future. The traditional politics of
inclusion/exclusion based on negation: x = x = not y (I = I = not You), is senseless
because “I” and “you” are entangled in multiple ways.

Postmodern Social Theory
In order to grasp postmodern social theory, I will categorize it into two:
poststructuralist postmodern social theory and critical postmodern social theory.
Poststructuralist postmodern social theory utilizes poststructuralist linguistics for
theorizing the postmodern. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory considers society
as language (an indefinite signifying chain), and argues that society can be best studied
through linguistics. Critical postmodern social theory utilizes post-Marxist political
economy for theorizing the postmodern. It sees society in general in Marxist terms of
base and superstructure, and characterizes contemporary Western advanced societies as
the most developed form o f capital. Critical postmodern social theory connects the
aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics with the restless
transformative activity o f capital accumulation, and tries to see the postmodern within a
given historical framework as related to one another as to a totality.

1. Poststructuralist Postmodern Social Theory
The term poststructuralism always comes together with the term structuralism.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

According to Sarup (1993), structuralism and poststructuralism have many similarities: a
critique o f the human subject, historicism, meaning, and philosophy. But there is a
fundamental difference between structuralism and poststructuralism. Intellectually,
structuralism belongs to the rationalist version o f the Enlightenment. Structuralism tries
to discover the truth, a deep structure lying behind appearances. This structure is
linguistically organized, a system o f groups o f binary opposition o f the signified and the
signifier. In this structure, there is a master code that determines others within the
system. By contrast, poststructuralism intellectually belongs to the tradition o f the
aesthetic, especially the anti-Enlightenment tradition. Poststructuralism developed out of
a disillusionment with structuralism. Poststructuralism is anti-scientific; it does not
believe that there is a deep structure lying behind appearances. Binary opposition
between the signified and the signifier is deconstructed. Poststructuralism criticizes
structuralism which sees language as closed structures of oppositions by giving primacy
to the signifier over the signified. According to poststructuralism, the signifiers do not
rest in the signified. The signified is only a moment of a never-ending process o f the
infinite, intertextual play of the signifiers. Thus, language is approached as a selfreferential system o f differences. There is no “being,” but only “becoming.” Therefore,
poststructuralism denies the existence o f a master code.
Structuralism developed in post-WW II France. Many parts of France were destroyed
during the war, and its people were weary o f change and destruction. They wanted to
rebuild social stability through applying scientific knowledge to their country. Marxism,
existentialism, and phenomenology dominated the intellectual scene in the post-WW II
France, but by 1960s they were superseded by structuralism (Poster 1975). There might
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be many reasons for this change, but two seems to be decisive. Intellectually, most
French intellectuals sought for scientificity and “structuralism promised a rigorous
method and some hope for making decisive progress toward scietificity” (Dosse 1997a:
xix). Structuralism adopted modem structural linguistics as a primary model o f science )
and applied it to social phenomena. During those days, “linguistics was a pilot science
guiding the steps o f the social sciences as a whole toward scientificity” (Dosse 1997a:
X X ).

Institutionally, the boom o f structuralism was related to the continuous growth o f

French capitalism, in which wages and profits steadily increased in parallel. In fact, this
was not a unique French phenomenon; firom the late 1940s, Western capitalism in general
enjoyed continuous economic growth. The age o f ideology seemed to end. Structuralism
fitted this ambience because it focused on stability and synchrony rather than change and
diachrony.
In post-World War II France, Ferdinard de Saussure was revitalized as the founder of
modem linguistics. Saussure established “the arbitrariness of the sign, showing that
language is a system o f values established neither by content nor by experience, but by
pure difference” (Dosse 1997a: 44). The linguistic sign joins a concept (a signified) with
an acoustic image (a signifier) whose link is arbitrary. Saussure was only interested in
the relationship between the signified and the signifier and excluded the referent. The
meaning o f a sign does not lie in the connection between the sign and the referent, but in
the connection between the sign and the overall system o f language. In this sense,
language creates rather than conveys meaning; it is language that constructs reference.
Language is a system o f signs whose meanings lie in relations o f difference: “in language
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive
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terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences
without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has
neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and
phonic differences that have issued from the system”(Saussure 1966: 120). Saussure
argued that the oppositional or binary relation o f sign in a specific language system
generates the meaning o f the sign. In this sense, the oppositional or binary relation o f
sign is the fundamental structure which determines the meaning o f the sign in a specific
language system. Saussure also conceived o f language mainly as a synchronic system.
When a person is bom, this system is given as a synchronic system. As a result, the
meaning that language produces is stable; a sign is the inseparable union between the
signified and the signifier within language. In this sense, language acquires autonomy.
In this formalistic notion o f language, the speaking subject is eliminated.
Through Jakobson’s stmctural linguistics, Claude Lévi-Strauss applied this
Saussurean linguistics to anthropology. Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism embraced the
positivistic tradition in two ways: first is “Comte’s idea that knowledge is only interesting
if it borrows from a scientific model or manages to transform itself into a science or a
theory”; and second is Comte’s inspiration “toward ‘holism,’ his desire to totalize”
(Dosse 1997a: 13). Lévi-Strauss believed that stmctural linguistics would satisfy this
positivistic project. Lévi-Strauss saw the social as a language: “[l]ike language, the
social is an autonomous reality (the same one, moreover); symbols are more real than
what they symbolise, the signifier precedes and determines the signified” (Lévi-Strauss,
quoted in Dosse 1997a: 29). Thus, the social can be studied by linguistic methods in
which phonemes play a decisive role: “[Ijike phonemes, kinship terms are elements o f
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meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they are integrated into systems”
(Lévi-Strauss, quoted in Dosse 1997a: 22). According to Jakobson, structural phonology
is the model o f models, whose code is binary. Following Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss
believed that the social is structured according to a binary code. According to him,
kinship relationships are like linguistic systems; just as signs stand in a binary
relationship o f opposition and correlation to each other, so do members o f society to one
another. The binary code is constants belying the multitude of identifiable variations.
These constants are universal structures that manifest themselves in appearances. What is
important here is that these universal structures are characterized by the unconscious. It
is not the conscious subjects but the signifiers that are autonomous. Studying the
reciprocal combination o f discrete signifiers will reveal the internal laws regulating
language. In this sense, Lévi-Strauss emphasized synchrony over diachrony.
This structuralist project for a science o f human societies took off with Roland
Barthes. In Mythologies (first published in 1957), Barthes analyzed petit-bourgeois
culture as a myth that functions to eliminate reality by utilizing a linguistic model.
Barthes worked within the binary opposition o f ideology and science. Using the
linguistic model as a true scientific method, Barthes aimed to demonstrate how a myth
functions in contemporary society. Here, the agent is myths, not human subjects.
Barthes contributed to the success o f the linguistic model in social sciences.
In the 1950s, Jacques Lacan also applied the linguistic model to the unconscious.
Rereading Freud through structural linguistics, Lacan embraced Lévi-Strauss’s notion of
the unconscious as the site o f structures, not Freud’s notion o f the unconscious as being
composed o f primary processes. By connecting Freud’s condensation and displacement
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with Jakobsonian metaphor and metonymy, Lacan showed how the unconscious is
structured like a language. Language is composed of phonemes and o f groups of
phonemes. In this sense, “Lacan reversed Freud; the symbolic governed the structure
whereas the id, which Lacan assigned to the Real, was at the core o f drives for Freud”
(Dosse 1997a: 119). The human subject is the product or effect o f language. As a
structuralist, Lacan gave priority to synchrony over diachrony. Lacan considered the
Oedipal structure to be universal and autonomous with respect to all temporal and spatial
contingencies. The Oedipal structure is characterized by the symbolic.
In the early 60s, other figures joined this poststructuralist project. In Madness and
Civilization (first published in 1961), Michel Foucault demonstrated how madness was
historically constituted as the other o f reason by discourses. In The Order o f Things (first
published in 1966), he claimed that the agents of knowledge and history are what he
called “episteme,” not modem Man. According to Foucault, modem Man, who was
considered as an autonomous agent, was a discursive effect.
Similarly in For Marx (first published in 1965) and Reading Capital (with Balibar,
first published in 1965), Louis Althusser applied the structuralist method to Marxism.
Althusser worked within the binary opposition o f ideology and science. Althusser
considered the late Marx as the real scientific Marx who presented a scientific theory o f
history utilizing structural categories such as social formation, the forces of production,
relationships of production, etc.
In short, structuralism can be summarized as follows: 1) structuralism is a French
version o f the scientific project, which aims to discover the truth, a deep structure lying
behind appearances; 2) stmcturalism sees the social and the subject to be structured like a
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language as a system o f signs whose meanings are determined by the binary opposition of
signs within itself; and 3) structural linguistics can be used to investigate the social and
the subject.
In the 1970s, structuralism was superseded by poststructuralism even though “[w]hat
American call poststructuralism existed even before the structural paradigm waned"
(Dosse 1997b: 17). There might be many reasons for this change, but intellectual and
institutional reasons should be pointed out. Intellectually, poststructuralism followed the
Anti-Enlightenment tradition, especially Nietzsche’s attacks on Western philosophy and
Heidegger’s critique o f metaphysics: “Building on the legacy of Nietzsche and
Heidegger, poststructuralists stressed the importance o f differences over unities and
identities while championing the dissemination o f meaning in opposition to its closure in
totalizing, centered theories and systems’’ (Best and Kellner 1991: 22-23). Informed by
the Anti-Enlightenment, poststructuralism challenged the scientific project of
structuralism, radicalizing Saussure’s linguistics in which structure is assumed to be
stable. Poststructuralists gave primacy to the signifier over the signified and thus opened
the dynamic productivity of language. Institutionally, the decline of scientific project
was related to the dynamic change o f capitalism, which was often termed as the
postindustrial society, the consumer society, the society o f spectacle, etc. Post-war
France saw a rapid development of (monopoly) capitalism, mass communication
technologies, and mass consumption (Best and Kellner 1991: 16-18). This challenged the
post-war bureaucracy, which was represented by the events o f May 1968 and the
turbulent politics o f the period. The subject o f this challenge did not come from the
working class as traditional Marxism predicted. Rather, radical students and social
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minorities played an important role in protesting against bureaucracy. Influenced by the
Situationists who demanded the overthrow o f all bureaucratic regimes, radical students
and social minorities were not after reconstruction; they wanted to deconstruct existing
rules, codes, structures, etc. “The events o f May appeared as a sort o f cultural
upheaval/street theater/happening/performance art as much as a political protest. Wall
posters and leaflets put into question not only capitalism, representative democracy, and
bureaucracy, but the parties o f the Left, the star system of radical intellectuals, and the
culture o f daily life in advanced industrial society" (Poster 1990; 131). Structuralism lost
support, because it contained a stable notion o f structure; “In May, the mythology o f a
return to Eden with its (anti)rules, (anti)structure, and anti(law) was expressed in a
hostility toward the dominant, structuralist intellectual methodology" (Turkle 1992: 70).
In this social ambience poststructuralism emerged.
Most scholars agree that one o f the chief figures of poststructuralism is Jacques
Derrida. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Derrida clearly proposed a new notion of
language that is different from the structuralist one, radicalizing Saussure’s notion of
language. Saussure saw sign as an inseparable union o f the signified and the signifier,
excluding the referent from a linguistic concern. Lacan considered the signifier and the
signified as two distinct and separate orders. Lacan contended that the two realms o f
signifier and signified are never unified and the signifier is superior to the signified
because the signified is the secondary and passive effect o f the signifier. The final, fixed
meaning is impossible because o f “an incessant sliding of the signified under the
signifier" (Lacan 1977:154). Thus, there are not some opaque signified hidden behind
signifiers, a deep structure. Derrida went further; he eliminated the signified “in favor of
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an indefinite signifying chain without any site at which it could be perceived” (Dosse
1997b: 23). Derrida claimed that meaning is in a state o f infinite regress by way o f a
continual deferral o f signs to others: “The meaning of meaning is infinite implication, the
indefinite referral o f signifier to signified.. Its force is a certain pure and indefinite
equivocality which gives signified meaning no respite, no rest.. it always signifies again
and differs” (Derrida, quoted in Best and Kellner I991: 21). Language always entails a
process of deferral and delay. There is no fixed stable structure. In this way, Derrida
deconstructed the binary opposition between the signified and the signifier. According to
Derrida, Western philosophy is structured in terms o f binary oppositions such as
good/bad, presence/absence, mind/matter, being/non-being, identity/difference,
nature/culture, speech/writing, meaning/form, masculine/feminine, man/women,
literal/metaphorical, positive/negative, reason/madness, etc. Further, there is a hierarchy;
the first term is given privilege. The first positive term disavows its intimate dependence
on its negative term and masquerades itself as self-present truth. According to Derrida,
Western philosophy has been obsessed with this knowledge. Thus, Derrida called
Western philosophy “metaphysics o f presence” which identifies knowledge with selfpresent truth (Norris 1987). But it is impossibly ideal because it in fact depends on its
negative terms. In this sense, Derrida refuted traditional ontology which has been based
on binary opposition o f being and non-being: “Derrida renounced all ontology. The trace
he perceived always eluded itself by a continuous veiling making it impossible to
establish any meaning” (Dosse 1997b: 27).
Other major structuralists also began to depart fi-om structuralism to
poststructuralism. Mainly using Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion o f text as being polyphonic
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within the text itself, Kristeva introduced a historical dimension to structuralism. In S/Z
(1970), Barthes distanced himself from what he later considered to be the illusory
reduction o f all the stories “to a single structure” (Dosse 1997b: 57). Lacan also took a
similar step. This might be seen as the first phase o f poststructuralism, which was
characterized by the “imperialism of the signifier” (Dews 1987: 110). Even though
language was conceptualized as a decentered dynamic, its all-embracing feature was not
challenged. Rather, everything became textualized. This textual poststructuralism
conceived that there is nothing outside o f language.
But there was a second phase in poststructuralism, which was characterized by the
deconstruction of the textual and non textual. “It is precisely against this ‘imperialism o f
the signifier,’ however, that the second phase o f post-structuralism turns. Attention
begins to shift from language as all-embracing medium to the determinations which bear
upon language; discourse starts to be seen as patterned and disturbed by non-discursive
forces” (Dews 1987: 110). The referent o f language began to become an important issue.
Language was no longer considered to be a self-perpetuating system which does not need
the referent for signification. Poststructuralism brought the referent back. But this
referent is not positivistic or phenomenological; rather, it is similar to what I defined as
“the aesthetic.” The referent as the aesthetic resides at points o f impasse in language
exchange, functioning to make signification possible. The referent as the aesthetic
always tries to return as a subversive force. Many poststructuralists began to challenge
the monolithic notion o f language by reintroducing the non-discursive referent. Lacan’s
notion o f the real, Foucault’s notion o f power, Lyotard’s notion o f the figurai, Deluze and
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Guattari’s notion o f desire were some examples. Thus, textual poststructuralism was
challenged by more materialist poststructuralism.
In short, poststructuralism can be seen as an anti-scientific project which deconstructs
an invariant structure by making it an infinite game o f differences. This project was
highly philosophical or literary. Its main figures were relatively less interested in the
social than the textual. But through the late 1960s and the 1970s, poststructuralism began
to permeate other areas. Especially, poststructuralism began to be associated with
postmodernism, from which poststructuralist postmodern social theory emerged.
Poststructuralist postmodern social theory utilized poststructuralism for explaining and
investigating ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics in Western societies since
World War II. In this sense, poststructuralist postmodern social theory situated
poststructuralism within institutional change in the advanced Western societies. What is
distinct is that poststructuralist postmodern social theory understood this institutional
change in terms o f postindustrial society or information society, a non-capitalist society
based on the production, ownership, and exchange o f knowledge. Poststructuralist
postmodern social theory replaced the category o f class as the operative unit of social
analysis or relegated it to historical utility only. In different words, poststructuralist
postmodern social theory denied that there are “structured” contradictions in advanced
Western societies. According to poststructuralist postmodern social theory, the most
spectacular feature in institutional change is the textualization o f the social institutions, in
which multiple types o f linguistic experiences bombard individuals so as to change them
into masses. The main point is that the social has become an indefinite signifying chain,
in which traditional binary oppositions are deconstructed. Poststructuralist postmodern
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social theory tried to understand this aestheticized world from the perspective o f the
aesthetic. It replaced the relations o f production with the relations o f consumption as the
key dimension o f advanced Western societies, and claimed that the relations of
consumption exist outside the relations o f production in postmodern Western societies
and, thus, are exempt from political economy. The relations o f consumption operate
according to the poststructuralist notion of language (the play o f differences). In this
sense, poststructuralist postmodern social theory embraced the aesthetic as the primary
model o f knowledge.
Foucault presented poststructuralist thoughts which many postmodernists utilized for
their purpose, but he himself did not situate his thoughts within the institutional change of
Western societies since World War II. Foucault’s main target lied in the critique o f
modernity, not an analysis o f postmodemity. Derrida and Lacan are similar. They are
poststructuralists but not poststructuralist postmodern social theorists. It was later
postmodernists who utilized Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan when discussing
postmodernism (for instance, see Poster 1989,1990; Best and Kellner 1991). Derrida,
Foucault, and Lacan did not develop analysis of postmodern forms o f society or culture.
Their works concentrated mainly on epistemological issues.
In this respect, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard are different. First o f
all, they linked poststructuralism with the institutional changes o f Western societies since
World War n. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard concentrated on conditions of
postmodern knowledge and challenged modem knowledge with postmodern knowledge.
Lyotard, even though implicitly, situated his critique o f modem knowledge within the
institutional change o f Western societies since World War H. He understood this change
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in terms o f the discourse o f postindustrial society. Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard
linked poststructuralism more explicitly with the institutional changes o f Western
societies since World War H. Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 33) situated the forms o f
subjectivity within their social structures: “schizophrenia is the product o f the capitalist
machine, as manic-depression and paranoia are the product o f the despotic manic, and
hysteria the product o f the territorial machine.” Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 33) argued
that “[cjapitalism is in fact bom o f the encounter o f two sorts o f flows: the decoded flows
o f production in the form o f money-capital, and the decoded flows o f labor in the forms
o f the ‘free worker.’” In this sense, the most characteristic and the most important
tendency o f capitalism is the decoding o f flows and the deterritorialization o f the socius.
Capitalism “continually draws near to its limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic limit”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34). This tendency produces the condition in which the
schizophrenia is massively produced: “As for the schizo, continually wandering about,
migrating here, there, and everywhere as best he can, he plunges further and further into
the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the further limits o f the decomposition o f the
socius on the surface of his own body without organs.” Baudrillard utilized some
semiotic versions o f information society theory when explaining the historical change.
Baudrillard (1994: 121) distinguished three orders o f simulacra: “simulacra that are
natural, naturalist, founded on the image, on imitation and counterfeit, that are
harmonious, optimistic, and that aim for the restitution or the ideal institution o f nature
made in God’s image; simulacra that are productive, productivist, founded on energy,
force, its materialization by the machine and in the whole system o f reproduction—a
Promethean aim o f a continuous globalization and expansion, o f an indefinite liberation
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o f energy (desire belongs to the utopias related to this order o f simulaca); simulacra of
simulation, founded on information, the model, the cybernetic game— total
operationality, hyperreality, aim o f total control.” Baudrillard situated poststructuralism
within the age o f simulacra o f simulation which has no referent or ground in any reality
except its own. In the age of simulacra of simulation, a hyperreality, a world of selfreferential signs, that electronically-mediated media generate, replaces reality.
In addition, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard all agreed that the social
has become like a language, but had slightly different positions about the nature of
language. Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari had similar view on the nature o f language:
they all embraced the second phase o f poststructuralism, a more materialist
poststructuralism. They all emphasized that there is an asignifying element, the aesthetic
that resides at points o f impasse in language exchange, functioning to make signification
possible. From his early intellectual career, Lyotard contrasted the figurai with the
discursive. If the discursive is the condition o f representation to consciousness by a
rational order o f concepts, the figurai is an unspeakable other necessarily at work within
and against discourse, disrupting the mle o f representation. With these two terms,
Lyotard invented a more materialist poststructuralist notion of language. The critical
discourse Lyotard valorized “seeks to make possible meanings that cannot be produced or
presented directly or immediately within the linguistic code: meanings that are not extralinguistic in nature, but not entirely linguistics or discursive in nature either” (Carroll
1987: 33). Deleuze and Guattari are similar. They rejected representation itself because
they considered “representation to be not just a distortion of desire but the principal
means o f repressing desire and o f betraying its authentic schizophrenic form” (Holland
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1999: 22). By contrast, Baudrillard accepted the first phase of poststructuralism, a textual
poststructuralism which emphasizes merely the multiplication and dispersion of
signification (see Kellner 1989a). This position appears more clearly in his later works
such as Simulations, In the Shadow o f the Silent Majorities, Simulacra and Simidation,
and Fatal Strategies, which I take as the primary postmodern texts o f Baudrillard’s
postmodern social theory.
Poststructuralism was actively imported to, and soon began to influence, American
academe, especially the humanities. But it was the first phase o f poststructuralism that
influenced American academe during these days. Textual poststructuralism gained
power especially in literary criticism. The Yale School represented this; it considered
language as an autonomous system of purely internal relations. From the mid-1980s,
social sciences began to investigate the social implications of poststructuralism. What is
important here is that social sciences paid more attention to the second phase of
poststructuralism which reintroduced the referent as the aesthetic.
In short, poststructuralist postmodern social theory can be summarized as follows: 1)
it is an anti-scientific project, which aims to deconstruct any rigid hierarchical
organization structured according to binary oppositions; 2) it sees the social as an
indefinite signifying chain, in which traditional binary oppositions are deconstructed; 3)
to investigate the social, it utilizes poststructuralist discourse theory, in which discourse is
seen as being already heteronomous, complicated by absences and impasses.
In a nutshell, poststructuralist postmodern social theory characterized the postmodern
by the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

1) Ontology
a. The Nature o f the Social
Lyotard argued that there were two basic representational models for society in the
modem era: the functional model and the conflictual model. The functional model saw
society as a unified totality, a “unicity,” in which the principle o f performativity prevails.
By contrast, the conflictual model saw society as being divided in two, in which the
principle of dualism resists the principle of performativity. Lyotard claimed that the
functional model in fact happened to dominate advanced Western societies. Even the
conflictual model has been absorbed into the functional model. Further, Lyotard argued
that these two models are no longer appropriate for the postmodern condition. The
reason is that the functional model (also the functionalized conflictual model) is based on
the instrumental notion o f knowledge. The instrumental notion o f knowledge is valid
only when society is considered as a giant machine in which one big language functions
as the social bond. According to Lyotard, society has changed so as that the social bond
becomes a fabric formed by the intersection o f an indeterminate number o f language
games. Lyotard argued that the nature o f the social bond in the postmodern condition
increasingly relied on language games which are “heteromorphous, subject to
heterogeneous sets o f pragmatic rules” (Lyotard 1984: 65). Lyotard understood the
social in terms o f flexible networks o f language games in which displacement or
unexpected new moves are important. Thus, the precondition o f the instrumental
knowledge changed. Lyotard refitted an overly reifying view o f what is institutionalized
even though he acknowledged the constraints of institutions that “function to filter
discursive potentials, interrupting possible connections in the communication networks”
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(Lyotard 1984: 17). Lyotard (1984: 17) emphasized the flexible nature o f institutions:
“We know today that the limits the institution imposes on potential language ‘moves’ are
never established once and for all (even if they have been formally defined). Rather, the
limits are themselves the stakes and provisional results of language strategies, within the
institution and without.” In this sense, Lyotard saw society as consisting o f diversified
groups equipped with their own language game. This pluralist notion o f society is,
however, different fi'om traditional one. Lyotard’s pluralist society emphasizes the
incommensurability among language games.
Deleuze and Guattari claimed that capitalism subverts Being through its incessant
cycles o f deterritorialization and reterritorialization, and criticized traditional ontology
such as “the root-book” and “the fascicular root,” and presented their alternative
ontology, rhizome. The law of the root-book is “the law o f reflection, the One that
becomes two” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5). In the fascicular root, “the principal root
has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; and immediate, indefinite multiplicity o f
secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development. This time,
natural reality is what aborts the principal root, but the root’s unity subsists, as past or yet
to come, as possible” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5). The rhizome is characterized by
several principles. First and second are “principles of connection and heterogeneity” in
which “any point o f a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7). Third is the principle o f multiplicity: “A multiplicity has
neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot
increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws o f combinations
therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8).
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Last is the principle o f asignifying rupture: “against the oversignifying breaks separating
structures or cutting across a single structure. A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a
given spot, but it will start up again on one o f its old lines, or on new lines” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987:9). In short, Deleuze and Guattari considered the social as a complex of
bodily intensities in a state o f continuous nonlinear movement, which is characterized by
multidimensional and discontinuous logic. In this sense, they presented an aesthetic
ontology, “a new ontology o f the social, o f social being, grounded in a philosophical
ontology o f Being as pure difference or Becoming" (Bogard 1998: 54).
Embracing a semiological view on society, Baudrillard claimed that signs and codes
are the primary constituents o f the social in the postmodern world. From his early works
such as The Mirror ofProduction and Critique o f Political Economy o f the Sign,
Baudrillard claimed that under capitalism the commodity has become a sign in the
Saussurean sense. The meaning o f a sign is arbitrarily determined by its position in a
self-referential system o f signifiers. Consumer culture produces a surfeit o f images and
signs that gives rise to a simulational world. Consumer society saturated with images and
signs effaces the distinction between the real and the imaginary. In his later work In the
Shadow o f the Silent Majorities, Baudrillard (1983: 67) claimed that the social is
disintegrated into a mass o f individual atoms thrown into the absurdity o f Brownian
motion: “our ‘society’ is perhaps in the process o f putting an end to the social, o f burying
the social beneath a simulation o f the social.” The system continues to produce the social
through polling, voting, etc., but the masses “don’t express themselves, they are
surveyed. They don’t reflect upon themselves, they are tested” (Baudrillard 1983:20).
Thus, the effort of the system at producing the social does not belong to a dimension of
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representing the masses, but to one o f simulation o f the masses. In his later work Fatal
Strategies, Baudrillard (1990: 150) presented a kind of Sadean view o f the world: “this is
a world where there is no such thing as chance. Nothing is dead, nothing is inert, nothing
is disconnected, uncorrelated or aleatory. Everything, on the contrary, is fatally,
admirably coimected—not at all according to rational relations (which are neither fatal
nor admirable), but according to an incessant cycle o f metamorphoses." In this aesthetic
world, traditional dichotomies between appearance and reality, surface and depth, subject
and object collapse into a flattened universe o f simulacra controlled by simulation models
and codes.

b. The Nature of Man
Lyotard claimed that postmodern man is exposed to a lot o f language games,
occupying nodal points o f specific communication circuits: “A se lf does not amount to
much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric o f relations that is now more
complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a
person is always located at ‘nodal points’ o f specific communication circuits, however
tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various kinds
o f messages pass’’ (Lyotard 1984: 15). The social subject dissolves in the dissemination
o f language games. But the social subject is not a total passivity. By contrast, an
unexpected “move” by the social subject is important because o f the agonistic nature of
language game. As a result, social interaction becomes temporary and fragile: “the
temporary contract is in practice supplanting permanent institutions in the professional.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
sexual, cultural, family, and international domains, as well as in political affairs"
(Lyotard 1984:66).
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari claimed that capitalism fosters schizophrenia,
“creative semiosis unlimited by fixed meaning” (Holland 1999:21), “because the
quantitative calculations o f the market replace meaning and belief-systems as the
foundation of society” (Holland 1999: 2). In this sense, the schizophrenic, not the
neurotic, is the dominant subject under capitalism. The schizophrenic refers to the
historical category which developed under capitalism. Capitalism as the socialproduction fosters the appearance o f the body-without-organs, which “might be actively
dis-organ-ized so as to enable the production o f other forms o f organ-ization—or no fixed
organ-ization at all” (Holland 1999:28). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari
also valorized schizos, nomads, rhizomes, all o f whom favors difference and multiplicity
over identity and dichotomy: “Schizos withdraw fi-om repressive social reality into
disjointed desiring states, nomads roam freely across open planes in small bands, and
rhizomes are deterritorialized lined o f desire linking desiring bodies with one another and
the field o f partial objects” (Best and Kellner 1991: 103). Deleuze and Guattari situated
the schizophrenia within the limits of capitalism. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the
schizophrenia is constituted through their place in the circuit o f information flows: “one
is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the television viewers are no longer
consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly ‘make’ it, but intrinsic
components pieces, ‘input’ and output,’ feedback or recurrences that are no longer
connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it” (Deleuze and Guattari
1987:458). The schizophrenia “passes from one code to the other” and “he deliberately
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scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the
questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never
invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way" (Deleuze
and Guattari 1983:15). What is at stake here is that the human subject loses his/her self:
“the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983:2). As a result, the human subject can simulate other
simulators, which is antithetical to the traditional subject who plays social roles: “The
schizo has no principles: he is something only be being something else. He is Mahood
only by being Worm, and Worm only by being Jones. He is a girl only by being an old
man who is miming or simulating the girl. Or rather, by being someone who is
simulating an old man simulating a girl. Or rather, by simulating someone..., etc"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 87).
Baudrillard claimed that the electronically-mediated media such as TV transformed
the subject into a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks o f influence.
Embracing McLuhan’s media theory, Baudrillard saw the media as cybernetic noise in
which all content implodes into form. The media obliterates meaning through
neutralizing and dissolving all content. There is no more meaningful communication in
the media because the hyperreality the media produces undermines the solid basis for
meaningful communication. Saturated with information, images, events and ecstasies,
the individual becomes more and more like terminals o f media: “media have a chilling
effect.. .which freezes individuals into functioning as terminals o f media and
communication networks who become involved as part and parcel o f the very apparatus
o f communication. The subject, then, becomes transformed into an object as part of a
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nexus o f information and communication networks” (Kellner 1989b: 71). Individuals
become the silent masses who passively consume the media. Thus, stable and persistent
interaction between silent mass is difficult because “the mass is what remains when the
social has been completely removed” (Baudrillard 1983: 6-7).

2) Epistemology
Lyotard refuted the totalizing experience which covers science, morality, and ethics.
Instead, Lyotard accepted Kant’s notion o f the sublime. According to Kant, taste refers
to the form o f pleasure, which is achieved in an accord between the capacity to conceive
and the capacity to present an object corresponding to the concept. By contrast, the
sublime comes fi*om the contradiction between the faculty to conceive o f something and
the faculty to present something. In other words, the sublime takes place “when the
imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a
concept” (Lyotard 1984: 78). Lyotard argued that modem art found its impetus from the
aesthetic of the sublime, but that it had a nostalgia for a reconciliation o f the concept and
the sensible. Lyotard saw the postmodern as part of the modem, but he wanted to put
forward “the unpresentable in presentation itself’ in order to “impart a stronger sense o f
the unpresentable” (Lyotard 1984: 81). He argued that the effort to totalize all human
faculties into a real unity led to terror. According to Him, each human faculty has its
own language game. It is impossible to make one true language which cover all human
faculties. Lyotard (1984: 82), thus, announced that “Let us wage a war on totality; let us
be witness to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor o f the
name.” Lyotard argued that modem scientific knowledge wanted to totalize all human
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faculties into a real unity, relying on the two grand narratives: the idea o f progress and
the idea of education as promoting the health o f the nation. But these grand narratives
have lost its credibility in postindustrial society and postmodern culture in which science
separates itself from these grand narratives. Science itself has become a kind o f language
game: “science plays its own game; it is incapable o f legitimating the other language
games” (Lyotard 1984: 40). Science lost its own legitimate narrative, and thus, it repeats
within itself. This new situation opens up the discursive field to the proliferation o f new
languages which do not need to be legitimated by a grand narrative. As a result, a variety
of little narratives generate their own knowledge whose legitimation “can only spring
from their own linguistic practice and communication interaction” (Lyotard 1984:41). In
this sense, the postmodern condition is characterized by infinitely proliferating language
games.
Deleuze and Guattari criticized traditional epistemology, what they called
“arborescent,” that tried to build systematic knowledge from the first principles.
Traditional epistemology distorts the real mode o f the unconscious, posing fixed meaning
on it. The unconscious operates without meaning: “The unconscious poses no problems
o f meaning, solely problems o f use. The question posed by desire is not ‘What does it
mean?’ but How does it workT" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 109). Against
foundationalism. they proposed rhizomatic epistemology that aims to uproot arborescent
epistemology: “The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act.
Nomad thought replaces the closed equation o f representation, x = x = not y (l = 1 = not
you) with an open equation: — + y + z + a + ...( ...+ arm + brick 4- window +__ ).
Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the
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One (=Two) of self-reflection, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set o f disparate
circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity o f elements without
effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging” (Massumi
1996: 6).
Baudrillard (1983: 19) argued that signs “no longer represent anything and no longer
have their equivalent in reality” because the boundary between representation and reality
implodes. Baudrillard situated this crisis o f representation within the era o f simulacra of
simulation. According to Baudrillard, the era o f representation is over by the wide spread
o f simulated reality that electronically-mediated media generate. Simulation replaces
representation. The hyperreality or simulated reality loses its referent, ground, or source.
In this era, the traditional distinction between the subject and the object is obsolete, and
so are traditional disciplines based on them. Sociology is one o f them: “sociology can
only depict the expansion o f the social and its vicissitudes. It survives only on the
positive and definitive hypothesis of the social. The reabsorption, the implosion o f the
social, escapes it. The hypothesis o f the death o f the social is also that of its own death”
(Baudrillard 1983:4).

3) Ethics/Politics
Lyotard (1993:24) asked, “can we today continue to organize the mass o f events
coming from the human and nonhuman world by referring them to the Idea o f a universal
history o f humanity?” Lyotard said, “No.” The reason is that Lyotard considered the
event as “the fact or case that something happens, after which nothing will ever the same
again. The event disrupts any pre-existing referential frame within which it might be
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represented or understood” (Readings 1990: xxxi). In this sense, the event disrupts the
discourse, the process o f representation by concepts, and it could not narrated by a
universal subject of history. Lyotard criticized the moral ideal o f self-sufficiency. He
distinguished between two notion of desire: “desire as a longing for the lost object
represented in phantasy, as ‘forbidden in its very depths,’ as negativity, and desire as the
positive energy which disrupts discourse in order to embody the figurality of phantasy"
(Dews 1987: 131). Unlike Freud and Lacan who defined desire as negativity or lack,
Lyotard embraced desire as positivity. Desire disorients, disrupts, transgress, and
transforms everything it touches. Desire also continually reverses directions and invests
itself elsewhere and otherwise. By the same token, desire disrupts the moral ideal o f selfsufficiency, which aims to control desire by concept. Lyotard is perhaps one of the most
radical postmodernists who attack the ideal of identity politics. He did not believe that
there should just resolution between the two sides o f a conflict. Rather, he argued for the
différend, “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably
resolved for lack o f a rule o f judgement applicable to both argument” (Lyotard 1992: xi).
Politics should not aim to bridge between absolute differences because “applying a single
rule of judgment to both in order to settle their différend as though it were merely a
litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both o f them if neither side admits this
rule)” (Lyotard 1992: xi). Rather, politics should evoke or testify to différends so as to
resist the injustice which silences those who cannot speak the same language (see
Williams 2000).
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:25) attacked the temporal order: “A rhizome has no
beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. .
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.Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? These
are totally useless questions.” They criticized the ideal o f self-sufficiency as internalizing
self-denial and submitting to Oedipal authority. For them, the ideal o f self-sufficiency
means the desire o f the people for their own repression. According to them, men have
come to want fascism through Oedipalization. What is needed is to schizophrenize the
individual unconscious: “Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of
destruction—a whole scouring o f the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy
Oedipus, the illusion o f the ego, the puppet o f the superego, guilt, the law, castration”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 311). Deleuze and Guattari criticized identity politics for
being based on negation: x = x = not y (I = I = not You). They proposed pre- or a-social
arrangement o f the social, in which no hierarchy exists: “The space o f nomad thought is
qualitatively different fi-om State space.. .Nomad space or ‘smooth,’ or open-ended. One
can rise up at any point and move to any other” (Massumi 1996:6).
Baudrillard also argued that the linear notion o f temporality disappeared in
contemporary society: “there are no longer any stable structures, nexuses o f causality,
events with consequences, or forms o f determination through which one could delineate
historical trajectories or lines of development. Everything instead is subject to
indeterminism and an unpredictable aleatory confluence that produces vertigo ” (Best and
Kellner 1991: 133). Baudrillard made the moral ideal o f self-sufficiency nonsense by
way o f giving the agency to objects, not subjects. The moral ideal o f self-sufficiency
evaporates in the system o f objects. Masses are obliged to strive for happiness and
pleasure in consuming the sign value o f objects. Fun morality replaces the moral ideal of
the self-sufficient. Baudrillard’s fatal strategies challenged identity politics that aims to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

include all members in the social system. Baudrillard saw identity politics as
subordinating to the hyperconformity. Rather, Baudrillard argued that the ironic power
o f the masses is dangerous to the social, “the ironic power of withdrawal, o f non-desire,
non-knowledge, silence, absorption then expulsion of all powers, wills, of all
enlightenment and depths o f meaning” (Baudrillard 1990; 99). Indifference and inertia o f
the masses are their true, their only practice to refuse to participate in the recommended
ideals, a form of resistance. In this sense, staying outside o f the social is a new politics:
“A fatal strategy pursues a course o f action or trajectory to its extreme, attempting to
surpass its limits, to go beyond its boundaries” (Best and Kellner 1991: 131).

2. Critical Postmodern Social Theory
Critical postmodern social theory has a dubious relationship with poststructuralism.
On the one hand, critical postmodern social theory agree to some extent with
poststructuralism that language does not represent the referent. On the other hand,
critical postmodern social theory argued that language represents more than itself.
Critical postmodern social theory concentrated on something more than language. For
critical postmodern social theory, this “something more than language” is the restless
movement o f capital. Critical postmodern social theory is poststructuralist insofar as it
sees the restless transformative activity o f capital accumulation to be disseminated like
Derrida’s meaning. Critical postmodern social theory is critical insofar as it nevertheless
does not stop tracking the movement o f capital and its effects on the social. In this sense,
critical postmodern social theory, unlike poststructuralist postmodern social theory, does
not give up Marxist political economy. Like poststructuralist postmodern social theory.
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critical postmodern social theory documented that the social has become fragmented or
textualized to an extent that there doesn’t seem to be structuring principles in society any
more. But critical postmodern social theory believed that the seemingly fragmented
particles are in fact related to each other. Thus, it is too early to give up the possibility o f
a totalizing theory. The main force to arrange or disarrange the seemingly fragmented
particles is the movement of capital. But critical postmodern social theory did not see the
movement o f capital as a mechanical, subjectless process, and wanted to preserve the
notion o f the subject when theorizing postmodernism. Like poststructuralist postmodern
social theory, critical postmodern social theory acknowledged that the human subjects
have become flexible, fluid, decentered, dispersed, etc. Nevertheless, critical postmodern
social theory did not give up the agency o f human subjects, who can connect their private
petty affairs with the public grand structures. For this, critical postmodern social theory
tried to ground critical analysis in historical and social contexts. In this sense, critical
postmodern social theory preserved the morally practical as the primary model o f
knowledge. Critical postmodern social theory tried to interpret and change the world o f
aestheticized commodification from the perspective o f the morally practical.
Roughly, critical postmodern social theory has two versions: Hegelian-Marxist
postmodern social theory and post-Fordist postmodern social theory. Hegelian-Marxist
postmodern social theory is developed out of the Hegelian Marxism associated with the
Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School articulated the transition from the stage of
market capitalism to the stage o f organized, or state, capitalism. The Franfurt School tried
to theorize the new relationship between economy and the state in the totalitarian and
democratic forms o f state capitalism. In this process, the Frankfurt School proposed new
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theories o f consumerism and the development o f the consumer society (see Held 1980;
Jay 1973; Kellner 1989a). Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory followed this
tradition, theorizing new relationships between base and superstructure in postmodern
period o f late capitalism. Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory is represented by
Fredric Jameson. Jameson proposed a unique synthesis o f Hegelian-Marxist tradition and
French poststructuralism. But in this synthesis, Jameson relatively ignored the movement
o f capital itself while concentrating on the cultural logic of late capitalism. This feature
is an inevitable result of one-sided acceptance o f the Frankfurt School. Early Frankfurt
thinkers such as Pollock and Horkheimer who developed Marxist political economy in
the 1930s were relatively forgotten in the Frankfurt School. Rather, cultural analyses o f
reification and commodification were accepted as a main theoretical contribution o f the
Frankfurt School to critical theory. Jameson, a literary critic, was not an exception. His
analysis o f postmodernism concentrated on the new forms of reification and
commodification in postmodern period o f late capitalism.
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory developed out of Marxist political economy.
Unlike Hegelian-Marxist postmodern social theory, post-Fordist postmodern social
theory directly dealt with the movement of capital itself and its impact on society in
general. Post-Fordist postmodern social theory is represented by David Harvey.
Modifying Marx’s political economy, Harvey paid attention to the change o f the mode o f
regulation and its impact on other spheres o f society.
These two critical postmodern social theories agreed with poststructuralist
postmodern social theory in that ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics in
contemporary Western societies have become aestheticized. However, neither abandon
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the effort to discern the main force for this aestheticization. According to both, the main
force is capital: it is the totalizing force underlying the process o f aestheticization o f the
social and the individual. But they emphasized different aspects of capital. Following
the Frankfurt School tradition, Jameson emphasized the expanding power of capital to all
spheres. The commodifying logic of capital penetrates into all spheres including nature
and the unconscious. Jameson implicitly suggested that capitalist commodity relations
extend in an inexorably “smooth” way. By contrast, Harvey emphasized the inherent
instability and morbidity o f the structures o f capitalist accumulation. For Harvey, the
notion o f “crisis” is important.
Before presenting his unique position about postmodernism, Jameson was famous for
being a Marxist literary critic, hi his early career, Jameson turned to the tradition o f
European Hegelian Marxism through the works o f Sartre, Lukàcs, and the Frankfurt
School. Marxism and Form (1971) represented this period. But in The Prison-House o f
Language (1972), Jameson also tried to incorporate theories o f Barthes, Althusser,
Derrida, and other poststructuralists in his literary theory while criticizing their ahistorical
and synchronic features. In this sense, Jameson synthesized Hegelian Marxism and New
French Theory. In this synthesis, Jameson as a Hegelian Marxist favored a dialectical
criticism, a double hermeneutic of ideological and utopian analysis: “thinking which
contextualizes the object o f study in its historical environment; utopian thinking which
finds utopian hope in literature, philosophy, and other cultural texts and which draws
attention to these hopes as a vital source o f critique and struggle” (Kellner 1989c: 13).
From the outset, Jameson did not abandon a totalizing theory which is characterized
by inclusive and comprehensive framework. Following Lukàcs, Jameson considered

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

“totality” to be a hallmark o f Marxist literary theory. Speaking in sociological terms,
Jameson paid attention to both macro and micro levels. For instance, in The Political
Unconscious (1981) Jameson investigated the complex relationship between modes o f
literary forms, bourgeois subjectivity, and various stages o f capitalism. Jameson
basically embraced Marx’s model o f base and superstructure, but he rejected a certain
orthodox Marxist interpretation o f base/superstructure, according to which culture is an
ephenomenon of economy. Rather, Jameson proposed a dialectical view about the
relation between base and superstructure, utilizing Althusser and Freud. Althusser and
Freud provided categories such as overdetermination, uneven development, semi
autonomy, reciprocal interaction, condensation, displacement, repression, etc., which
enabled Jameson to overcome a deterministic interpretation of the relationship between
base and superstructure. Jameson’s dialectic utilized imagination to make connections
and to discern gaps, breaks, discontinuities, and contradictions between base and
superstructure. “In this way, Jameson is faithful to the Marxian dialectic which relates all
cultural and superstructural phenomena to the socio-economic foundation and which
interprets stages o f cultural and superstructural development in culture as part o f the
trajectory of the history o f capitalism” (Kellner 1989c: 18). This totalizing theory does
not presuppose the preexistence o f reified, hypostatized totality. Rather, it aims to
historically contextualize all subjects in order to properly explain, interpret, and change
them.
Jameson soon turned from specialized literary theory and analysis to a more cultural
theory and interpretation, which means the extension o f the totalizing theory to
contemporary culture, and further, contemporary society in general. Jameson first
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presented his position about postmodernism in “Postmodernism and Consumer Society”
(1983), in which he linked consumer culture with postmodernism. But here, Jameson
merely attempted to distinguish some traits of postmodernist from modernist culture. In
the follower year, Jameson published “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic o f Late
Capitalism,” the expanded version of “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” in the
New Left Review. As a response to poststructuralist postmodernists’ attacks o f Marxism
as an outmoded totalizing, productivist, and reductionist discourse, Jameson held onto
Marxism and presented postmodernism as a new cultural totality and cultural dominant
corresponding to a new stage o f late capitalism. Jameson basically agreed with
poststructuralist postmodernism in that the social and the subject have become
textualized, that a new methodology for investigating the social and the subject is needed,
and that traditional ethics/politics based on the traditional notion o f subject should be
abandoned. But Jameson did not accept that there is no structural force to (re)produce
structured inequality. Thus, Jameson believed that a postmodern condition could be
theorized within the framework o f a neo-Marxist social theory. Following a Marxist
totalizing theory, Jameson tried to theorize postmodernism as a wide range of cultural,
social, economic, and political phenomena, not just as an aesthetic phenomenon. For
Jameson, postmodernism must refer to cultural and aesthetic style, philosophical and
political position as well as modes of social and economic organization. Thus, for
Jameson postmodernism is much more than a purely cultural affair. For this, Jameson
situated postmodern culture in the neo-Marxist model o f stages o f capitalist development.
Following and modifying Mandel’s Late Capitalism (first published in Germany in
1972), Jameson distinguished three periods within the history o f capitalism with their
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correspondences in the cultural forms: market capitalism and realism, monopoly or
imperialist capitalism and modernism, and late capitalism and postmodernism. Late
capitalism is capitalism in its late phase, which is in fact a purer, more developed, more
realized form of capitalism. Postmodernism is a new stage of “cultural development of
the logic o f late capitalism” (Jameson 1984a: 85).
Even though acknowledging the determining force o f economic base, Jameson spent
little time analyzing it in this article and subsequent articles. In fact, Jameson devoted
virtually all of his attention to culture. This is the weakest point in Jameson’s analysis o f
postmodernism: Jameson did not “adequately provide a foundation for his theory in a
systematic analysis of the political economy o f the present age” (Kellner 1989c: 28).
This weakness is perhaps a logical consequence when Jameson embraced the totally
administered society thesis o f the Frankfurt school. In the postmodern era, even culture,
which used to resist the commodifying logic o f capital, is totally colonized by capital,
serving a socioeconomic function to reproduce capitalism itself. Everything has become
cultural, and thus, we don’t have to study the economic base separately.
Harvey’s postmodern social theory filled this gap, working within the horizon of
post-Fordism. Post-Fordism emerged out of the economic downturn o f the 1970s
onwards. If information society theory emphasized the possibility o f rebirth o f the
advanced society, post-Fordist society theory paid attention to the nature and causes o f
the economic downturn. From the late 1940s onwards, the economies o f industrialized
countries enjoyed continuous growth, with wages and profits steadily increasing in
parallel. However, in the early-l970s, the rate o f growth suddenly declined. At the same
time, a rapid rise in the price o f oil and other raw materials substantially increased the
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costs o f production. As in previous decades, national governments responded to the
crisis by adopting reflationary policies. But, imlike in earlier recessions, this strategy
didn’t work. Instead, the economies of advanced societies entered a period of persistent
inflation, currency instability, and growing unemployment.
In the course o f explaining these phenomena, the Regulation School emanated from a
group of French intellectuals who were influenced by Marxist economic tradition. The
Regulation School began with a critique of scientific Marxism of the inter-years, which
argued general, eternal laws applicable to all socioeconomic systems. The Regulation
School rejected simple economism, and recognized the complexity and
multidimensionality o f modem capitalism (Boyer 1990; Brenner and Click 1991). The
Regulation School also objected to the pure neoclassical model o f the economy in which
all markets, including labor markets, tend toward equilibrium, and thus, ensure full
employment. In fact, the Regulation School grew mainly out o f Althusserian Marxism
and a simultaneous critical distantiation from it. Althusser showed the contradictory
character o f social relations o f production. But many felt that Althusser’s notion o f
reproduction as a subjectless process was too static to explain economic crisis at the time:
“Althusser had upset economist determinism, and advancing the concept of the mode of
production as a structure articulated by three instances made it possible to complexify the
analytical grid, and, advantageously, to leave the vulgate behind. But Althusserism was
not satisfying for the regulationists when it described an essentially static reality and
when, in the name o f combating historicism and evolutionism, it ignored transitions and
changes” (Dosse 1997b: 289). The Regulation School did not take for granted “smooth”
reproduction o f capitalism, and conceded the point that instability is part and parcel o f
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capitalist relations. The fundamental question asked by the Regulation School is: how
does capitalism ensure its perpetuation in spite o f this instability? As a response to this
question, the Regulation School answered that there is the “mode o f regulation” which
manages instabilities. This argument was important in relation to structuralism: it not
only conceived of instability o f capitalism, but also brought the subject back. The
Regulation School reintroduced “actors in terms o f groups and social categories, actors
who were to become central to the analysis, particularly by inflecting the relationship o f
salaried workers, which became the most important instance in the long-term
transformation of modes o f development” (Dosse 1997b: 294).
One o f the first works to present Regulation School theory to the United States is
Michel Aglietta’s A Theory o f Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience (1979). In this
historical study of transformation o f American capitalism, Aglietta argued that Fordist
regime o f accumulation, “a type o f intensive accumulation based on mass production and
consumption and on the accession o f salaried workers to the American Way o f Life”
(Dosse 1997b: 294), produced a post-War boom. In Fordist regime of accumulation, “the
wage relation—the point at which workers exchange their labour for cash payment with
which they must purchase the goods and services necessary to their maintenance—
becomes the fulcrum o f capitalist development” (Heffeman 2000:25). But this post-War
boom was only provisional, depending primarily on the ability of capital to stave off the
“tendency for the rate of profit to fall.” As this tendency reasserted itself from the late
1960s, the Fordist regime o f accumulation began to break down, from which a neoFordist or post-Fordist regime might emerge. However, Aglietta did not see this
breakdown as a mechanical breakdown in the system o f capitalist accumulation, but the
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exposure o f the limits of a particular social formation. According to Aglietta. this
exposure is expressed through struggles over the meanings o f work, leisure and
consumption:
[T]he crisis o f Fordism is first o f all the crisis o f a mode o f labor
organisation. It is expressed above all in the intensification o f class
struggles at the point o f production. By challenging conditions o f work
bound up with the fragmentation of tasks and intensification o f effort,
these struggle showed the limits to the increase in the rate of surplus-value
that were inherent in the relations of production organized in this type of
labour process. This was the root of the crisis. It can be seen in the halt to
the fall in real social wage costs that occurred simultaneously with the
outbreak o f sporadic conflicts and endemic confrontations challenging
work disciplines o f the kind Fordism had established. But it is clear
enough that the crisis extends to the sum total of relations o f production
and exchange, and is upsetting the regime o f intensive accumulation”
(Aglietta 1979:162).
Since Aglietta proposed his theme, the Regulation School has begun to attract some
attention in both America and Europe. In the United States, Michael Piore and Charles
Sahel’s The Second Industrial Divide (1987) popularized the theme o f post-Fordism. In
this book, they traced the origin o f the crises in advanced societies since the 1970s. Piore
and Sabel were very against both neoclassical view and neo-Marxist view because both
o f them considered mass production as the unique path o f technical progress. They
argued that there is another tradition in the production system: a Proudhonist small-scale
cooperative artisanal production (craft system). In the nineteenth century. Western
societies stood on the way o f the first industrial divide, and finally chose mass-production
technologies, limiting craft system. Mass-production technologies entailed two decisive
regulation crises in the late nineteenth century and in the 1930s. In the late nineteenth
century, the large corporations emerged in order to deal with the first regulation crisis. In
the 1930s, the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state appeared in order to deal with the second
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regulation crisis. But since the 1970s, the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state began to show
its limit in regulating crisis. According to Piore and Sabel, this was due to the limitation
of mass-production technologies. As an alternative to Fordism, they proposed “flexible
specialization.” The saturation o f mass markets led to a growing differentiation o f
products, with a new emphasis on style and quality. More differentiated products
required shorter nms and thus, smaller and more flexible production imits. This flexible
specialization depended on new information technologies such as the computer. Flexible
technology gave rise to flexible specialization and more highly skilled polyvalent
workers to operate flexible technology. These highly skilled polyvalent workers did not
need any more monolithic and bureaucratic Fordist trade-unions and political parties.
Thus, the model of flexible specialization appeared more coherent in postulating a
relationship between new technologies, new patterns of demand, and new forms o f social
organization o f production.
These debates on the nature of economic change in the United States since the end o f
World War II developed independently o f postmodern debates. But by the 1980s,
debates on economic change and on cultural change began to intertwine with each other.
A more comprehensive theory was needed. British sociologists were the first social
scientists who began to see postmodernism as something worthy o f serious attention
(Bertens 1995: 209). These British sociologists were primarily Marxist-oriented scholars,
especially post-Fordism-related scholars. In England, a variety o f post-Fordist society
theory was presented by Marxists under the banner of “New Times.” This perspective
was first stated in a series of articles in Marxism Today (the official journal o f the
Communist Party o f Great Britain) and then collections o f these articles were published
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by the executive of the British Community Party as the Manifesto fo r JVew Times (June
1989). And in the same year, some critical articles in the Manifesto fo r New Times and
other critical responses to it were brought together in a book. New Times (Kumar 1995:
50). Following Gramsci’s article “Americanism and Fordism,” the New Times School,
unlike Piore and Sabel, defined Fordism in the broadest possible terms. As Hall and
Jacques (1990: 12) put it: “Just as Fordism represented, not simply a form o f economic
organization but a whole culture.. so post-Fordism is also shorthand for a much wider
and deeper social and cultural development.” The British version o f post-Fordism tried
to connect post-Fordist development with cultural phenomena.
Roughly, David Harvey, an American Marxist geographer, belonged to the New
Times version o f post-Fordism. In The Condition o f Postmodemity: An Inquiry into the
Origins o f Cultural Change (1989), Harvey generally identified Fordism with
institutionalization o f modernist precepts and experiences in culture and social life and
connected the breakdown o f Fordism and the turn towards “flexible specialization” with
the rise to cultural dominance of postmodernist features in social and cultural life. In
short, Harvey focused on the socio-economic factors responsible for the transition from
modernity to postmodemity.
In a nutshell, critical postmodern social theory can be summarized as the following:
1) critical postmodern social theory is a project o f de-essentializing Marx; 2) critical
postmodern social theory sees the social and the subject to be constituted by both the
movement o f capital and human praxis; and 3) critical postmodern social theory utilizes
political economy for investigating the social and the human subject.
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Critical postmodern social theory shared with poststructuralist postmodern social
theory, to a greater or lesser extent, at least one argument that ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics have been aestheticized since World War II. But the response o f
critical postmodern social theory to the process of aestheticization was very different
from one o f poststructuralist postmodern social theory; critical postmodern social theory
tried to retain a totalizing view on ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. From my
perspective, this difference comes from the model o f knowledge that each postmodern
social theory adopted. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory embraced the aesthetic
and critical postmodern social theory adopted the morally practical.

1) Ontology
a. The Nature of the Social
Following Mandel, Jameson (1984a: 78) distinguished “three fundamental moments
in capitalism, each one marking a dialectical expansion over ihe previous stage: these are
market capitalism, the monopoly stage or the stage o f imperialism, and our own—
wrongly called postindustrial, but what might better be termed multinational capital.”
Late capitalism is the purest form of capitalism in which capital expands into hitherto
uncommodified areas including Nature and the Unconscious: “This purer capitalism o f
our own time thus eliminates the enclaves of precapitalist organization it had hitherto
tolerated and exploited in a tributary way: one is tempted to speak in this coimection o f a
new and historically original penetration and colonization o f Nature and the
Unconscious: that is, the destruction o f precapitalist third world agriculture by the Green
Revolution, and the rise o f the media and the advertising industry” (Jameson 1984a: 78).
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This colonialization o f nature and the unconscious by commodifying logic o f capital
corresponds to the radical separation o f the signifier from the signified. This is part o f
the liberation of words and all other signifiers from signification, which results in the
breakdown o f all syntactic order and meaningful relationships in time. Jameson
characterized the social in the postmodern space by the aesthetic; “The break-up of the
Sign in mid-air determines a fall back into a now absolutely fragmented and anarchic
social reality” (Jameson 1985: 201). In this sense, Jameson argued that the social has
become cultural: “Culture itself falls into the world, and the result is not its disappearance
but its prodigious expansion, to the point where culture becomes coterminous with social
life in general: now all the levels become ‘acculturated,’ and in the society o f the
spectacle, the image, or the simulacrum, everything has at length become cultural, from
the superstructures down into the mechanisms of the infrastructure itself' (Jameson 1985:
201). Everything is mediated by culture saturated with images and signs. As a result, the
distinction between the real and the imaginary disappears, which gives rise to a depthless
aestheticized hallucination o f reality. But Jameson went further, claiming that
aestheticization o f the social is governed by commodification. Jameson identified the
main force of aestheticization o f the social with the expanding logic o f capital: “the
frantic economic urgency o f producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods
(from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation”
(Jameson 1984a: 56).
Post-Fordism observed that the social has become dispersed, mobile, flexible, etc.
Following Marx, Harvey (1989:181) argued that “the tendency towards
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overaccumulation can never be eliminated under capitalism.” Harvey (1989: 180)
defined the problem o f overaccumulation o f capital as “a condition in which idle capital
and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no apparent way to bring these idle
resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks.” According to Harvey, there are
three options to deal with this problem. First is

evaluation of commodities, of

productive capacity, o f money value, perhaps coupled with outright destruction” (Harvey
1989: 181). Second is “[mjacro-economic control through institutionalization o f some
system of regulation” (Harvey 1989:181). Last is “[ajbsorption o f overaccumulation
through temporal and spatial displacement” (Harvey 1989: 182). According to Harvey,
Fordism utilized these three options, among them the temporal and spatial displacement
“within” countries was the main strategy to give the advanced Western societies the postWar prosperity. But during the period of 1973-1975 or 1980-1982, Fordism was in crisis
and superior regime o f capitalist production which “would assure a solid basis for further
accumulation on a global scale” (Harvey 1989: 186) was needed. Flexible accumulation
emerged as a response to the rigidities o f Fordism. Flexible accumulation
rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets,
products, and pattems o f consumption. It is characterized by the
emergence o f entirely new sectors o f production, new ways o f providing
financial services, new markets, and, above all. greatly intensified rates of
commercial, technological, and organizational innovation (Harvey 1989:
147).
Just as the success o f Fordism came mainly from absorption o f overaccumulation of
temporal and spatial displacement, so “the crisis o f Fordism was in large part a crisis of
temporal and spatial form” (Harvey 1989: 196). Flexible accumulation entailed two
shifts: new patterning o f uneven development both between sectors and between
geographical regions; a new round of time-space compression, “the time horizons o f both
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private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communication and
declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions
immediately over an ever wider and variegated space” (Harvey 1989:147). Among
them, the second shift is crucial because it has changed the meaning o f time and space.
The speed-up in the turnover times of capital is the determining force in changing the
meaning o f time and space. The major consequence o f the speed-up in the turnover times
o f capital is to accelerate “volatility and ephemerality of fashions, products, production
techniques, labour processes, ideas and ideologies, values and established practices"
(Harvey 1989: 285). As Marx said, “all that is solid melts into air.”

b. The Nature o f Man
Jameson accepted that the subject itself is dead. But Jameson adopted the historicist
position rather than the poststructuralist position. For Jameson the subject who is dead is
the autonomous bourgeois monad or individual, “a once-existing centered subject, in the
period o f classical capitalism and the nuclear family” (Jameson 1984a: 63). Jameson
portrayed Edvard Munch’s expressionist painting The Scream as depicting the
autonomous bourgeois monad or individual: “The very concept o f expression
presupposes indeed some separation within the subject, and along with that a whole
metaphysics o f the inside and the outside, o f the wordless pain within the monad and the
moment in which, often cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and
externalized, as gesture or cry, as desperate communication and the outward
dramatization o f inward feeling” (Jameson 1984a: 61). But in the postmodern period o f
late capitalism, the subject becomes aestheticized: “the alienation o f the subject is
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displaced by the fragmentation o f the subject” (Jameson 1984a: 63). Jameson (1984a:
71) said that Lacan’s account o f schizophrenia “seems to me to offer a suggestive
aesthetic model.” Following Lacan, Jameson argued that schizophrenia represented the
postmodern condition o f subjective fragmentation. Under the postmodern condition, the
subject becomes the schizophrenic who is imable to link signifiers together in a temporal
order. To the schizophrenic, signifiers are experienced as a series of pure and unrelated
presents in time. Jameson (1984a: 72) said that “[i]f we are unable to unify the past,
present, and future o f the sentence, then we are similarly unable to unify the past, present,
and future o f our own biographical experience or psychic life.” Jameson explained the
affective outcome o f this fragmentation o f subjectivity in terms o f Lyotard’s “intensities.”
Intensities are asignifying particles that “are now free-floating and impersonal, and tend
to be dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria” (Jameson 1984a: 64).
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory argued that people do not exist as a
homogeneous group who has identical interests. The general speed-up in the turnover
times o f capital influences the human subject as both producer and consumer. The
human subject as a producer is exposed to “vertical disintegration” (sub-contracting,
outsourcing, etc.) and “an increasing roundaboumess in production even in the face of
increasing financial centralization” (Harvey 1989: 284). For this, the new technologies of
electronic control, small-batch production, etc. played an important role. “For the
labourers this all implied an intensification (speed-up) in labour processes and an
acceleration in the de-skilling and re-skilling required to meet new labor needs” (Harvey
1989:285). Thus, the human subject as a producer is not stable, which results in
tmdermining the collective interest. The human subject as a consumer is also exposed to
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the paralleling speed-up in exchange and consumption: “Improved systems o f
communication and information flow, coupled with rationalizations in techniques o f
distribution (packaging, inventory control, containerization. market feed-back, etc.),
made it possible to circulate commodities through the market system with greater speed.
Electronic banking and plastic money were some of the innovations that improved the
speed o f the inverse flow o f money. Financial services and markets (aided by
computerized trading) likewise speeded up, so as to make, as the saying has it, ‘twentyfour hours a very long time’ in global markets” (Harvey 1989: 285). What is more
important than this acceleration o f the pace o f exchange and consumption is that the
content o f consumption has changed from goods to services not only personal, business,
educational, and health services but also entertainments, spectacles, happenings, and
distractions. Consumers are exposed to the “image production industry” which tried to
manipulate “desires and tastes through images that may or may not have anything to do
with the product to be sold” (Harvey 1989: 287). Consumers “are living in a world of
ephemeral created images” (Harvey 1989: 289).

2) Epistemology
Jameson pointed out that the traditional epistemology that favored “depth models”
was in crisis because depth is replaced by surface or multiple surfaces. Jameson (1984a:
62) enumerated four depth models: “the dialectical one o f essence and appearance (along
with a whole range of concepts o f ideology or false consciousness which tend to
accompany it); the Freudian model of latent and manifest, or o f repression...; the
existential model o f authenticity and inauthenticity, whose heroic or tragic thematics are
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closely related to that other great opposition between alienation and disalienation..

and

finally, latest in time, the great semiotic opposition between signifier and signified." In
postmodern culture in which there are no longer depths, traditional methodology which
aimed to “represent” the deep truths is obsolete. But Jameson did not fully accept the
poststructuralist position that representation is impossible. Jameson accepted Althusser's
definition o f ideology as “the Imaginary representation o f the subject’s relationship to his
or her Real conditions o f existence.” Following Althusser, Jameson argued that ideology
is a necessary function in any form o f social life, telling a story o f future that grips the
masses. By contrast, Jameson (1988: 358) defined science as “a discourse (which is
ultimately impossible) without a subject” like a mathematical equation. Science as an
ideal discourse deals with the real with abstract conceptions independent of individual
subjects. Thus, science does not teach people how to relate their own individual lives
with the abstract larger structure. Science can do this only if it becomes an ideology.
Then, “we are back to aesthetics. Aesthetics is something that addresses individual
experience rather than something that conceptualizes the real in a more abstract way”
(Jameson 1988: 358). In this sense, Jameson challenged the sharp division between
ideology and science. For Jameson, representation is the synonym o f figuration itself:
“all forms of aesthetic production consists in one way or another in the struggle with and
for representation” (Jameson 1988:348). The representation as figuration is similar to
cognitively mapping social space. Jameson historicized social space, claiming that social
space has its different forms according to the three historical stages o f capital. In
classical or market capitalism, some older sacred and heterogeneous space was
reorganized into geometrical and Cartesian homogeneity by a logic o f the grid. In this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

new emerging space, figuration would not be a big problem because “the immediate and
limited experience of individuals is still able to encompass and coincide with the true
economic and social form that governs that experience" (Jameson 1988: 349). In a sense,
in this space essence and appearance, structure and lived experience do not contradict.
Realism is a strategy to cognitively map this social space. But in the next stage, “the
passage from market to monopoly capital, or what Lenin called the ‘stage of
imperialism,’” the problems o f figuration “may be conveyed by way o f growing
contradiction between lived experience and structure, or between a phenomenological
description o f the life of an individual and a more properly structural model o f the
conditions o f existence o f that experience” (Jameson 1988: 349). Modernism is a
strategy to overcome this dilemma. In the third stage referred to the moment o f the
multinational network, not only the older city but even the nation-state itself lost its
former power due to multinational capitalism. This new stage produced a new
postmodern space involvir.g the suppression o f distance and the saturation o f capital into
nature and the unconscious, to the point where the postmodern subject is exposed to “a
perceptual barrage o f immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening
mediations have been removed” (Jameson 1988: 351). In this sense, traditional forms of
representation are obsolete. But the need to represent this space is still alive in order to
get about in the world. Postmodernism is a strategy to cognitively map postmodern
space. But this is not easy because o f the complex space o f multinational or late
capitalism and the fragmentation o f the subject. Jameson claimed that we need to use the
strategies, techniques, and elements o f postmodernism against postmodernism itself: “To
undo postmodernism homeopathically by the methods o f postmodernism: to work at
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dissolving the pastiche by using all the instruments o f pastiche itself, to reconquer some
genuine historical sense by using the instruments o f what I have called substitutes for
history” (Jameson in Stephansonl989: 59). An aesthetic of postmodern cognitive
mapping “seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its
place in the global system” (Jameson 1984a: 92).
Post-Fordist postmodern social theory also recognized the crisis o f representation, but
it believed that Marxist tradition could overcome it. To post-Fordist postmodern social
theory, the core methodology o f Marxism is political economy, which aims to historically
trace the development of capital. Capital is the essence or form that manifests itself in a
variety of matters. In this sense, post-Fordist postmodern social theory responded to the
crisis o f representation with the aid o f the essentialist version o f the theoretical. Harvey
claimed that the nature o f space and time, which were basic categories o f human
existence, has changed since modernism served to compress both time and space.
Harvey historically traced how this compression of time and space has occurred from
European feudalism to the postmodern era. Harvey argued that the acceleration of
compression o f time-space in the postmodern era challenged human capacity to grapple
with the realities because traditional notion of realities was based on the epistemology
based on fixed and stable notion o f time and space. But Harvey still believed that “It is
possible to write the historical geography o f the experience of space and time in social
life, and to understand the transformations that both have undergone, by reference to
material and social conditions” (Harvey 1989:327). To Harvey, material and social
conditions refer first o f all to the law o f capital accumulation and speculative change:
“There are laws o f process at work imder capitalism capable o f generating a seemingly
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infinite range o f outcomes out o f the slightest variation in initial conditions or o f human
activity and imagination. In the same way that the laws o f fluid dynamics are invariant in
every river in the world, so the laws of capital circulation are consistent from one
supermarket to another, fi'om one labour market to another, fi-om one commodity
production system to another, fi’om one country to another and fi’om one household to
another” (Harvey 1989: 343). But unlike orthodox Marxists, Harvey recognized that the
future cannot be predicted in advance because the restless transformative activity of
capital accumulation and speculative change is bound to context: “the degree o f Fordism
and modernism, or o f flexibility and postmodernism, is bound to vary from time to time
and fi’om place to place, depending on which configuration is profitable and which is not”
(Harvey 1989: 344). In this sense, post-Fordist postmodern social theory has a much
more agnostic position on the outcome o f postmodemization.

3) Ethics/Politics
Jameson (Stephanson 1989:46) argued that “[t]ime has become a perpetual present
and thus spatial.” Mainly due to this new depthlessness, historicity has weakened both in
our relationship to public history and in the new forms o f our private temporality. In this
situation, traditional morality/politics seems to be obsolete because fragmented
individuals are dominated by a peculiar kind o f euphoria. But Jameson believed that this
is a transitional phenomenon which appears when people don’t yet invent inclusive and
totalizing stories which can endow the individual subject with some new heightened
sense o f its place in the global system. Thus, what is needed is to invent new inclusive
and totalizing stories: “I am far firom suggesting that no politics at all is possible in this
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new post-Marxian Nietzschean world of micropolitics— that is observably untrue. But I
do want to argue that without a conception o f the social totality (and the possibility of
transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible" (Jameson
1988: 355). These totalizing stories do not cease to imagine how a society without
hierarchy, a society o f free people, can possibly cohere.
Harvey also recognized that the traditional notion o f temporality has fundamentally
changed mainly due to the accelerating turnover time in production, exchange, and
consumption. Volatility and ephemerality has replaced linear, accumulative, progressive
notion o f temporality, making it hard to maintain any firm sense o f continuity. As a
result, aesthetics of instant ecstasy in a world o f ephemerally created world makes
obsolete traditional morality based on the promise o f future rewards. As a Marxist,
Harvey wanted to overcome the crisis of historical materialism. But unlike some postMarxists who totally abandoned class politics, Harvey tried to retain the importance o f
class in postmodern condition while embracing postmodernist concern about difference
and otherness. For this, difference and otherness should not be treated as "something to
be added on to more fundamental Marxist categories (like class and productive forces),
but as something that should be omni-present from the very beginning in any attempt to
grasp the dialectics o f social change” (Harvey 1989: 355).

Some Historical Parallels o f the Aesthetic Moment
1 have argued that the postmodern might be understood as the aestheticization o f
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/morality, which has proceeded from early 1960s to
the present in advanced Western societies. As postmodern social theories have
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witnessed, the aestheticization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics includes
both intellectual and institutional processes. In fact, what is peculiar in postmodern
debates is that postmodern social theories have documented that there are "substantive
institutional” changes associated with the process o f aestheticization. But if we take only
the intellectual or philosophical dimension and leave the institutional level aside, we can
easily find some historical parallels in Western intellectual history.
Gorgias, Sade, and Nietzsche might be some exemplars. Gorgias lived in ancient
Greece around the fourth century B.C., Sade in the seventeenth century, and Nietzsche in
the second half o f the nineteenth century. They all presented similar views that might be
characterized by the aesthetic model o f knowledge. But their arguments did not gain
popularity during their days. One o f the main reasons for that is, I believe, that there was
no or little “substantive institutional” process of aestheticization. Society in general was
not yet substantively differentiated. As Durkheim showed in The Division o f Labour, the
aesthetic argument could not attract people in a society in which the degree o f division o f
labor is low. In the postmodern era in which the degree of division o f labor is high
enough to be called de-differentiation in which everything is saturated by images and
signs, the aesthetic model of knowledge could be resonant in people. In this sense, we
might say that the aesthetic model o f knowledge was latent and dominated in the whole
Western history, but in postmodern era it becomes explicit and dominant.
In what follows I will show how Gorgias. Sade and Nietzsche presented their views
on ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which were very similar to the aesthetic. I
do not aim to present these thinkers as postmodern social theorists. I believe that the
"philosophical” distinction between these thinkers and postmodern social theorists is
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highly superficial unless we situate each within its institutional contexts. We could even
find some philosophical similarities between ancient Asian philosophies and postmodern
philosophies. We need to situate ideas within the institutional contexts in which they are
inscribed. Postmodern social theories are meaningful only when they are situated within
the institutional change in society, which were often expressed in terms o f consumer
society, post-industrial society, information society, postmodern society, late capitalist
society, fast capitalist society, etc. Nevertheless, this section is not totally useless
because it will inform us that the aesthetic model o f knowledge is not entirely new in the
Western intellectual history. It will also hint to us that what is new in the postmodern is
certain institutional changes in which the aesthetic model o f knowledge gained power.
Finally, it will reaffirm that sociological analysis o f institutional contexts in which the
aesthetic bloomed is still needed.

1. Ancient Greek Sophist: Gorgias
Rejecting Protagoras, Gorgias, and all their followers as relativistic
nihilists whose ides would lead to social decay, sexual perversity, and
anarchy creates a comfortable certainty for Western thought. By rejecting
sophistry. Western thought can play itself out as a history in which truth,
after much tribulation, triumphs through its own self-righteous virtue and
then remains available in the West forever (Neel 1988: 205).
Gorgias was one o f the Greek sophists who lived in the age o f transition from
mythology to a kind o f humanism. Before the fifth century B.C.. Greek thought was
profoundly influenced by traditional patriarchal mythologies represented by Homer,
Hesiod, and the so-called Orphic poems, in which the wills o f gods or o f superhuman
heroes presided over the world. Gorgias was one o f the Greek sophists who changed this
traditional worldview into a humanistic worldview. This transition o f worldview
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occurred in an era of crisis. Politically, Athens grew enough to challenge the hegemony
o f Sparta: “[i]t was not until Athens had risen to power and had come into conflict with
Sparta, especially during the long Peloponnesian War (430-400 B.C.), that social thought
independent o f religious tradition began to manifest itself’ (Ellwood 1971:9). But when
Athens was defeated by Sparta, the sense o f crisis spread wide: “Now, a major crisis in
Greek institutions and social life occurred when Sparta overthrew Athens in the
Peloponnesian War. Athens had built up a great empire after the Persian wars, and it
must have been indeed a shock to the Athenians to see the imperial power o f Athens
overthrown by Sparta and her allies” (Ellwood 1971: 10). Socially, Greece o f the fifth
century B.C. was experiencing rapid growth of democracy and expansion of scientific
knowledge, which brought out a sense o f crisis (Barrett 1987: 6). Confronting this crisis,
the Athenians began to ask what was wrong. In this respect, Ellwood’s remark is
suggestive: “social thinking arises when the institutions and customs of the past no longer
work well, perhaps break down, and have to be replaced by new adjustments, new values,
which result in new customs and institutions” (Ellwood 1971:9). The Athenians
increasingly did not find adequate solutions in their existing mythologies. Therefore,
they began to shift their attention from the universe to man himself, and from cosmogony
to morality and politics. The sophists were the first who represented this shift. Thus, the
fifth century was often referred to as the “Age o f Sophists” (Burnet 1914:109), the “Age
of Illumination” (Bury 1958: 376-397), the “Age of Enlightenment” (Guthrie 1971:48),
or the “Greek Enlightenment” (Tamas 1991:25). Socrates was one of these sophists, and
it was Plato who distinctly separated the true philosopher (Socrates) from the sophists.
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The sophists did not form schools, and most o f their works have been lost. Most
information about the sophists, in fact, came from Plato who disliked them. Plato
negatively defined and grouped the sophists mainly into two terms: first is that the
sophists were merchants, retailers, and manufacturing traders of learning; and second is
that the sophists were imitators o f the wise (see Notomi 1999:44-48). The sophists have
been long forgotten partly due to this negative image long dominating the Western
intellectual history: “Until the nineteenth centiuy, the first sophists had been buried under
two millennia o f neglect, and outcome o f the passionate condemnation they provoked
from two o f their contemporaries who have fared better in the histories, Plato and
Aristotle” (Jarratt 1991: 1). But since Hegel revived the sophists as relativists in the 19***
century, many revisionist interpretations began to pour out. What the sophists did was to
voice their objection to the ideal o f the theoretical, which was then represented by
Parmenides who argued that “Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is
whole of limb, without motion and without end” (quoted in Romilly 1992: 95). Thus for
Parmenides, the rigorous philosophical or scientific inquiry should rest on this ultimate
and immutable foundation of being. The sophists in general refuted this view.
From my perspective, Gorgias lived in an aesthetic moment. In the opening o f his
treatise On the Nonexistent, Gorgias expressed the archetype of the aesthetic: “first and
foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man;
third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being
expressed or explained to the next man” (Sprague 1972:42).
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Ontologically, Gorgias proposed a position o f philosophical nihilism, according to
which neither the existent nor the nonexistent exists. As Sextus (Sprague 1972: 43-44)
put it:
[T]he nonexistent does not exist, for if the nonexistent exists, it will both
exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar as it is understood as
nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as it is nonexistent it will, on the
other hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely absurd for something to
exist and at the same time not to exist. The nonexistent, therefore, does
not exist. And to state another argument, if the nonexistent exists, the
existent will not exist, for these are opposites to each other, and if
existence is an attribute o f the nonexistent, nonexistence will be an
attribute of the existent. But it is not, in fact, true that the existent does not
exist. <Accordingly>, neither will the non-existent exist. Moreover, the
existent does not exist either. For if the existent exists, it is either eternal
or generated, or at the same time eternal and generated. But it is neither
eternal nor generated nor both, as we shall show. The existent therefore
does not exist.. .So that if the existent is eternal it is unlimited, and if it is
unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist.
Accordingly, if the existence is eternal, it is not existent at all. Moreover,
neither can the existent be generated. For if it has come into being, it has
come either from the existent or the nonexistent. But it has not come from
the existent. For if it is existent, it has not come to be, but already exists.
Nor from the nonexistent. For the nonexistent cannot generate anything,
because what is generative of something o f necessity ought to partake o f
positive existence. It is not true either, therefore, that the existent is
generated. In the same way it is not jointly at the same time eternal and
generated. For these qualities are mutually exclusive of each other, and if
the existent is eternal it has not been generated, and if it has been
generated it is not eternal. Accordingly, if the existent is neither eternal
nor generated nor both at once, the existent should not exist.
This argument reverses Parmenides’ argument that “What is, is; what is not, is not.”
According to Parmenides, “what is” is the absolute unity and permanence o f the One.
“What is” excludes motion, change, and becoming because they necessarily harm the
absolute unity and permanence o f the One. By contrast, “what is not” is something other
than “is.” In other words, “what is not” is any alteration o f “what is” and thus “what is
not” is not. In this way, Parmenides sharply divided “what is” and “what is not” and
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gave ontological privilege to “what is” over “what is not.” Thus, anything that moves,
changes, and becomes into being is not real. Gorgias disrupted Parmenides by arguing
that nothing exists.
This argument has been interpreted in several ways (see Kerferd 1997: 7), but 1 would
like to interpret it as the archetype of the aesthetic. Gorgias denied the dichotomy of
being (the absolute unity and permanence o f the One) and becoming (the modification of
being). In this dichotomy, being and becoming is in fact one, because becoming is some
modification o f “being.” In this sense, being is original and becoming is a copy o f the
original. Gorgias deconstructed this dichotomy. Nothing exists. In other words, “some
more” exists. Some more follows the convention of pastiche. As Vitanza (1997: 261)
put it:
One o f the primary conventions o f pastiche is that there is no origin,
original, that is, no No. Pastiche is a paragenre that denegates a grand
narrative founded on cause-effect, or on any other negative iopos or
e/utopos. Pastiche is informed by the post-ontology and postepistemology that a copy is a copy o f a copy o f a copy, and infinitum.
This ontology might be applied to man even though Gorgias did not present a
systematic view on man. If Protagoras is an agnostic, Gorgias is an atheist. Gorgias did
not believe in the existence of God or the soul. In this sense, man is not a fixed substance
whose essence is God-given reason but a ceaseless flux. Man refutes the binary
opposition o f Being and not-Being, and resides somewhere in between the two.
Temporary “stop” o f this flux depends on changing contexts in which many competing,
contradictory voices are deployed. In this sense, man is a historical process in which
many competing, contradictory voices open up fixed binary positions, active and passive,
and thus provide partial, multiple positions for man, which promotes an activity o f
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endless desiring metamorphosis. These partial, multiple positions lead man to the
irrational or nonrational states because they are beyond representation based on the
binary opposition of “what is” and “what is not.” In this sense, man defies any fixed
category which is necessarily based on negation of, or exclusion of. something which is
beyond the category. In a sense, man is a pre-socialized fiux or a socialized neurotic who
is haunted by something that is negated or excluded. This notion o f man is very radical
when we think o f the Greek ideal o f man, a self-sufficient being. Self-sufficiency not
only demands perfection o f being that calls for realization o f being, but also excludes all
limits, generating a positive infinity which refuses all determination. Gorgias directly
opposed this view by deconstructing the binary logic of self-sufficiency, “is” versus “isnot.”
Methodologically, Gorgias reversed Parmenides. Parmenides argued that one can
validly think only about what really exists. In this sense. Thought and Being are one and
the same. By contrast, Parmenides argued that the non-existent cannot be known because
it does not exist. We might perceive, not think, something that moves, changes, and
comes into being, but its is not “what is.” Thus Parmenides sharply divided thinking and
perceiving, and gave epistemological privilege to thinking over perceiving. As
Parmenides put it:
Come now, I shall speak, and you must hear and receive my word. These
are the only roads of enquiry that exist for the thinking mind: one road,
that ‘IT IS,’ and that ‘IT CANNOT NOT BE’ is the path o f Persuasion, for
Truth attends it. Another road, that ‘IT IS NOT,’ and IT [i.e. what is not]
MUST BE NON-EXISTENT’ is a road that I declare to be totally
indiscernible. For you could neither know [or recognise?] what is non
existent, for that is unattainable, nor could you describe it. For it is the
same thing which is for thinking and for being (Luce 1992: 51).
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For Parmenides, thought is equated with logos, i.e., word and speech, and logos is
further equated with being. Gorgias argued that '"logos is not evocative o f the external"
(Sprague 1972:46). In other words, Gorgias argued that there is always the gap between
word and thing. In this way, Gorgias deconstructed the equation o f logos and being. As
Crowley (1979: 281) put it:
[H]e [Gorgias] wants to free language from any ties to objective reality, in
order that language may be exploited to its fullest potential as a medium
for creating illusions and exciting the emotions.. .What Gorgias does here
is to release logos from adherence to any other reality; the word has no
necessary correlation to the world o f Being.
This detachment o f language from reality leads to a new notion of the rhetoric, i.e.,
“an art which employs words not to find truth, b u t.. to mold or impress the psyche, to
create beautiful illusions, to ‘stop fear and banish grief and create joy and natural pity’”
(Crowley 1979:282). In this sense, “the function o f an orator is not logical
demonstration so much as emotional presentation what will stir the audience’s will to
believe. Thus, the power o f persuasion involves deceiving ‘the emotional and mental
state o f listeners by artificially stimulating sensory reactions through words ”(Kennedy
1999: 36).
As a result, Gorgias will not “confine reality within a dogmatic scheme but allow it to
rage in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity” (Untersteiner 1954: xvi). Thus,
Gorgias leaves audiences confused. But for Gorgias, unlike for Protagoras, antithesis
does not necessarily entail parataxis. The connection between antithesis and parataxis
does not depend on the necessary correlation o f language and being, but on the mental
participation o f the audiences. If they are “deceived” by language, parataxis for actions
would be followed. But this is only a possibility. Playing with words is the cornerstone
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o f Gorgias’ methodology, in which any kind o f temporal copula between words, not
between words and beings, goes if it succeeds in persuading the audiences. In this sense,
some compare Gorgias’ rhetoric to advertising in the contemporary world: “Following
the analogy, one might assign to rhetoric the place now occupied by advertising" (Guthrie
1969: 50); “it is clear that we have already the elements of a theory of rhetoric which can
stand comparison with modem accounts o f the technique o f advertising" (Kerferd 1984:
82).
On the direction o f history, Gorgias did not propose a systematic view. But we can
draw some hints from his general view. Gorgias might argue that there is no direction of
history because there is no design by the Supreme Being. History is subject to
contingency, not to deteminism.
The moral implication o f Gorgias s argument is nihilism or playfulness. In the
Encomium o f Helen, Gorgias exempted Helen from responsibility for her actions. To
defend Helen against blame for her part in the fall of Troy, Gorgias advanced four
arguments: 1) she was fated by the gods; 2) she was raped; 3) she was seduced by
discourse; or 4) she acted out o f love. In any case, Helen is not blamed for actions
because she was not the master o f her own actions. In the first case, “it is right for the
responsible one to be held responsible; for god’s predetermination cannot be hindered by
human premeditation’’ (Sprague 1972: 51). In the second case, Helen should not be
blamed: “if she was raped by violence and illegally assaulted and unjustly insulted, it is
clear that the raper, as the insulter, did the wronging, and the raped, as the insulted, did
the suffering. It is right, then, for the barbarian who undertook a barbaric undertaking in
word and law and deed to meet with blame in word, exclusion in law, and punishment in
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deed” (Sprague 1972: 51). In the third case, Helen should not be blamed because
language has the power to impress the psyche: “Speech is a powerful lord, which by
means o f the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear
and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity” (Sprague 1972: 52). In the last case,
Helen is not responsible for her actions: “For if it was love which did all these things,
there will be no difficulty in escaping the charge of the sin which is alleged to have taken
place” (Sprague 1972: 53). Thus, Helen is not responsible for her actions; she was not
the master o f her actions. As Neel (1988:205) argued: “Those persuaded by the clever,
he [Gorgias] contends, should be held blameless for their actions because the bewitching,
hypnotic power o f persuasion overcomes everyone sometime. By like token, those
seduced by the passion of love, because they have fallen under the power o f the god o f
love and because the need to love is a human frailty, should at worst be pitied; they are
the victims o f fate merely obeying the compulsion o f love, not free individuals with the
strength o f will to make a choice.” Then what man can do is to do what he has to do or
what he is doing. There is no moral code, because man has no power to control his
actions. This is very nihilistic, which Plato and his followers hated extremely.
Playfulness is directly connected with nihilism. Man can play with words without any
restriction because language does not have any necessary relation to being or truth or
reality. In a sense that human beings are not responsible for their actions, anything may
go. No law is allowed.
The political implication is anarchy. No hierarchical organization is allowed because
it would exclude “others” who threaten its fixed identity.
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2. The Anti-Enlightenment: Sade
[D]o everything you fancy, anything; to act, to riot, to react at your ease,
without interference from anybody.. to say to yourself, here is an object
Nature surrenders into my hands to do with absolutely whatever I please, I
can smash it, I can bum it, I can maim it, I can dismantle it, 1 can torment
it, I can fondle and annihilate it as I like, it is mine, nothing can deprive
me of it, nothing save it from its fate (Sade, quoted in Sawhney 1999:91).
What 1 call “anti-Enlightenment” is in fact one extremity o f the CounterEnlightenment. Berlin considered Romanticism to be the main force o f the CounterEnlightenment. According to Berlin (1999), the Romantic movement has two main
features. One is the morally practical, whose core idea is that society is constmcted
through the rhetorical and political activities o f man who changes with change o f society.
In addition to this, Berlin characterized the other feature o f the Romantic movement as
the aesthetic, whose core idea is that any kind o f social, political, or religious
organization o f society and man is unnatural. Nature does not have any universal law
except for the law o f permanent fluidity o f creation and destruction.
The second position—connected with the first— is that there is no
structure o f things. There is no pattem to which you must adapt yourself.
There is only, if not the flow, the endless self-creativity of the universe.
The universe must not be conceived o f as a set of facts, as a pattem of
events, as a collection o f lumps in space, three-dimensional entities bound
together by certain unbreakable relations, as taught to us by physics,
chemistry and other natural sciences; the universe is a process o f perpetual
forward self-thrusting, perpetual self-creation.. (Berlin 1999: 119-120).
In fact, the second feature o f the Romantic movement is significantly different from
the main force o f the Counter-Enlightenment. Even before Schopenhauer (1788-1860)
and Nietzsche (1844-1900), this view is found in one of the eighteenth-century figures.
Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). I am very convinced that it is Sade who revitalized the
aesthetic model o f knowledge that had been repressed since the Greek sophists.
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especially Gorgias. Sade attacked the Enlightenment and, moreover, the entire structure
o f Western culture; he disrupted the traditional notion o f the universe, seeing the universe
as absurd and meaningless. Sade also disrupted the traditional notion of man. freeing the
body from the confines o f social, political, religious, and ethical constructions. If there is
a law, it is the law o f permanent fluidity of creation and destruction.
Sade was enormously influenced by materialists such as La Mettrie and D 'Holbach,
and pushed their materialist implication to the extreme. On the problem o f God, Sade
took an extreme atheist position. God does not exist; neither the anthropomorphic
Christian God nor the Cartesian efficient cause nor the Newtonian mathematic God
exists. Sade attacked the anthropomorphism o f such doctrines as final causes which
assume God’s province. In this sense, Sade went hand in hand with the empiricist
version o f the Enlightenment. But Sade did not embrace the Cartesian efficient cause.
Unlike the empiricist version, Sade did not assume any universally ordered law that
governs universe and man. Nature does not have any universal law except for the law of
permanent fluid of creation and destruction. Thus, Sade attacked all core ideas of the
Enlightenment about the universe and man: both the First Cause and the Final Cause are
rejected. Also Sade was differentiated from the main force o f the Counter-Enlightenment
as far as it defied any kind o f social, political, and religious organization of society and
man. Bureaucratic hierarchy is the main enemy o f the aesthetic version because it
betrays nature which is characterized by the laws of perpetual creation and destruction.
In this sense, Sade might be seen to be the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century version of
the aesthetic.
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Ontologically, Sade, like the empiricist version o f the Enlightenment, held that there
exists only nature which is matter in motion. But unlike the empiricist version o f the
Enlightenment, Sade emphasized “motion” over “matter.” Nature is neither the created
nor the substance. Rather, “Nature is a perpetuating force, a turbulent system, which
casts organisms upon the surface o f the earth. The cast o f Nature is a temporal
suspension o f material forces on a cosmic scale” (Sawhney 1999: 83). There is neither
the First Cause nor the Final Cause. There is only the perpetual twin processes o f
creation and destruction o f nature, through which infinite unlike entities are made and
disappeared. In this scheme, the traditional notion o f being, self-same entity, disappears.
Applying this ontology to the universe, Sade (quoted in Sawhney 1999: 79) argued as
follows:
The universe is an assemblage o f unlike entities which act and react
mutually and successively with and against each other; I discern no start,
no finish, no fixed boundaries, this universe I can see only as an incessant
passing from one state into another, and within it only particular beings
which forever change shape and form.
For Sade, the universe is a perpetually revolutionizing system that creates diverse
levels o f interaction through acts of destruction. Destruction is a basis of creation;
without destruction, creation cannot be. Destruction, by nature, is amoral; it is beyond
humane morality. Enormously influenced by materialists such as La Mettrie and
D’Holbach, Sade opposed to the then dominant concept o f a rationally ordered universe
(Crocker 1959: 8-11). Sade argued that disorder is the only order of the world. For Sade,
disorder means that the world is full o f tyraimy and injustice, because the strong always
oppress and exploit the weak. Thus Sade held that evil is a universal law o f nature. As
Sade (quoted in Crocker 1959:42) put it in one o f the characters in his novel:
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I raise my eyes over the universe, I see evil, disorder and crime ruling
everywhere as despots.. .what ideas result from this examination? that
what we improperly term evil really is not evil, and that this mode is so
necessary to the designs o f the being who created us that he would cease
being the master o f his own work if evil did not exist universally over the
earth.. .[God’s hand] has created [the world] only for evil, it takes
pleasure only in evil, evil is its essence.. It is in evil that he created
world, it is by evil that he maintains it, it is for evil that he perpetuates it. it
is impregnated with evil that the creature must exist.. .the mode being the
soul o f the Creator as it is that o f the creature.
In these sentences, Sade seemed to believe in God, but he just pretended to do so
purely for the sake o f argument. Sade, an extreme atheist, deprived the world of
meanings and morals. As a result, the world becomes meaningless, absurd, and cruel,
because “in the world o f nature and men, the good (or synonymously, the weak) are
destined to be the wretched victims o f the vicious (or the strong)” (Crocker 1959:41).
For Sade, the social world is not a discrete world different from the natural world.
The cruel law o f disorder dominates the natural world as well as the social world.
Everything becomes permissible because there is no God nor morals. In this sense, the
Sadean world is a world o f beasts that act instinctively without knowing God or morals.
Thus, Sade proposed an anarchistic view on society, which is against the Enlightenment
view in general as well as one o f the Vichian version o f the Counter-Enlightenment. This
anarchistic view on society is significant under the historical context of the rising
bourgeois capitalism which is characterized by a ceaseless struggle for profit.
Applying this ontology to man, Sade robbed man o f his privileged position in the
“Great Chain o f Being” by deconstructing it. Man is not an exceptional being any more.
Man is just one o f many kinds o f organism that nature casts upon the surface of the earth.
What is man? and what difference is there between him and other plants,
between him and all the other animals o f the world? None, obviously.
Fortuitously placed, like them, upon this globe, he is bom like them; like
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them, he reproduces, rises, and falls; like them he arrives at old age and
sinks like them into nothingness at the close of the life span Nature assigns
each species o f animal, in accordance with its organic construction (Sade,
quoted in Sawhney 1999: 83-84).
Thus, to place man in a privileged position in the universe is illogical because the cast
of nature is only a temporal suspension of material forces. Man also follows a law o f
nature, a law o f permanent twin processes o f creation and destruction. Like plants and
beasts, man follows the supreme law o f egoism. “There is,” thus, “only one law, the law
of instinct, which makes us seek pleasure and happiness. No other law obtains, despite
our self-delusion” (Crocker 1959:99).
In this sense, the dualism o f body and soul is meaningless. Soul was conceived as the
core place in which morals such as pity, social duties, love o f neighbor reside. But Sade
argued that this notion o f the soul is our self-delusion, because there is only the supreme
law o f egoism in nature. Man is the body which follows the law of nature. Thus, Sade
wanted to criticize man’s pretensions that a sphere of reason and morals exists apart from
men. As Crocker (1959: 101-102) put it:
Sade conceived one o f his main goals to be stripping the idol o f love o f all
its false attractions, restoring it to its true status as animal pleasure in
which we have the desire and right to wallow, to any excess. In Sade’s
mind, this was one way o f uncovering the true man, man the animal,
underneath the pretentious self-imposed halo of a being made in the image
o f God. Sade’s writings respond to the desire he expressed, in an essay on
the novel, to reveal man not only as he shows himself, “but such as he
may be, such as the modifications and all the shocks o f the passions may
possibly make him.” It is this exploration which leads Sade to the great
discovery that the vitalities in human life are destructive as well as
creative, and in fact are essentially destructive when they are not chained
and diverted into other channels. Sade, then, destroys the notion o f love as
something pure and lovely; it is, rather, much worse than merely bestial; it
is cruel, and its freest and fullest expression is in torture and death.. he
was the first to present sex as necessarily, inherently and essentially evil.
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Methodologically, Sade tried to subvert the traditional epistemology in which
language (thought) is supposed to represent reality (being). Thus, in traditional
epistemology, only being is supposed to be represented and non-being is not supposed to
be represented. Against this, Sade held that everything, including being and non-being, is
exposed and seen. As Sawhney (1999; 86) put it:
Sade, most passionately, aspires to document all that is forbidden to
thought, to categorize all that lies outside the realm o f reason, a strategy
that is entirely compatible with his philosophy that everything must be
exposed, however monstrous and inhumane it may be.
Sade tried to express the inexpressible. Transgression is the most intellectual activity
which tries to express the inexpressible; to transgress is to pass beyond any limit or
boundary which has discrete form and discrete identity. Transgression demands the
complete overthrow o f any vestige o f order, because order itself constrains and dictates
only certain possibilities of personal action. Transgression takes place, in each case,
according to the particular type of restriction that is imposed on his freedom. Thus,
“Sade variously proposes blasphemy, immorality, crime, incest, murder, violation, lies,
slander, theft, rapacity, irrationality, sodomy, hate, and every other kind o f violence,
perversion, or aberration conceivable—each of these a specific and considered tactical
operation to serve the strategic movement o f the libertine’s transgressive itinerary”
(Allison 1999:211).
On the direction o f change, Sade argued that there is no direction in history because
there is only the twin permanent processes o f destruction and creation in the world. Sade
argued that there is neither start (the First Cause) nor end (the Final Cause). One o f the
most important moral implications in this is the extremist secular hedonism. He could
not but negate the transcendental imperative o f universal Christian morality. He denied
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the concept of immortality because he did not believe in the existence o f spiritual soul.
Thus, the hope o f the postmortem rewards for the spiritual control over corporeal desires
vanishes. The spiritual control over the corporeal desires or the subordination to any kind
of supernatural authority is illogical because “Nature, when she cast us into the world,
created us free and atheists” (Sade, quoted in Sawhney 1999; 84). Man is completely
free o f moral constraints because he is living in an absurd and meaningless universe,
utterly deprived o f purposes and moral values. In this way, Sade tried to free man from
the confines of social, political, religious, and ethical constructions. Morality is
experienced only in a form o f induced illusion or habituation. Thus, true morality is
desire in cosmic flows. From this follows the extremist position that it is natural that the
strong tries to despoil the weak and obtain pleasure at his expense. Even crime is
celebrated because it’s the extreme form of self-love or egoism.
Crime is nought but the means Nature employs to attain her ends in regard
to us and to preserve the equilibrium so indispensable to the maintenance
of her workings. This explication alone suffices to make clear that it is not
for man to punish crime, because crime belongs to the Nature that
possesses every right over us and over which we dispose o f none (Sade,
quoted in Sawhney 1999:83).
Crime is the instrument by which social, political, ethical assemblages are destroyed and
recreated in order to (re)integrate desire back into the flux o f Nature.
One of the most important political implications is extremist anarchism. Sade
criticized state interventions that “embody desire into homogeneous realms, that is,
instances o f state institutions suspending the material forces o f desire in order that desire
serve a higher purpose, such as God, church, or government. Sade argued that this
suspension of desire is a mechanism o f control that lies outside the flux o f Nature”
(Sawhney 1999: 80). The state plays the role in stabilizing and suspending desire
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through hierarchical stratification. The state interventions change the temporal
suspension o f matters to a higher transcendent purpose. By so doing, the state
interventions eliminate desire’s incessant passing from one state into another. This
elimination betrays the law of nature because it suspends the regenerative (creative and
destructive) materiality o f Nature. Sade aimed to restore desire to cosmic fiuxes. As
Sawhney (1999: 85) excellently put it:
Sade asks: Why then should the individual follow the laws, rules, norms,
dictates, and values o f society when it is evident that social systems are in
direct conflict with the laws o f perpetual destruction within Nature?
However much the human race attempts to harness and manipulate
Nature, “she” always acts according to “her” own laws. Why, asks Sade,
does the state machinery thwart the impulses o f Nature by
institutionalizing desire, a process that imprisons desire tlnough inhibition,
prohibition, and taboo, even though Nature’s laws state that desire is
always in “a perpetual variation, a perpetual permutation.. .a perpetual
movement?”

3. Nietzsche
Everything is false! Everything is permitted (Nietzsche 1968: 326).
Nietzsche (1844-1900) lived in the second half of the 1800s, when positivistic belief
in progress was offset by the dark sides of industrialization, urbanization, technical
advances, etc. New developments in the physical and biological sciences informed
people that contingency was important when explaining society and man. The aesthetic
model o f knowledge, which lost its power in the first half o f the century, began to attract
some intellectuals. Schopenhauer was one o f them. Schopenhauer claimed that human
beings have not only ideas, the categories through which human beings see the world, but
also the will to life, a categoryless force that pushes toward certain ends. Schopenhauer
conceptualized the will to life as a kind o f energy or force which expresses itself through
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the multiplicity o f phenomena in variegated ways. In fact, the notion o f will to life is a
philosophical version o f biological and physical notion o f force which was then
prevalent. Schopenhauer exerted a powerful influence on Nietzsche, who developed a
more materialist version o f will as a virtual asocial biological force. Nietzsche presented
the will to power as a weapon against philosophy, religion, and morality, all o f which
submitted to herd instincts. What Nietzsche hated is the homogenizing and leveling
effect o f philosophy, religion, and morality. Nietzsche (1968: 175) wanted to rescue “the
charm o f rareness, inmitableness, exceptionalness and unaverageness" from traditional
philosophy, religion, and morality. For Nietzsche, art can do this task: “Art reminds us of
states o f animal vigor; it is on the one hand an excess and overflow of blooming
physicality into the world o f images and desires; on the other, an excitation o f the animal
functions through the images and desires of intensified life;— an enhancement o f the
feeling o f life, a stimulant to it” (Nietzsche 1968:422). In this sense, it would be argued
that Nietzsche adopted the aesthetic as the primary model of ontology and epistemology.
What have been repressed, silenced, marginalized, etc. should be expressed.
Ontologically, Nietzsche refuted the traditional ontology, which is based on dualism
o f being and non-being. Nietzsche wanted to abolish the world of being as the real
world: “The apparent world and the world invented by a lie—this is the antithesis. The
latter has hitherto been called the ‘real world,’ ‘truth,’ ‘God.’ This is what we have to
abolish” (Nietzsche 1968: 254). For Nietzsche, what is existent is a kind of natural force,
the will to power, which Nietzsche borrowed from the physical science’s energy-flow
model. The will to power denies the existence o f being as being opposed to becoming.
Nietzsche tried to reverse the hierarchy o f being and becoming by deconstructing the
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binary opposition o f being and becoming; “To impose upon becoming the character o f
being—that is the supreme will to power” (Nietzsche 1968: 330). Being does not exist;
rather, it is humans who invented it. For Nietzsche, the will to power is a basic instinct o f
all organisms or bodies for their own expanded reproduction. As Nietzsche (1968: 550)
put it:
This world: a monster o f energy, without beginning, without e nd;.. a
play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many,
increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea o f forces
flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back,
with tremendous years o f recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms;
.. .a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my
Dionysian world o f the eternally self-creating, the eternally selfdestroying, this mystery world o f the twofold voluptuous delight, my
“beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy o f the circle is itself a
goal.. .The world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you
yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!
On the nature o f man, Nietzsche identified individuality with bodily intelligence and
multiplicity. The genuine self is a nonsocial, irreducible, individual particularity. This
genuine self is contradictory to the herd-like ego, the social self. For Nietzsche, human
beings and their societies are in an endless struggle between the principles of
instrumental rationalism and the necessity for sensual satisfaction in the lives of human
beings. Superior cultures nurture particularity by providing resources to express bodily
drives. But the culture of Western society have repressed bodily drives so severely that
the herd instinct o f obedience and consequent guilt, illness, and nihilism prevail.
Nietzsche saw how new modes o f communication and technologies began to destroy
individuality and community while producing homogenized herd conformity (Best and
Kellner 1997: 57). In this sense, Nietzsche criticized the Enlightenment notion o f the
rational subject, which portrays reason or mind as a higher faculty governing the body.
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Nietzsche rejected the positive evaluation o f reason, rationality, and the rationalization
processes. Nietzsche emphasized the body instead o f subjectivity, the soul and the mind:
The awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else;
and soul is only a word for something about the body. The body is a
great reason, plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a
shepherd. An instrument o f your body is also your little reason, my
brother, which you call “spirit”—a little instrument and toy of your great
reason.. .Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a
mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self. In your body he
dwells; he is your body (Nietzsche, quoted in Love 1986:29).
Epistemologically, Nietzsche refuted the traditional epistemology which has been
based on the dualism o f the subject and the object. “If we give up the effective subject,
we also give up the object upon which effects are produced. Duration, identity with
itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called
object: they are complexes o f events apparently durable in comparison with other
complexes— e.g., through the difference in tempo o f the event” (Nietzsche 1968:298).
There exists neither the subject nor the object. Thus, traditional epistemology based on
the dualism of the subject (doer, cause) and the object (deed, effect) is senseless. For
Nietzsche, the distinction between cause and effect is achieved as an effect o f language in
which the grammatical subject (I) is believed to “do something, suffer something, ‘have’
something, ‘have’ a quality” (Nietzsche 1968: 294). Thus, the dualism of the subject
(cause) and the object (effect) is fictitious. The problem is not in the relationship
between cause and effect; rather, it is in the difference o f power between the two:
Two successive states, the one “cause,” the other “effect”: this is false.
The first has nothing to effect, the second has been effected by nothing. It
is a question o f a struggle between two elements o f unequal power: a new
arrangement o f forces is achieved according to the measure o f power o f
each o f them. The second condition is something fundamentally different
from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in
struggle emerge with different quanta o f power (Nietzsche 1968: 337).
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In this sense, Nietzsche nullified the traditional epistemology which saw science as
the autonomous pursuit o f truth. Nietzsche connected the scientific pursuit o f truth with
the “will to power.” As Nietzsche (1968: 298) put it:
Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition o f
the false character of things, a reinterpretation o f it into beings. “Truth” is
therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but
something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or
rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as
a processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a becoming
conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a world
for the “will to power.”
Our belief in science has no objective validity; we hold this belief insofar as it
functions towards the expanded reproductions o f bodies. The genealogy o f knowledge is
an inquiry into the self-deception that Western reason has succumbed to in its quest for
power. Nietzsche also criticized the empiricist epistemology then represented by
positivism. He criticized positivism in general and positivistic sociology in particular.
According to Nietzsche, nobody has privileged position which enables him/her to grasp
the “facts,” because there are no facts. Everything is in flux, incomprehensible, and
elusive, which opens up the possibility of plural interpretations.
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—“There are only facts"—I
would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.
We cannot establish any fact “in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to do
such a thing.. .In so far as the word “knowledge” has many meaning, the
world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning
behind it, but countless meanings.—“Perspectivism” (Nietzsche 1968:
267).
On the direction o f change, the aesthetic did not believe any specific direction of
history. It would be irrelevant to ask whether societies or the various forms o f
objectification of the will succeed one another temporarily or not, because the will does
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not know time. Therefore, we could not adequately explain history through tracing a
sequence o f developmental stages. Nietzsche did not accept the Enlightenment argument
that the modem society brings human beings happiness and welfare: “Progress.—Let us
not be deceived! Time marches forward; we’d like to believe that everything that is in it
also marches forward—that the development is one that moves forward.. .‘Mankind’
does not advance, it does not even exist.. Man represents no progress over the animal ”
(Nietzsche 1968: 55). While Enlightenment thinkers argued that modernity is
characterized by individual freedom and welfare, Nietzsche insisted that nearly identical
“useful, industrious, handy multipurpose head animals” prosper in modem society rather
than genuine diversity. According to Nietzsche, modem Westem culture is characterized
by “slave morality” that promises salvation for the obedient and punishment for the
dissolute. Nietzsche saw Christianity as the prototypical slave morality: “The promise of
equality and salvation to all the ‘subjugated and oppressed’ and o f eternal damnation to
all nonbelievers demanded unparalleled denial of the body, absolute obedience, mortal
hostility,’ and ‘hatred o f those who think differently’ and o f ‘multiplicity’” (Antonio
1995: 8). The Enlightenment and bourgeois revolutions made the process even more
extensive and inclusive. Thus, Nietzsche argued that the modem age has developed
ethics o f utility that was destroying the sovereign individual. Antonio (1995: 6) said,
“Nietzsche equated rationalization with cultural homogenization and liquidation of
particularity.”
Nietzsche criticized universalist morality because he believed that one has no rational
foundation for choosing one mode of behavior over another. Nietzsche refuted
traditional grounds for universalist morality such as God and nature. Nietzsche (1966:
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85) argued that “[t]here are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation o f
phenomena.” Then, isn’t there any morality? Nietzsche argued that one should create his
own morality. The aesthetic is decisive in creating morality. The one who creates his
own morality is “[h]e who can command, he who is by nature ‘master,’ he who is violent
in act and bearing” (Nietzsche 1989: 86). This man is one o f the conquers whose natures
“come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightening
appears, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too ‘different’ even to be hated. Their
work is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary,
unconscious artists there are” (Nietzsche 1989: 86). In this sense, Nietzsche attributed to
“art an ontogenetic, that is, a world-making significance” (Megill 1987: 31). A slave
does not create his/her own morality; rather, s/he dogmatically follows a master morality.
What Nietzsche hated is the normalizing effect o f slave morality: “To accommodate
oneself, to live as the common man’ lives, to hold right and good what he holds right;
this is to submit to the herd instinct. One must take one’s courage and severity so far as
to feel such a submission as disgrace" (Nietzsche 1968: 252). In this sense, Nietzsche
saw socialization in a negative light.
Politically, Nietzsche was opposed to both socialism and democracy. He believed
that they aimed to make man mediocre and lower his value: “1 am opposed to 1.
socialism, because it dreams quite naively o f “the good, true, and beautiful” and o f “equal
rights” (—anarchism also desires the same ideal, but in a more brutal fashion); 2.
parliamentary government and the press, because these are the means by which the herd
animal becomes master” (Nietzsche 1968: 397). Nietzsche wanted to liberate life from
philosophy, religion, and morality and he wished to make a society in which only quanta

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

o f power determine ranks. The strongest man equipped with the strongest will to power
should rule society. This man will be “artist-tyrants" who will work like artists. Unlike
the herd, artists create new values. They are commanders and legislators who say how
things are to be.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

VULNERABILITY OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE AESTHETIC CHALLENGE

I have argued that the postmodern might be understood as the aestheticization o f
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics, which has proceeded from early 1960s to the
present in advanced Western societies. I have also claimed that postmodern social theory
documented that 1) there emerged a qualitatively new form o f aesthetic society entangled
with the emergence o f a qualitatively new form o f aesthetic subject, that 2) the
aestheticization o f the social and the subject undermined traditional
epistemology/methodology based on the traditional subject-object distinction, proposing
trans- or multi-disciplinary methods, and that 3) the aestheticization o f the social and the
subject produced new morality/politics based on difference rather than identity.
This argument o f postmodern social theory challenged fundamental assumptions o f
sociology about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Classical European
sociology emerged out o f the complex mixture o f the Enlightenment and the CounterEnlightenment, but modem American sociology mainly followed the Enlightenment
vision of science, especially positivism, in the course o f its development. In
this sense, sociology was a product o f modernity associated with the Enlightenment. In
fact, from the outset sociology was hostile to the aesthetic. Sociology
saw the aesthetic as being pre- and/or anti-social.
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In what follows, I will show how sociology happened to exclude the aesthetic, and
will present some fundamental assumptions o f classical European sociology and modem
American sociology, which are vulnerable to the aesthetic challenge.

Classical European Sociology as the Exclusion
o f the Aesthetic
Most sociologists considered Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel
as “fathers” of sociology who built a new discipline called sociology. Many sociologists
also recognized that these classical European sociologists tried to synthesize the
Enlightenment tradition and the Counter-Enlightenment tradition (Saiedi 1993; Seidman
1983). This effort at synthesis was not a new phenomenon that first appeared in the
nineteenth century. The so-called “forerunners” o f sociology in the eighteenth century all
tried to complement the extremity o f the Enlightenment with the Counter-Enlightenment:
Montesquieu (1689-1755), Rousseau (1712-1778), the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers
such as Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816),
John Millar (1735-1801), etc. The so-called “fathers” o f sociology such as Comte (17981857), Marx (1818-1857), Spencer (1820-1903), Durkheim (1858-1917), Weber (18641920), and Simmel were similar. The Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment
traditions were two common tacit intellectual references on which the “fathers” o f the
classical European sociology relied. All o f them tried to synthesize the Enlightenment
and the Counter-Enlightenment traditions in their own ways.
But when we look more closely, we can find a very important fact with regard to the
emergence o f classical European sociology: the so-called “fathers” o f classical European
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sociology criticized the individualist approaches to man and society. To them, the most
representative of the individualist approaches were the technically practical and the
aesthetic. But ways to deal with these two individual approaches were very different.
For the technically practical, classical European sociologists tried to complement the
extremity o f the technically practical with the theoretical and/or the morally practical. By
contrast, classical European sociologists rejected the aesthetic as a model o f knowledge
for investigating the social.
In the early nineteenth century, classical political economy and utilitarianism were
social versions o f Newtonian physics. The most representative o f classical political
economy were Malthus (1776-1834) and Ricardo (1772-1823), both of whom followed
and modified Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) claim that man’s self-interest is the counterpart
of Newton’s principle of gravitational attraction. The most representative o f
utilitarianism were James Mill (1773-1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),
both o f whom followed and modified Bentham (1748-1832)’$ psychological proposition
that man is by nature a being whose behavior is governed by desire for pleasure and
aversion to pain. Classical political economy and utilitarianism were more popular in the
early nineteenth-century England. For classical political economy and utilitarianism,
“natural” means “physical.” But by the mid-century, this position was challenged by
Darwin’s theory o f natural selection. For Darwin’s theory, “natural” means “biological”
rather than “physical.” But the technically practical soon realized that this difference was
not essential because both “physical” and “biological” were materialistic. Gordon (1991 :
494-495) explained it well:
From the standpoint o f man’s conception o f himself and his relation to the
cosmos, the development of the theory o f evolution in the nineteenth
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century was no less than a second scientific revolution, but in terms o f the
philosophy of science it was a continuation or extension o f the first,
applying to organic phenomena the same conception o f the world as
governed by laws that are essentially ‘materialistic’ in nature and thereby
reducing still further the significance of spiritual, and indeed mental,
factors in the explanation o f reality.
Darwin’s theory of natural selection was easily combined with classical political
economy and utilitarianism: “Social Darwinism represented a biologized form of
classical economics, an attempt to modernize and refurbish the social ethic of
competitive individualism by appealing to the authority o f Darwin’s version o f natural
selection’” (Fine 1979: 23-24). The technically practical interpreted Darwinian
evolutionism in terms of the struggle for survival among atomistic individuals. As
Darwin said in The Autobiography o f Charles Darwin:
In October 1838.. .1 happened to read for amusement Malthus on
Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for
existence wliich everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of
the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these
circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved and
unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result o f this would be the
formation o f new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which
to w ork.. .(quoted in Gordon 1991: 505).
A hallmark of all three (classical political economy, utlitarianism, and Darwin’s
theory o f natural selection) is reductionism, in which the social is reduced to the
individual. All kinds o f human behaviors are reduced to a simple law of natural selection
or the survival of the fittest.
In the late nineteenth century, the technically practical saw another development:
statistics. Even though the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) presented
his first work in 1835 and a huge interest in the collection o f social statistics occurred in
England in the 1830s, it was in the late nineteenth century that statistics began to become

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145

the most important alternative to other models of the technically practical. In fact,
statistics was revolutionary as far as the nature of the technically practical was concerned.
The technically practical used to believe that social phenomena, like natural phenomena,
are law-governed. This law is essentially a mechanical law that does not allow any
variation. But the substantive findings o f sciences betrayed this view. Statistics resolved
this problem by construing social phenomena as statistical in nature. The governing laws
o f social phenomena are probabilistic. Thus, the term “positivism” gained new meaning,
that social sciences can be reduced to just collecting the facts and formulating them as
general laws.
Classical European sociologists criticized this individualistic view, but they did not
totally devaluate it. Rather, they tried to complement it with the theoretical and the
morally practical. In this nineteenth century there were mainly two forms of the
theoretical: positivistic organicism' and Hegelian essentialism. A hallmark o f two
versions is that they attacked the Newtonian mechanical world characterized by its
inability to explain “the change, the temporality, the novelty, in a word, the
progressiveness, o f the human world” (Kumar 1978: 18) and that they retained the
spiritual or divine nature of man and society.
For the explanation o f change, positivistic organicism depended on Platonian
transcendentalism and more directly on French Enlightenment tradition and evolutionary
biology. Positivistic organicism “arose as an integration o f two formerly discrete strands
o f Western thought: the idealistic theory of society, and a positivistic program o f social
'. The nineteenth century positivism maybe designated as “positivistic organicism” as
distinguished from the 20 century logical positivism or logical empiricism represented
by the Vienna School o f 1920s (Martindale 1981:68).
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reform” (Martindale 1966:4). Positivistic organicism as the idealistic theory o f society
was a modem version of the idealism that developed since Plato. This tradition relied on
an organic analogy: “Society is considered to be a living entity, at least, as similar
thereto—perhaps organic, perhaps spiritual” (Martindale 1966: 5). Some version o f the
French Enlightenment followed this tradition. French Enlightenment thinkers such as
Turgot and Condorect created an entity, mankind, whose essence is ideas, conceptually or
by a priori reasoning about human nature, that was supposed to have undergone
continuous development through time (Bock 1978). In France, the concept o f organism
developed as a vital independent unity without any specific reference to biology. French
organistic school followed the Platonian transcendentalism inasmuch as they believed
that the change of things must come through the change of ideas. For them, ideas, not
matters (appearances), are real (Maus 1962: 36-43). Positivistic organicism as a
positivistic program o f social reform relied on the empiricist version of the
Enlightenment, which wanted to apply the methods o f natural sciences to the realm o f
human society in order to refonn peacefully and organize rationally human society.
It was the achievement o f evolutionary biology that made it possible to combine these
two different thoughts. Pre-Darwinian positivists such as Saint-Simon (1760-1825)
argued that the principles o f order and change in the biological evolution could be applied
to ones in the social evolution because social evolution was conceived as a special case o f
biological evolution. But there is a fundamental difference between them: for the social
evolution it is “ideas” that maintain society as an organic whole or equilibrium.
In fact, the term “positivistic organicism” is self-contradictory as Martindale (1981:
68) defined it as the following:
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Organicism refers to that tendency in thought that constructs its picture o f
the world on an organic model. By an organismic metaphysics is meant
the attempt to explain reality, or the world, or the universe, or the totality
o f everything as if it were a kind o f organism or had properties like an
organism such as being “alive,” having a “vital principle,” or displaying
relations between parts like those between the organs o f a living body.
Positivism, on the other hand, refers to that tendency in thought which
rigorously restricts all explanation o f phenomena purely to phenomena
themselves, preferring explanation strictly on the model o f exact scientific
procedure, and rejecting all tendencies, assumptions, and ideas that exceed
the limits o f scientific technique.
As a theory of being, organicism refers to the “metaphysical” ontology, which argued
that there exist some metaphysical beings beyond the limit o f physical beings. But as a
theory o f knowledge, positivism designates a positive or phenomenological epistemology
that can be defined as the following:
[T]he thesis, which can be expressed in various ways, that “reality”
consists of sense impressions; an aversion to metaphysics, the latter being
condemned as sophistry or illusion; the representation o f philosophy as a
method of analysis, clearly separable from, yet at the same time parasitic
upon, the findings of science; the duality o f fact and value—the thesis that
empirical knowledge is logically discrepant from the pursuit o f moral aims
or die implementation o f ethical standards; and the notion o f the “unity of
science”—the idea that the natural and social sciences share a common
logical and perhaps even methodological foundation (Giddens 1978: 237).
Evolutionary social theory had already emerged quite independently of Darwin
(Burrow 1970). But pre-Darwinian organicism or biological metaphor was
fundamentally different from Darwin’s theory o f natural selection concerning the nature
o f evolution: for the former biological evolution meant the evolution o f distinct organs,
the wing, the hand and so one while for the latter the evolution o f species as such. PreDarwinian evolutionary theory conceived o f evolution as gradual, peaceful, piecemeal
adaptation o f some organs o f a specific organism to its environment while Darwin’s
evolution theory saw evolution as radical breaching transformation o f species as such.
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Even since Darwin’s impact, positivistic organicism interpreted Darwin’s theory of
natural selection through the eyes of more traditional idealism.
By contrast, Hegelian essentialism relied on Aristotelian notion o f change and more
directly on Spinozian version o f the Enlightenment. Spinoza influenced the Romantic
movement in general, and its later movement in particular. For Spinoza, the only one
substance or God is an absolutely infinite totality the essence o f which is infinitely
expressed in infinite attributes. Likewise, for Hegel (1770-1831) the only one substance
or absolute Spirit is an absolute infinite totality, whose essence is reason, the activity of
absolute Spirit. As Hegel put it in his Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History :
[R]eason.. is substance and infinite power; it is itself the infinite material
o f all natural and spiritual life, and the infinite form which activates this
material content. It is substance, i.e., that through which all reality has its
being and subsistence; it is infinite pow er,.. and it is the infinite content,
the essence and truth o f everything, itself constituting the material on
which it operates through its own activity (quoted in Harris 1995: 201).
As the Spinozian God is the organizing principle of the universe, the Hegelian
absolute Spirit is the organizing principle of society. Hegelian essentialism believed that
society as an organism has its essence and that its growth or development is the
realization o f its essence. In this sense, society develops of necessity from its essence.
For Hegel, this essence is ideas called Geist, Spirit or God. But unlike Platonian
transcendentalism, ideas are not transcendental ideals that exist beyond this world, but an
immanent force that determines the structure and development o f the universe. Thus, the
essence o f society objectifies itself in all customs, habits, institutions. Hegelian
essentialism also conceived man as a living organism, not mechanical matter. Man has
his own essence and his growth or development is the realization o f his essence. The
Hegelian subject does not have fixed transcendental essential nature. Rather, through
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expressing his purpose in life, he achieves his essence as a finite spirit. He is always in
the process o f movement in order to acquire the True. This implies that the Hegelian
subject moves towards a certain direction, the True. The reason why the Hegelian subject
can move is that he is a living substance: “the living Substance is being which in truth
Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of
positing itself, or is the mediation o f its self-othering with itself’ (Hegel 1977: 10). Only
the living substance can move because it has its own contradiction. “This Substance",
says Hegel, “is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the
bifiucation o f the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the
negation of this indifferent diversity and o f its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]’’
(Hegel 1977:10). In this way, man and society retains their spiritual or purposive
dimension, which was deprived by the Newtonian physics. Both society and man are
organic totality rather than mechanic atoms, in which the infinite essence of absolute
Spirit is expressed.
Positivistic organicism was more popular in the mid-19'*’ century in France while
Hegelian essentialism was more popular in the early 19'*’ century in Germany. Comte,
Spencer, Durkheim mainly adopted positivistic organicism while Marx embraced
Hegelian essentialism. But classical European sociologists did not restrict themselves to
the theoretical model o f knowledge. Marx, Weber and Simmel also embraced the
morally practical.
In the nineteenth century the morally practical appeared in the early Romantics who
acted against “a too narrow constructing o f human experience in terms o f reason alone”
and who celebrate experience, “in its infinite richness and color and warmth and
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complexity” (Randall 1954: 399)’. The most representatives o f the early Romantics
were Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845), and
Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). The early Romantics emphasized the experience of life
in the inner flow of consciousness, rather than abstract principles. The early Romantists
also emphasized that individuals are qualitatively unique. Individuals are not abstract
human beings like the abstract economic man, but concrete individuals who are bound to
their own unique spatio-temporal, linguistic, or socio-psychological contexts. The early
Romantics considered reason as part o f life and history. Thus reason is limited by its
own historicity, and context is more important than foundational axioms. But these early
Romantics were soon eclipsed by transcendental subjectivism and finally Hegelian
essentialism. Since then, the morally practical lost its intellectual power until the late
nineteenth century.
But in the late 19'*’ century, the morally practical was revitalized in a transatlantic
community o f discourse. The most representatives were Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911),
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), Henry Sidgwick (1838-1912), Alfred Fouillée (18381912), William James (1842-1952) (see Kloppenberg 1986). These thinkers were
basically post-Darwinians. Unlike the technically practical which interpreted Darwin’s
’. 1 borrow the distinction between the early Romanticism and the late Romanticism from
Saiedi (1993). Saiedi considered Romanticism mainly as a German movement and he
distinguished the early German Romanticism from the later German Romanticism: “Early
German Romanticism focuses on the idea that individual human beings are qualitatively
unique and that they are free and autonomous. On the other hand, later German
Romaticism defines individuals as passive embodiments of a universal history and
celebrates tradition and religion” (69). I considers the early Romanticism mainly as an
heir o f the Vichian version of the Counter-Enlightenment, especially it hermeneutic
approach to reality. But I do not deny that it also contains some o f the Sadean version o f
the Counter-Enlightenment, especially its characterization o f reality by paradox, mystery,
contradictions, and chaos.
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theory o f selection as the struggle for survival among atomistic individuals, these thinkers
emphasized the adaptive capacity o f conscious human beings and recognized that
contingency is important when explaining man and society (Wiener 1965). These
thinkers fully accepted Darwin’s emphasis that “evolution was essentially a branching
process, the creation of variety, rather than a main line o f development with subsidiary
ones” (Burrow 2000: 72), and recognized that context was more important than abstract
principles. As a result, these thinkers situated practical reason in concrete sociohistorical
settings, not in a priori ahistorical category. Thus we might say that the hallmark o f the
morally practical is contextualism that rejects excessively abstract, deductive and formal
modes of thought. The morally practical, like the theoretical, preferred the organicist
vision o f the world to the mechanical one. But unlike the positivistic organicism that
tended to see society as a transcendental entity that exists regardless o f man’s
participation, the morally practical conceived society as a cultural, not a biological,
whole. Also unlike Hegelian essentialism that saw society as a substance, the morally
practical saw society as the interaction o f its elements, i.e., individuals. For example,
Dilthey saw society as an intricate web o f multiple relations established among
individuals in constant interaction with one another.
[T]he individual.. .is an element in the interactions \ Wechselwirkungen\
of society, a point of intersection o f the diverse systems o f these
intersections who reacts with conscious intention and action upon their
effects (Dilthey, quoted in Frisby 1984:47).
The morally practical advocated the Vichian subject, the self-creating as well as
society-creating subject. The morally practical shared the traditional ideal o f the whole
man with the theoretical, but the morally practical argued that this ideal could be
achieved in society. The growth o f man comes together with the growth o f society. The
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whole being who belongs to a cultural community is characterized by his/her wholeness
within him/herself, uniqueness and freedom, which were possible only in the process o f
his/her communion with society. According to this tradition, human beings could not be
reduced to a part o f a machine that had only a specific fimction because they were a selfsufficient cosmos. The morally practical did not see reason as a universal entity existing
across time and space but as a historical product produced in specific historical, social,
cultural, economic, and geographical contexts o f each society. Human reason is a
dynamic complexity situated in a specific history and tradition, in which human beings
live, feel, desire, love, hate, eat, drink, create, worship, etc. Every society has its own
reason, because every society has its own specific tradition, culture, and history. Every
individual also has its own reason, but this reason is similar to other individuals’ reasons,
because every individual reason is constructed within the same community.
Classical European sociologists utilized the theoretical and the morally practical when
they criticized the technically practical. By contrast, they excluded the aesthetic, which
was then represented by Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Early Romanticism as the aesthetic
lost its power in the mid-nineteenth century. Since then, the aesthetic did not attract
European intellectuals until the late nineteenth century when the irrational forces o f
modem European civilization began to appear more clearly. Schopenhauer saw human
beings as having not only ideas (the categories through which human beings see the
world), but also a will to life (a categoryless force that pushes toward certain ends).
Schopenhauer had a powerful influence on later thinkers, especially Nietzsche and Freud,
both o f whom developed more materialist version o f will to life. But later sociologists
expunged the main advocates o f the aesthetic model o f knowledge such as Nietzsche
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(1844-1900) and Freud (1856-1939), who are nowadays considered to be forerunners of
postmodernism, from the canon of sociology.
There might be two reasons for this exclusion o f the aesthetic model from classical
European sociology. The first is related to the newly emerging discipline called
sociology. Classical European sociologists considered the aesthetic model o f man and
society as predominantly pre- and/or anti-social. The second is related to the historical
context o f the nineteenth-century. Classical European sociologists observed how German
Romanticists turned into patriots, reactionaries and irrationalists afrer they had
experienced the Terror and the military humiliations o f Germany by the armies o f
Revolutionary France and o f Napoleon. Classical European sociologists recognized the
political and moral implication o f the aesthetic model o f knowledge: anarchy or Fascism.
Considering their times as a transitional era from the traditional to the modem eras,
classical European sociologists thought that the aesthetic could not provide any solid
foundation on which a new social order would be established. Thus, they excluded the
aesthetic model o f knowledge from sociology.
Classical European sociologists such as Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber,
and Simmel struggled with the urgent contemporary problems o f the times by utilizing
intellectual resources derived from both the Enlightenment and the counterEnlightenment traditions. But there was a generational difference between Comte, Marx,
and Spencer on the one hand, and Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel on the other hand.
Comte, Marx, and Spencer belonged to the mid-nineteenth century. Becker (1963: 96)
characterized this period as follows:
The phrase “break with the past” came spontaneously to the lips o f the
nineteenth-century historians because they were so much concerned with
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the “continuity o f history,” the evolution o f institutions. After twenty-five
years of revolution and international war, most people felt the need of
stabilizing society; and the most satisfactory rationalization o f this need
was presented by those historians and jurists who occupied themselves
with social origins, who asked the question. How did society, especially
the particular society o f this or that nation, come to be what it is? The
unconscious preconception involved in this question was that if men
understood just how the customs o f any nation had come to be what they
were, they would sufficiently realize the folly o f trying to refashion them
all at once according to some rational plan.
Comte, Marx, and Spencer were not firee from this rational plan and they concentrated
tremendous efforts to synthesize the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment
traditions in order to achieve it. They all produced grand narratives in part due to the
efforts at synthesizing the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment traditions.
Their commonality is that they all excluded the aesthetic.
Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel belonged to the late nineteenth century which was
characterized by the growing awareness o f the dark sides o f industrialization and
urbanization. Due to this historical fact, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel could pay more
attention to the dark sides o f modernity, especially the alienating effect of
industrialization and urbanization. As a result, they were more sensitive to the aesthetic
model of knowledge as compared to the previous generation. Nevertheless, Durkheim
and Weber did not go far enough to embrace the aesthetic. In this respect, Simmel was
exceptional. Among other classical European sociologists, Simmel was most sensitive to
the aesthetic model o f knowledge even though he was also influenced enormously by the
Enlightenment traditions. Although Simmel presented many views similar to the
aesthetic, later sociologists robbed him o f his aesthetic character. Especially, early
American sociologists translated Simmel as a formal sociologist. As a result, the
aesthetic character o f Simmel was expunged firom sociology. That is why some
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sociologists tried to reevaluate Simmel as a postmodernist (see Weinstein and Weinstein
1993).

Fundamental Assumptions o f Classical European Sociology
Classical European sociologists (Comte, Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber)
shared, to a greater or lesser extent, an hostility against the aesthetic model o f knowledge.
As a result, classical European sociology presented some fundamental assumptions about
ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.

1) Ontology;
a. The Nature o f the Social
On the nature o f society, Comte rejected the technically practical while accepting the
positivistic organicism of the theoretical. Comte objected to individualist approaches to
society because he believed that society is an organic whole. Comte borrowed this view
from biology, but unlike biological thinking, Comte conceived society mainly in terms o f
its mental aspects. It is ideas that make a society as an organic whole. This thinking is in
fact part of long tradition of rationalism according to which reality itself is in the nature
o f ideas. In a sense, society is superior to the individual because society had the greater
diversity of its functions: “The main cause o f the superiority o f the social to the
individual organism is according to an established law; the more marked is the
specialization o f the various functions fulfilled by organs more and more distinct, but
interconnected; so that unity o f aim is more and more combined with diversity o f means”
(Comte 1968:289). But once society was constituted, a division of labor to make
individuals interdependent was required for its continued existence. Here the biological
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analogy was employed again. More developed biological organisms like the human
beings had more differentiated functions which did not result in chaos or disorder of the
organism. “Structural differentiation” was ensued by functional integration. As the
higher animal had more differentiated organs that had specialized functions, so did the
higher society. In this higher society all parts functioned smoothly and peacefully with
each other to integrate the whole. But society is not a simply division o f labor, as the
Smithian political economy argued. With the division o f labor, the guidance o f the state
is needed to integrate society: “Without State guidance and the division of labour no
society could exist at all; and conversely without society authority and the division o f
labour would be nothing” (Maus 1962: 14). Society as an organism develops over time
according to the law o f three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive.
Each stage has its own form o f social organization: society is ruled first by pagan priests
and soldiers, then by Christian clergy and lawyers, and finally, by industrialists and
scientists.
Marx saw the social as an organic unity that is necessarily moving from potentiality
to actuality. Marx’s notion o f labor plays the role of the fbnn-giving, unifying element
that brings objects back into the organically conceived production process. Society
develops from the simplest substance, labor: “we must begin by stating the first premise
o f all human existence and, therefore, o f all history, the premise, namely, that man must
be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The
first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the
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production o f material life itself’ (Marx and Engels 1995:48). Society is a living
organism whose character is determined by the method o f organizing labor.
To explain the nature o f society, Spencer did not take the technically practical
tradition o f the Enlightenment, but rather took the theoretical tradition o f the
Enlightenment. Even though Spencer was influenced more by the technically practical
tradition o f the Enlightenment, he did not follow it in regards to an ontology on society
because he fully knew the anarchical implication o f the its individualistic approach on
society. Like other classical European sociologists, Spencer believed in a kind o f social
realism; he argued that society should be regarded as a distinctive level of reality. For
Spencer, “the constant relations among its [society’s] parts make it an entity” (Spencer
1905:448). But Spencer argued that there was the discreteness o f the social organism
standing in marked contrast with the concreteness o f the individual organism: “The parts
o f an animal form a concrete whole; but the parts o f a society form a whole which is
discrete. While the living units composing the one are bound together in close contact,
the living units composing the other are free, are not in contact, and are more or less
widely dispersed” (Spencer 1905:457). In spite of this wide dispersion, the social
organism maintains its wholeness by means of culture. Spencer’s society is not a
totalitarian organism; rather it consists of highly differentiated structures that fulfill their
own specific functions so as to form a relatively loose, but stable whole. According to
Spencer, this feature o f society is a product o f evolution. Not all societies share this
feature; only the highly developed societies have it. This historical or emergent feature
o f society gave Spencer a conviction that a society could be regarded as an organism
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Durkheim objected to both the technically practical and Hegelian essentialism, and
accepted primarily positivistic organicism. Against the utilitarians who “supposed that
originally there were isolated and independent individuals who thus could only enter into
relationships with one another in order to co-operate,” Durkheim argued that “[cjollective
life did not arise from individual life; on the contrary, it is the latter that emerged from
the former” (Durkheim 1984: 220, 220-221). Like other classical European sociologists,
Durkheim believed in a kind of social realism; he argued that society should be regarded
as a distinctive level of reality. But unlike Hegelian essentialism, Durkheim did not see
society as a mystic whole entity whose development is a necessary realization o f its
substance. Rather, Durkheim followed the tradition o f positivistic organicism which cam
from Saint-Simon, Comte, and Spencer. Following them, Durkheim saw society as a
living organism whose development can be explained in terms of the law o f division of
labour. Durkheim knew well that the term of division o f labour came from Smithian
economics, but he did not want to restrict its implication to the economic field.
Durkheim argued that biological works confirmed that the law of division o f labour is a
general law applicable to all organisms. Society is not an exception. But the division o f
labour in society is not exactly the same as one in organisms because, unlike organisms,
society is “above all a composition o f ideas, beliefs and sentiments o f all sorts which
realize themselves through individuals. Foremost o f these ideas is the moral ideal which
is its principal raison d'être" (Durkheim 1953: 59). In different words, the division o f
labour in society entails specific solidarity which binds individuals together to form
societies. Durkheim argued that the structure o f society depends on the nature o f its
specific form o f solidarity. According to him, there are two ideal types o f solidarity:
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mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is a form o f social
integration o f the less developed society in which the division o f labour is based on
resemblance or sameness. In the “self-same type o f society,” society is like an entity
which totally absorbed all its members. Thus there are no individuals who have their
own subjectivities because the collective consciousness possesses most power. By
contrast, organic solidarity is a form o f social integration o f the more developed society
in which the division o f labour is based on differences. As the higher animal had more
differentiated organs that had specialized functions, so did higher society. As a higher
organism is a system o f diverse organs each o f which has its own individuality, a higher
society is a system o f diverse institutions each of which has its own individuality.
Weber was a little different. Salomon (1935:68) argued that “Weber operates
entirely without concept of society.” In fact, Weber seldom used the term “society”
(Bendix 1977:476), and did not give any reified status to the notion o f society. Society
is not a reified entity which operates automatically without the participation o f actors.
Rather, society is a man-made pattern: “When reference is made in a sociological
context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family, or an army corps, or to similar
collectivities, what is meant i s .. .only a certain kind of development of actual or possible
social actions o f individual persons” (Weber 1978:14). Nevertheless, Weber did not
deny the social as a distinctive character in its own right. Society is “modes o f patterning
action” through which course o f actions are repeated by actors.

b. The Nature o f Man
Comte rejected the technically practical that saw human beings as matters as well as
the theoretical that saw human beings as wholly rational. Instead, Comte proposed a
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position nearer to the morally practical. While not totally accepting the Vichian notion of
human beings: “He [Comte] would not have said that man created himself through the
ages” (Aron 1998: 107), he accepted the basic idea of the morally practical, i.e., one that
the growth o f man comes together with the growth o f institutional life o f society. Comte
believed that both human beings and society in general would go hand in hand through
the three stages and argued that there were essential dispositions, which were present
from the beginning and did not change through the ages. They are feeling (affection or
sentiment), thought (intelligence), and action (will). Comte argued that all these three
dispositions could be differently combined through the ages. Comte, in fact, argued that
there were two ways of synthesis o f human dispositions: the theological and the positive
ways. The metaphysical ways was just a transitional way from the theological to the
positive ways. Comte (1975: 7) argued that “[t]he Theological synthesis depended
exclusively upon our affective nature.” In the theological stage, human beings’ affections
were stronger than their intellect, within which their egoistic, selfish instincts were
stronger than their benevolent, social ones. In this synthesis the intellect was a slave o f
feeling; it was reduced to abject submission. Thus this synthesis was purely subjective
because “the objective basis was supplied by spontaneous belief in a supernatural Will”
(Comte 1975: 19). Thus this subjective system “could not harmonise with the necessarily
objective tendencies and stubborn realities of practical life” (Comte 1975: 7). This is the
necessary basis for the development o f the positive synthesis. Metaphysical and
scientific intellect began to subvert all theological social order. But the intellect was not
sufficient for harmonizing all human faculties. The emotional always was the basis for
the task to harmonize all faculties o f human beings: “the question o f co-ordinating the
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faculties of our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought
into harmonious union, is the preponderance o f Affection over Reason, and even over
Activity” (Comte 1975:11). With regard to this task, the intellect had mainly a
methodological significance. The intellect discovers the external order, which became
the basis of the further positive synthesis o f our all faculties. Through the positive
synthesis, the subjective synthesis o f theology could begin to gain its objective attribute.
Based upon the external order, the positive synthesis will “bring the three primary
elements o f our nature into harmony” (Comte 1975:9). This development o f human
beings goes together with the development of institutions such as the family, the state,
etc. Within the family, “Man comes forth fi-om his mere personality, and learns to live in
another, while obeying his most powerful instincts” (Comte 1968: 281). Through the
family, human beings learn obedience and command; they learned how to modify their
egoistic affections by the altruistic rules set up by the family. Within the state, human
beings leam how to cooperate with other extra-familial people.
According to Marx, man is a self-creative being, who develops the capacities peculiar
to his “species” as he lives and works with his fellows and who, in this process, acquires
his ides of the world and o f himself. For Marx, self-creative means that man produces
and reproduces the means of his existence as well as himself by his productive labor.
Man’s labor is characterized by man’s capacity o f thinking conceptually. Marx agreed
that only man is self-conscious, but he added the term “species.” The term “species” is in
fact the counterpart of the Aristotelian term “substance.” Species is the category of the
possible, denoting in particular those potentialities which mark man o ff from other living
creatures. These potentialities are achieved in so far as the conditions o f communism
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allow an individual to develop and express all that he is capable o f as a human being. In
short, man becomes self-conscious in the process o f becoming a species (Plamenatz
1975: 68). In other words, a human being, a specific being different from other creatures,
is “species man” or communist man (Oilman 1971: 151). “Species man” means that man
becomes self-conscious as he becomes aware of others. Becoming self-conscious,
becoming aware o f other selves and coming to recognize oneself as a being o f a certain
kind are intimately interconnected with each other; they are inseparable. Therefore, man
is characterized by being self-creative, self-conscious, and world-conscious.
Spencer believed that human beings are originally asocial individuals. But through
an unconscious, essentially biological hereditary process, originally asocial individuals
become gradually tamed and increasingly integrated to form a society. The process of
becoming a social being follows the general law o f evolution from an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. Spencer argued that
civilized man is physically superior to primitive man in terms o f size and structure.
Likewise, civilized man is emotionally more complex and flexible than primitive man.
The evolution of emotion proceeds as the evolution of society proceeds. With regard to
intelligence, civilized man is also intellectually more complex and flexible than primitive
man. Intelligence such as abstract ideas is compounded out o f simple intelligence such as
concrete ideas and so there is progressing integration and complexity. What is at stake
here is that Spencer connected the evolution o f physical, emotional and intellectual
dimensions o f human beings with the evolution o f society.
Durkheim (quoted in Miller 1996:25) emphasized the real man’s social situation and
situatedness: “The real man, whom we know and whom we are, is more complex; he is o f
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a time and place, he has a family, a city, a country, a religious and political faith, and all
these and many other concerns come together, combine in a thousand ways, cross and
crisscross in their influence so that it is not at first sight possible to tell where one begins
and another ends.” The real man is an integral part o f society. Durkheim admitted the
old belief that human beings are composed o f two parts: “Far from being simple, our
inner life has something that is like a double center o f gravity. On the one hand is our
individuality—and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the other is
everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves” (Durkheim 1973: 152).
But Durkheim explained this duality o f human nature without recourse to a metaphysical
transcendence. Durkheim situated the origin o f the individual self in the body and the
origin o f the social self in society. Durkheim argued that the relationship between the
soul and the body can change over time. In the self-same type o f society, the soul as the
collective ideal tended to totally absorb the body, not allowing the genuine individual to
arise. By contrast, in the pluralist type o f society, the soul tended to develop enough to
allow the genuine individual to arise. In this way, Durkheim connected the nature of
human beings with the nature o f society. Human nature historically changes in relation
to the change o f the nature o f the division o f labor.
According to Weber (quoted in Wallace 1994: 14), both “material and ideal interests
directly govern man’s conduct.” For Weber, interests refer to ends. Additionally, human
beings also possess certain material and ideal means o f pursuing those interests or ends.
Thus “All serious reflection about the ultimate elements o f meaningful human conduct is
oriented primarily in terms o f the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’” (Weber 1968: 52). What
is at stake here is that both ends and means are culturally given. What are culturally
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given means that “the meaning o f the world is not fixed and inherent in the world; it is a
variable and changeable construct—a labeling o f some features of the world as means,
and other features as ends, o f given actions” (Wallace 1994: 16). In this sense, human
beings are primarily cultural beings who can attribute meanings to objects as means as
well as ends. But this capacity is not of pre-cultural substance within the transcendental
subject. Instead o f using the term “transcendental subject,” Weber used the term
“personality.” For Weber, personality is “not a pre-cultural, pre-evaluative core, but a
self which has found an anchorage for itself in a value, a value which not only mediates
between self and world, but defines the meaning o f that selfs activity. More than this, it
is through this relationship to value that individuals are able to take a position towards
the world” (Turner C. 1992: 58). “The capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude
towards the world and to lend it significance” is culturally learned. The meaning o f an
object lies in its relation to human action in the role o f means or o f ends in a specific
society. But Weber emphasized the meaning o f an object as “ends” of human action
because he believed that social action driven by ends is more meaningful than one driven
by means.
2) Epistemology
Comte criticized the strict empiricist epistemology o f Francis Bacon and John Locke
who contended that knowledge is only the product o f direct experience via the physical
senses. Comte wanted a theory-guided empirical study: “No real observation of any kind
o f phenomena is possible, except in as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by
some theory” (Comte 1968: 242). Comte basically accepted the theoretical when he
conceived sociology as the abstract theoretical science o f social phenomena. In fact.
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Comte’s three laws o f human development “were not laws in any real sense of the word,
but descriptions o f mental processes that could conceivably have followed one another in
the course o f human development” (Abraham 1973: 87). But Comte rejected the
Enlightenment thinkers who considered mathematics as the model o f science and wanted
to apply mathematics to the area o f human society. Comte did not believe that all
scientific problems had a mathematical solution. According to Comte, the sciences
formed a series o f increasing complexity and decreasing generality. The more simple
phenomena are, the more general they are, and vice versa. In a word, every science has
its own separate subject matter that should be studied by its own specific scientific
method. This classification o f sciences was not just nominal; science depended on phases
and stages o f development. Comte traced how scientific knowledge was historically
formed and developed. Mathematics represented the origin of positive philosophy;
mathematics showed that the sciences should study invariable relationships between
independent and even apparently isolated phenomena, rather than search for causes or
substances. Astronomy was the first science to reach the positive stage; then came
physics, next came chemistry, and after these three had reached the positivistic stage,
thought about organic phenomena could become more positivistic. In this sense,
Heilbron (1990: 155) names Comte’s theory o f science a “historical and differential
theory of science.” Sociology was the last science that would soon reach the positive
stage. Biology, a science o f living organisms, can provide the basis for sociology;
biology showed that progress was the development of order. Human society was like
biological organism; the dominant force in the human world is the development of human
ideas or civilization. Sociology is the positive study o f all the fundamental laws
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pertaining to social phenomena. Only sociology could grasp social phenomena by
inserting them into the general social evolution. In this sense, historical methods or
historical comparisons o f the consecutive states o f humanity are important; they put the
different periods o f civilization into the law o f general social evolution. In this sense,
sociological knowledge is general.
Marx did not see the world as a collection o f unconnected appearances, but
distinguished essential events from accidental events (see Meikle 1985). For Marx, the
essence o f things is a concrete universal, from which the essential movements o f things
follow necessarily. Thus, Marx concentrated on finding a concrete universal and its
necessary historical movement &om potentiality to actuality. Marx traced how capitalism
developed from commodity as the simplest capitalist social form. In Capital, Marx
began with the elementary commodity, or “The Simple, Isolated, or Accidental Form of
Value.” From this elementary commodity, the Equivalent Form, a contradictory unity of
use-value and exchange-value, necessarily develops. Money is simply a more developed
expression of this contradictory unity o f use-value and exchange-value. In this sense,
that “The simple commodity form is .. .the germ o f the money-form” (Marx 1990; 163).
Capital is the final form attained by the value-form in its process o f development. As
Meikle (1985: 71) rightly pointed out: “The commodity-form is made the point o f
departure in ‘the method o f presentation,’ because the enquiry had revealed it to be, as
Marx repeatedly describes it, the ‘embryonic form’ o f the essence whose necessary
changes and realisations o f potentials culminate in the attainment o f the final, finished
form o f that essence: capital.” For Marx, this essentialist method was intimately
connected with historical method. But Marx’s historical method is not a simple
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comparative method which aims to attain a generalization from a comparison o f historical
data. Marx believed that an explanation requires the elucidation o f inherent tendencies to
particular sorts of change.
Spencer believed that there is a fundamental reality belying all appearances, but that
we could not arrive at the true knowledge o f this fundamental reality a priori. Rather, we
can acquire the true knowledge o f this fundamental reality through discerning
“persistence in consciousness”: “The real, as we conceive it, is distinguished solely by
the test o f persistence; for by this test we separate it from what we call the unreal”
(Spencer 1900: 143). This persistence o f fundamental reality in consciousness is what
Spencer called “relative reality.” This has a dissoluble relation with fundamental reality.
Considering space, time, matter, motion, and force as relative realities standing in
dissoluble relation with fundamental reality, Spencer confidently argued that we could
build up our science upon them. In First Principles, Spencer drew his First Principles
from the physics o f his time: the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and
the persistence of force. The universal law o f evolution was achieved from systematic
deductions from the First Principles. After formulating the law o f universal evolution,
Spencer tried to apply it to all areas, such as astrogeny, geogeny, biology, psychology,
sociology, and ethics. Spencer firmly believed in the unity o f all sciences because he
believed that the law o f evolution operated in physical, biological and social relations.
Durkheim presented two seemingly contradictory trends. In his methodological
works such as The Rules o f Sociological Method (1895), Durkheim proposed positivistic
methods that aimed to provide objective and universally valid descriptions of reality. By
contrast, Durkheim proposed a contextual approach to knowledge in his substantive
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works such as The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life (1912) in which the validity of
any truth-claim was not universal but was bound to designated historical contexts. These
two trends are not in fact contradictory because Dmkheim was neither a naïve positivist
nor phenomenalist who would argue that reality consists of only sense impressions and
thus the researcher should rigorously restrict all explanation o f phenomena purely to
phenomena themselves. Even his famous methodological argument that “Sociological
method as we practice it rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be
studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual” (Durkheim 1951: 37-38)
is not positivistic in the rigid sense o f positivism. According to Durkheim, social facts
are prior to the individual, and they exercise control over the individual through
compelling and coercive power. But this power o f social facts is possible only when
social facts mold and penetrate the individual and the individual in turn internalizes them.
In this sense, social facts exist only through individual consciousness. Then, how can we
study the social facts that exist through individual consciousness as we do the natural
facts that do not exist through individual consciousness? In different words, how can we
study collective consciousness, i.e., the cause o f individual actions? In this sense, we
cannot directly address social facts such as solidarity; we just address them through their
objectifiable effects, i.e., laws and the social effects o f breaking them. In this sense,
Durkheim was not content with a positivistic explanation o f superficial phenomena.
Weber argued that we could only know a slice o f reality through knowledge or
science because knowledge is an approximation o f reality. But Weber did not fully
accept this relativistic epistemology because he believed that the researcher could escape
the trap o f relativism through the formulation o f ideal types. As a way o f escaping from
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relativism and skepticism, Weber proposed the so-called “ideal type.” But the ideal type
does not aim to exhaust the totality of reality: “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided
accentuation o f one or more points of view and by the synthesis o f a great many diffuse,
discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena,
which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified
analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct
{Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia" (Weber
1968: 90). When constructing an ideal type, the researcher picks up some distinct and
essential features that seem to be “practically” relevant from his value. But before that
happens, the researcher should carefully analyze a situation in depth in order to discover
its distinct and essential feature. In this sense that the researcher’s value is involved in
the process o f constructing the ideal type, the ideal type is not an objective picture that
exhausts the totality o f reality, but a subjective distortion o f it in a sense. According to
Weber, the unique individual character o f cultmal phenomena could be grasped through
historical research o f it, for the criteria o f choosing its distinct and essential features
could be achieved through acknowledging its cultural significance at a specific historical
juncture. The ideal type should be a logically coherent statement of the characteristic
properties of a particular social phenomenon. As such, it is not a pure objective
foundation (an autonomous, self-evident Platonian ideal) of knowledge, but a logicohistorical and heuristic construction useful for understanding the unique individual
character o f cultural phenomena. Thus, if the ideal type tries to set forth the general,
external, impersonal, objective forms o f social actions, then it is in order to address the
problem o f their meaning for subjective life within a particular culture.
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3) Ethics/Politics:
Comte believed that progress in science and technology would lead to the
improvement of material well-being o f individuals and societies and further the moral
perfection of man and society. He distinguished four senses o f progress according to the
rule o f increasing generality and complexity in phenomena: material, physical,
intellectual and moral progresses. Like the hierarchy o f sciences, these notions of
progress are hierarchically interconnected with each other: the lower conditioned, but dis
not determine, the higher. Material progress is “the least elevated stage of progress, but
being the easiest it is the point from which we start towards the higher stages” (Comte
1975: 84). Physical progress entailed the extension o f the length o f life, increased
security for health, etc, whose influence on the well-being o f man is much greater than
material progress. Compared to these two notions o f progress, “Intellectual and Moral
progress, then, is the only kind really distinctive of our race” (Comte 1975: 85). But
moral progress is more decisive for determining our well-being than intellectual progress.
This belief in progress is directly connected with Comte’s vision o f ethics. Comte
criticized utilitarian morality because he believed that it belonged to the theological and
the metaphysical stages. Furthermore, Comte conceived utilitarian morality as one o f the
main causes o f mental, and further social, anarchy. Comte also rejected the
transcendental morality that advocated the absolute triumph of reason over other human
faculties. He was modest in so far as he argued that “true morality requires a deep and
habitual consciousness o f our natural defects” (Comte 1975:25). Without institutions
that check our egoistic instincts, we can never achieve true morality. According to
Comte, individuals begin to learn altruism in social institutions such as family and society
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in general. To achieve altruistic morality, individuals should leam how to subordinate
their animal instinct to social morality in institutions. Institutions are important in so far
as they inform human beings that there is an external order that they should follow. The
political implication o f this view is a combination o f liberalism and aristocracy. Unlike
the conservatives, Comte recognized that it was inevitable that the division o f labor
would bring about individual diversities. Using the biological metaphor, he recognized
that diverse individuals would depend on each other and thus form a mutually dependable
whole. But the real condition of Comte’s time seemed to betray this belief. Thus, in
addition to the biological analogy, Comte pointed out another solid basis o f integration
for society: government. The government is a centralization of authority to coordinate
exchanges of parts. But in addition to that, the government should develop a common
morality or spirit among members.
Marx believed that history in general is moving from potentiality to actuality. He
explained this progress in terms of Aristotelian logic according to which each society
developed necessarily out o f an inherent conflict. For Marx, this conflict is inherent
between the forces o f production and the relations o f production, both o f which
necessarily developed out o f substance, i.e., labor. Marx saw his time as a transitional era
from a capitalist to a communist society. Marx believed that his contemporary capitalism
was entering into a phase o f decay which would in turn become a potential matter for a
more developed form o f society. In the long run, history will achieve its telos. Marx
argued that the good life consists o f the activity of human life in accordance with the
nature o f human species. The moral implication o f this view is also Aristotelian. In
Nicoachean Ethics, Aristotle argued that the good life was activity o f human life in
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accordance with virtue or excellence. Marx similarly argued that the good life was
activity o f human life in accordance with the nature o f human species. Thus Marx tended
to propose a universal ethics, which must be established in the course of history. Such a
universal ethics was rooted in the natme o f human beings; human species was a germ o f
imiversal ethics. In this sense, Marx was different from the morally practical vision o f
morality in which morality was bound to a context. Marx also recognized the relativity
of morality, but he considered it as a transitory or underdeveloped morality-form. The
reason why Marx criticized capitalism on moral grounds was that it prevented human
beings from living the good life by depriving them o f their nature as human species.
Utilitarianism, the representative of capitalist morality, is an underdeveloped moralityform. Politically, Marx was against both liberal democracy o f the technically practical
and totalitarianism o f the theoretical. According to him, liberal democracy was based on
atomistic view on society while totalitarianism was based on a false abstract, i.e., a
totality abstracted from and set above human individuals. Marx believed that both o f
approaches conceived society as an abstract vis-a-vis the individual. As an alternative of
them, Marx proposed a kind o f corporate liberalism, which was based on his notion o f
human beings as species. Following Aristotle, Marx argued that a good man was he who
fulfilled his human potential and all men had the potential to become good men. But
under formal democracy, men’s potential to fulfill their potential could not be fully
actualized. Marx advocated true participatory democracy in which man’s process o f
realisation o f himself as a real species being is achieved through the co-operation o f
mankind and as a result o f history.
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Spencer believed that there is a universal direction o f evolution from “an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.” What is at stake here is
that Spencer connected homogeneity with disintegration or lack o f mutual
interdependence and heterogeneity with integration or mutual interdependence.
Differentiation means specialization o f fimctions while integration means mutual
interdependence o f the structurally differentiated parts and coordination o f their
functions. The moral implication o f this view is also evolutionary. According to
Spencer, egoism and altruism has existed since earlier stages, and the conflict between
them has been maintained. But historical data has showed that this conflict was in the
process of gradual disappearance. As societies evolved into the trebly-compound
industrial type, human beings adapted themselves to highly-differentiated organisms in
which mutual interdependence o f human beings will be reached. In this organism, the
personal pursuit of happiness will be achieved in furthering the welfare o f others because
others’ welfare is intimately connected with his/her own welfare in this highlydifferentiated organism. The political implication o f this is also evolutionary. Spencer’s
ideal society was based on the notion o f a definite, coherent heterogeneity. The true real
superorganism permits all of its parts to act freely, which will naturally lead to their
cooperation. Spencer believed that heterogeneity is more stable than homogeneity.
Durkheim believed that history is in a state o f progress from societies characterized
by mechanical solidarity to societies characterized by organic solidarity. Following
Malthus, Durkheim emphasized the importance o f an increase in population which entails
an increase in the geographical proximity o f individuals. What is at stake here is that
Durkheim connected an increase o f population density with moral density. According to
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Durkheim, an increase in population density leads to an increase in frequent
commiuiications between people and the need for transformation, which in turn leads to
an increase in moral density, intrasocial relations, and frequency o f contact between
individuals. Durkheim considered morality as a product o f social forces. Durkheim
proposed “moral individualism.” A moral individual is “an active member o f a political
community whose duties and desires are directed toward that community and whose
benefits (such as those in the Declaration of the Rights of Man) are protected by it”
(Cladis 1992:16-17). On the political dimension, Dmkheim also knew well the danger
of the technically practical as well as the theoretical. He believed that the technically
practical which was then represented by utilitarianism wrongly assumed that the state had
a limited role to protect what exist in human nature prior to society. According to
Durkheim, individual rights are not natural rights but civil rights that are given by
society. Diurkheim also believed that the theoretical which was then represented by
Hegelian essentialism wrongly assumed that the state is a mystic entity only for which the
individual exists. Against both of them, Durkheim accepted the morally practical
according to which individualism had developed into a major principle o f social order
precisely as the state had become stronger. Thus the relationship between the individual
and the state is not a static, fixed relationship, but a dynamic, historical relationship. In
the past, the state was not developed enough to permit individualism. In the transitory
present, individualism was not developed enough to support a more complex form of
social order. His whole work can be said to reflect his effort to reconcile liberalism and
communalism. But in the coming age, individualism and the state will not contradict
each other: “On the one hand we admit that the state goes on developing more and more;
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on the other hand that the rights o f the individual, which seem to be opposed to those o f
the state, develop in a similar way” (Durkheim, quoted in Hall 1987: 154). Durkheim
envisioned the future as a highly differentiated society in which every individual has
his/her specific function in the society as a whole, morally bound to each other. Thus, we
can argue that Durkheim proposed a participatory democracy, which is the basic
argument o f the morally practical.
Weber believed that history develops toward the increase of power over nature and
social environment, even though the tone o f his narrative was imbued with the CounterEnlightenment lamentation on the trade-off o f the Enlightenment achievement. Weber
argued that the emerging modem world characterized by the increasingly scientific and
technical control over nature, society, and human being forced human being to fall into a
moral dilemma. Following Nietzsche, he argued that the security which had been offered
by an absolute God had disappeared, but science could not fulfill the function that God
had performed. As a Kantian, Weber claimed that we had to choose our own meanings
according to knowledge which is partial but relevant to us. Without recourse to any kind
o f an absolutist monistic God, modem individuals should choose and legitimate values
that are relevant to them: “so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own
terms, it knows only an unceasing struggle o f these gods [ultimate values] with one
another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. Thus
it is necessary to make a decisive choice” (Weber, quoted in Owen 1997: 126). Weber
observed the process o f dominance o f the bureaucratic élites over ordinary people and
stated that the bureaucratic elites were armed with formal rationality and bureaucracy was
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the formidable agency o f it. Weber worried about the development o f the modem
bureaucratic state that tended to effectively reduce the general populace to mass political
subservience. Against this, he advocated a kind o f liberalism in which each member o f
specialized occupational groups “seeks to realize a personally chosen value by its
translation into worldly ends pursued in their respective institutional sphere” (Seidman
1991a: 160). Through his political life, Weber fought for parliamentary mle and full
citizenship of the workers.

Modem American Sociology as the Exclusion o f the Aesthetic
Modem American sociology was similar to classical European sociology with regard
to excluding the aesthetic when establishing sociology as a science. Except for the
aesthetic, modem American sociology utilized all models of knowledge. But unlike
classical European sociology, modem American sociology was not critical o f the
technically practical, but accepted it as the primary model of knowledge. Modem
American sociology also positively accepted the morally practical because it was
favorable to the American mind o f heroic individualism and capitalism. In addition,
modem American sociology utilized the theoretical model, but there was a significant
difference between America and Europe. In Europe, the essentialist version o f the
theoretical such as Marxism and structuralism strongly influenced European academe
including sociology. But in America, the essentialist version failed to find a foothold in
sociological discourse because American secular science could not endure its
teleological, thus nonscientific, implication. Rather, modem American sociology utilized
the transcendentalist version o f the theoretical.
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In short, in the course of establishing sociology as a scientific discipline, modem
American sociology excluded the aesthetic model of knowledge, but made use o f other
models of knowledge such as the theoretical, the technically practical, and the morally
practical. The aesthetic did not find its space in modem American sociology, and
developed outside o f sociological discourse. As formerly stated, the aesthetic strives to
go beyond the boundary of the social. The task o f the aesthetic is to blaspheme the
sacred nature of the social, and thus, to deconstruct the artificial distinction between the
social and the nonsocial. Avant-garde art represented the aesthetic model, but did its task
within the boundary o f art. Art was conceived as an autonomous realm independent of
science and ethics. As a result, the aesthetic couldn’t be a serious challenge to modem
American sociology. In what follows, I will review this process briefly. For the
convenience of discussion, I will divide modem American sociology into four periods;
1880s to 1915/18, I9I5/I8 to 1945/50,1945/50 to early 1960s, and early 1960s to early
1980s.
The first department of sociology was established in the United States, not in Europe.
Albion Small (1854-1926) established the department o f sociology in the United States at
University o f Chicago in 1892, and founded the first sociological joumal, the American
Journal o f Sociology there in 1895. Charles R. Henderson (1848-1915) and George
Vincent (1864-1941) were the other members o f the department. Later, Small brought to
the department people such as William I. Thomas (1863-1947), Robert E. Park (18641944) and Emest W. Burgess (1886-1966). Pragmatism influenced Chicago sociologists,
but during the first period it could not be said that they formed the so-called Chicago
School o f sociology yet: “Pragmatism at Chicago was early recognized to constitute a
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school o f philosophy. The same was not true o f sociology or political science, whose
schools only developed a generation later. The foundations for the school o f sociology
was laid at the earlier period, but in the form o f necessary institutional conditions rather
than high intellectual achievement” (Bulmer 1984: 32). Rather, the spirit o f the so-called
Chicago School could be found in Charles H. Cooley (1864-1929). In fact, Cooley
taught at University o f Michigan and was never on the Chicago faculty, but “his
psychical presence was far more significant than his corporeal absence” (Lewis and
Smith 1980: 162).
Along with the Chicago School, there were other foimders o f American sociology
such as William Graham Sunmer (1840-1910), Lester Frank Ward (1839-1913), Franklin
Henry Giddings (1855-1931), Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951), all of whom taught at
the Ivy schools. Ward spent nearly forty years in government service, and went to Brown
University to teach there. Ward was the first president of the American Sociological
Society. Sumner, the second president o f the society, taught at Yale. Giddings, the third
president o f the society, taught sociology at Columbia. Ross taught sociology at Stanford
University until his dismissal from the school in 1900, and few years later he moved to
University o f Nebraska and then to University o f Wisconsin where he taught for some
thirty years.
Virtually all early American sociologists were greatly influenced by Darwinian and
Spencerian evolutionary naturalism. According to Hinkle (1980: 16-17), evolutionary
naturalism designates three appropriate tenets:
(I) it is possible and desirable to offer a naturalistic, rather than a
supematuralistic, explanation o f social or societal phenomena (which are
thus a domain in and of nature and which involves social forces); (2) the
appearance o f social phenomena can be accounted for (causally) in terms
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o f other more basic, elementary or genetic phenomena, states, or
conditions, out o f which social phenomena arose gradually; and (3)
Darwinian (and Spencerian) views of organic evolution are held to afford
an acceptable model for interpreting the stability-instability o f modes of
human association as effective adaptations or adjustments to the
conditions of human existence.
Evolutionary naturalism was a British version o f Darwin’s evolutionism, which was
characterized by individualistic and deterministic interpretation o f Darwin’s
evolutionism. This British version was prominent in America until the 1920s because o f
“American provincialism and intellectual dependence upon Britain” (Connell 1997:
1561). Early American sociologists fully accepted the individualistic feature of this view.
Martindale (1966: 22) described the social ambience of the United States where an
individualistic approach to society was welcomed as such.
In the United States, a somewhat special circumstance eclipsed the
significance of holistic social theories from the beginning. The United
States had never had a powerful traditional aristocracy. Thus, the
revolution left the country in the hands of the middle classes, but without
the urgent necessity to consolidate the socio-political order against
possible counterrevolution by traditional aristocracies, on the one hand, or
against an activated proletariat, on the other. Furthermore, a great
continent remained to be exploited. As a result, there was no need for the
sharp reversal o f the philosophical and ideological outlook comparable to
the European movement from enlightenment rationalism to romanticism,
from laissez faire individualism to sociological holism.
Early American sociologists tried to eliminate or minimize the deterministic feature
o f evolutionary naturalism, preserving the belief in the progress or evolutionary
development o f humanity from the simple origin to the complex present (or future).
Early American sociologists tried to debunk the organicists’ reification o f social structure
and development by emphasizing the on-going process. This emphasis on the on-going
process fitted well to most early American sociologists’ aspiration to reform society with
the aid o f scientific knowledge. In this post-Civil War era, America underwent rapid
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industrialization and urbanization in which American sociologists saw advances o f
material life as well as decline of the traditional Protestant morality. American
sociologists were very conscious o f the ethical and political implications o f the historical
changes, as the vast majority came from rural and religious (Protestant) environments and
was educated in the Protestant ethics that demanded every individual to work hard in
order to believe that he is chosen by God. Every individual is a solitary pilgrim who has
to go his own way, not having any choice but to believe that s/he is chosen by God.
Nobody can decide who I am and what I do. This Protestant heroic individualism led
American sociologists to the Enlightenment belief in progress, one that men can reform
society towards betterment o f humankind through applying scientific knowledge to
society (see Greek 1992). But American sociologists had observed a lot o f urban
problems and the decline o f the Protestant ethic. American sociologists wanted to
preserve the traditional Protestant ethics by reforming social problems with scientific
knowledge, believing that if they would discover laws about human organization, these
laws could be used for the progressive betterment o f society. These laws were usually
expressed in terms of evolutionism; “the survival o f the fittest.” Except for some extreme
liberalists, most American sociologists who observed the chaos o f industrialization,
urbanization, and immigration believed that the social system should be reformed and
that it could be reformed without revolution. In this sense, early American sociologists
wanted to be both scientific and moralistic.
Regardless o f which school the early American sociologists belonged to, there were
two different interpretations o f evolutionary naturalism: the “social forces group” and the
“interactionist group.” The “social forces group” mainly followed the technically
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practical when modifying evolutionary naturalism. The technically practical that the
social forces group accepted was mainly based on the model o f Newtonian physics that
tries to find universal laws like the laws of gravity. This kind o f the technically practical,
like the theoretical, employed abstract and grand discourses. By contrast, statistics,
which characterized the post-Newtonian model o f the technically practical, was not yet
employed. Following the technically practical, the “social forces group” emphasized
individualistic and behavioristic aspects o f evolutionary naturalism. The “social forces
group” believed that some basic interests, desires or forces are universal or nearly
universal characteristics o f human beings, which impel people to do things. The social
forces group believed that society or organization emerged out o f the interaction o f
individuals, each o f whom is trying to satisfy some kind o f individualistic interest, desire
or force. This group did not emphasize the rigid and objective feature of society, but
recognized the importance o f the social process that is a perpetual relation between forces
lodged in individuals. The “social forces group” was represented by Small^, Sumner,
Ward, and Ross. Giddings also accepted the technically practical but his position was
significantly different from other social forces group members. Unlike them, Giddings
did not conceive early humans as egoistic, individualistic, selfish, atomistic, solitary, etc.
Rather, he believed that “Human nature is [characteristically and] preeminently social
nature” (quoted in Hinkle 1980: 107). Despite this difference, Giddings basically
accepted the technically practical, but unlike the social forces group that accepted the
Newtonian model o f the technically practical, Giddings argued that statistics was needed
Despite Small having established the Chicago sociology, he was not directly influenced
by pragmatism (Bulmer 1984:31). Rather, Small was similar to other Ivy school
sociologists.
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for sociology to become a reliable science. Even though statistics was relatively little
used among sociologists up to 1930, Giddings became the forerunner o f neo-positivistic
sociology.
The “interactionist group” adopted primarily the morally practical when modifying
evolutionary naturalism. This humanistic modification o f evolutionary naturalism was
possible with the aid o f pragmatism which developed the basic tenets o f the morally
practical. Ontologically, pragmatism rejected the deterministic worldview which saw the
world as inherently structured and determined in and of itself. Rather, it presented
pluralistic worldview according to which contingency and ambiguity were considered as
main features o f the world. Reality is not ready-made and complete for all eternity but is
still in the making. This indeterminate notion o f the world was intimately associated with
an emphasis on human beings as an active beings. Following the Darwinian notion o f
evolution, pragmatism saw the individual as an active flexible being who “continuously
adapts to his environment, changing his action to meet the exigencies o f the situation and
transforming the situation to satisfy his practical needs” (Shalin 1986: 11). According to
pragmatism, the individual and the environment mutually constitute each other. Action
connects the individual and the environment. Knowledge of the world is neither a
speculative pursuit of the eternal Truth nor the blind accumulation o f bare facts. Rather,
knowledge is an instnunent by which man adapts better to the environment. Thus, what
is important is to experience the world through action although knowledge is always
partial because the world is still in the making: “the state of indeterminacy endemic to
reality cannot be terminated once and for all. It can be alleviated only partially, in
concrete situations, and with the help o f a thinking agent” (Shalin 1986:10). On the
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direction o f history, pragmatism basically shared the belief in human progress with the
aid o f knowledge, but it did not believe that the mechanism of progress was determined a
priori. The concrete manifestation o f progress depends on interactions between human
actors and the environment. On morality, pragmatism emphasized the moral autonomy
of human beings; they are responsible for their actions. This morality is intimately
connected with a kind of participatory democracy which presupposes the pluralist
organization o f society. As Joas (1993: 18) excellently summarized:
The concept o f rationality and the normative ideal of this mode o f thought
are theoretically grasped in the idea of self-regulated action.
Pragmatism’s theory o f social order, then, is guided by a conception of
social control in the sense of collective self-regulation and problem
solving. This conception o f social order is informed by ideas about
democracy and the structure o f communication within communities o f
scientists.
Pragmatism was not a unified school, and generally accord unqualified primacy to
neither individual nor society: the individual is explained in terms o f society and society
in terms o f individual. Still we could find a significant division between nominalist and
realist pragmatists. Peirce represented the realist version o f pragmatism. Compared to
Peirce, James and Dewey were more nominalist than realist (Lewis and Smith 1984)^.
These two version o f pragmatism influenced American sociologists even though Peirce
did not influence them as James and Dewey did. Similarly, we can distinguish between
two groups o f interactionist sociology: the psychical interactionist and the social
interactionist.

In fact, this division was not determinate because the two groups basically shared the
basic tenets mentioned above (see Shalin 1986). Inspite o f this, we could identify that
these two groups emphasized one over the other among the individual and structure. We
believe that this distinction would be helpful for further mapping the development of
interactionist sociology.
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The psychical interactionist group “draws attention away from the biological givens
and centers the actual field o f interpersonal interaction as the primary source o f social
organization. The psychical interactionists were more aware that the biological
universals can be accommodated through a wide variety o f social structures. It is,
therefore, impossible to explain the diverse array o f concrete forms o f social
organizations by pointing to a list of universal ‘instincts’ or ‘forces.’ Rather, each form
must be interpreted through the specific interpersonal and historical processes that
conditioned its occurrence” (Lewis and Smith 1980: 157-158). Unlike the social forces
group which took the technically practical, the psychical interactionist group basically
accepted Dewey’s claim that we live in “ a universe which is not all closed and settled,
which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the making.. an open universe in
which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties, and possibilities are naturalized”
(Dewey, quoted in Kennedy 1950: 52). James, Dewey, and Cooley could be
representatives of the psychical interactionist group.
If the psychical interactionist group shifted the focus from the biological to
consciousness, the social interactionist group shifted the focus from consciousness to the
objective world. Mead represented this view, recognizing that “a great deal has been
placed in consciousness that must be returned to the so-called objective world” (Mead
1962: 4). Mead gave priority to society over the individual: “the whole (society) is prior
to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of
the whole, not the whole in terms o f the part or parts” (Mead 1962: 7). To Mead, “the
social whole precedes the individual mind both logically and temporally. A thinking,
self-conscious individual i s .. .logically impossible in Mead’s theory without a prior
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social group. The social group comes first, and it leads to the development o f selfconscious mental states” (Ritzer 1996: 184). Compared to the psychical interactionist
group that emphasized the open, flexible universe. Mead emphasized the universal and
objective feature of society in which the individual participates through taking the roles
o f others: “Mead’s approach is compatible with the recognition that relatively to the most
general co-operative acts there are highly invariant features o f the world” (Morris 1962:
xxx). Mead’s views are well presented in his famous book Mind, Self, and Society
posthumously published in 1934 by his students. In fact. Mead’s views were “developed
from 1900 on at the University o f Chicago in the widely known and highly influential
course, ‘Social Psychology’” (Morris 1962: v). One of the recent works showed well
how Mead developed his views from Dewey’s 1896 article “The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology” (Cook 1993). Thus, we consider that Mead’s views were basically
developed during the first period (1880s-l9l5/18).
In the second period (1915/18-1945/50), American sociologists started doubting their
optimistic belief in progress and began to make efforts to control social problems. The
massive violence o f World War 1 made it no longer possible “to take ‘progress’
unproblematically as the reality to be studied, the object of knowledge” (Connell 1997:
1533). Also a varuety o f “social problems” associated with the acceleration of
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration were enough to challenge the optimistic
belief in human progress. In parallel, America began to change into an organized
bureaucratic society as large corporations and large-scale industries developed. Large
bureaucratic organizations demanded that sociologists devise social skills to explain,
predict, and control the social world, and offered huge amounts o f fimding to American
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sociologists in return for solving social problems. The “efficiency” o f the theory to solve
social problems was the funding agents’ main concern (Ttumer and Turner 1990). This
condition led American sociologists to detach themselves fi-om evolutionism, regardless
o f whether it was mechanistic or dialectical, which proposed a grand narrative about the
origin o f humanity and its subsequent evolution o f humanity. Indeed, there were still
some scholars who continued to use the evolutionary scheme, but they increasingly lost
their currency (Hinkle 1994: 65-148). Rather, American sociologists began to study the
concrete social problems around them (Hinkle 1954, 1994; Turner and Turner 1990).
Answering the demands o f the funding agency, they devised sophisticated
methodological strategies to explain, predict and control social problems. Sociology as a
“genuine” science became conceptualized as inductive, empirical research: “Perhaps, the
most characteristic concern o f the second period was to make sociology a genuine
science through a devotion to inductive, empirical research” (Hinkle 1994: 30). The
effort to turn sociology into a science encouraged the detached and objective study of
society, which allowed no room for the subjectivity o f the researcher. Sociology became
increasingly equated with the scientific method.
With regard to the notion o f a scientific method, there were two main positions. One,
proposed by the so-called Chicago sociology, took the morally practical as the model o f
sociology as a scientific method. 1 consider thus Chicago sociology as a sociological
version o f pragmatism which could be seen as an heir o f the morally practical. As
previously stated, the most important feature o f the morally practical is the emphasis on
the freedom o f human beings in the open universe. Likewise, pragmatism believed in
men’s conscious activity (rationality) to define and solve problems encountered in the
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course o f their conduct. For pragmatism, science is a type o f activity, i.e., a problem
solving activity. Also, pragmatism believed that social order could be maintained only
through active participation o f actors.
As we have seen, pragmatism had two versions; James, Dewey, and Cooley’s
nominalist version and Peirce and Mead’s realist one. The psychical interactionists such
as Cooley followed a nominalist version. In the second period, although psychical
interactionism was developed by Thomas, Ellwood, and Blumer (Lewis and Smith 1980),
Thomas would be considered as its main representative because it was Thomas who set
up this tradition at Chicago. Thomas challenged any kind o f reified vision of society and
man, revitalizing their subjective dimension. Thomas placed more emphasis on man’s
power to define a situation than on the obdurate nature o f the situation. Social structure
or situation matters only when it is experienced by actors. Social structure is pluralistic
because actors experience it in different ways. In this sense, social structure is fluid and
dynamic enough to accord formative power to actors.
The realist version was developed by Park and his followers. In the Introduction to
the Science o f Sociology (1921), Park distinguished social nominalism from social
realism, and rejected social nominalism which saw society as consisting o f “a group o f
independent individuals who created social organization through psychical interactions”
(Smith and Lewis 1980: 185). Park shifted the interest from social nominalism to social
realism even though these two positions were intermingled:
On the macrolevel question of the relationship between consciousness and
social organization. Park w as.. .a self-professed realist. Yet when
required to provide an account o f the process through which social
consciousness is formed. Park relied upon the American tradition o f
Dewey, Cooley, and Thomas. The structural component o f Park’s thought
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was definitely realistic, but his processual analysis remained essentially
nominalistic (Smith and Lewis 1980; 186-187).
These two intermingled positions make it difficult to precisely grasp Parks’s position.
Indeed, Park did not present his view in a systematic way, but 1 want to emphasize Park’s
realist side because his students’ studies o f cities were based on his realist view to study
“society as it is”: “Under Park’s guidance, urban ethnography, the study o f social
behavior in its ‘natural setting,’ became the fulcrum o f research at Chicago” (Lai 1990:
2). The subsequent monographs published in the 1920s and the 1930s such as The Hobo,
The Gold Coast and Slum, The Gang, The Taxi-Dance Hall, and The Pilgrims o f Russian
Town were developed under Park’s guidance, and formed the dominant tradition at
Chicago (Bulmer 1984). The most important feature o f these studies is that the authors
gathered the data from their firsthand acquaintance with the society aroimd them. The
realist ontology underlies these studies, according to which “a sociologist is merely a
more accurate, responsible, and scientific reporter” (Park, quoted in Bulmer 1984:91).
The other, proposed by the so-called neo-positivist sociologists, accepted the
technically practical as the model o f sociology as a scientific method. Neo-positivist
sociology was developed mainly by Giddings’ graduate students at Columbia or students
o f their students. It is by the end of the 1920s that these “two major and antagonistic
conceptions of science and scientific method are beginning to crystallize, one centering
on statistics and the other on case study” (Hinkle 1994: 34). Up to 1930 American
sociologists mainly used qualitative methods. Indeed, up to then statistics had been
relatively little used (Harvey 1987: 74). But after the 1930s, neo-positivist sociology,
which mainly used statistics, increasingly dominated American sociology. We consider
neo-positivist sociology as an heir o f the technically practical, but unlike positivist
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sociology, neo-positivist sociology aimed to find truths with a small “t”: they are
conditional and subject to revision o f the accumulation of new knowledge. During the
second period, neo-positivist sociology was developed mainly by F. Stuart Chapin (18881974), William F. Ogbum (1886-1959), George A. Lundberg (1895-1966), etc. (Hinkle
1994). Neo-positivist sociology became the most dominant trend in American sociology,
especially after 1930. Lundberg was considered to be the most representative figure by
his contemporary sociologists (see Simpson 1949; Timasheff 1950). His Social Research
(1929) set up subsequent development o f positivistic sociology.
These two versions of American sociology, i.e., pragmatic sociology and neo
positivist sociology, were more interested in scientific “methods” than scientific
“theories.” But by the 1930s, a new interest in the general theory emerged. Pitirim
Sorokin (1889-1968) and Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) represented this trend. While
Sorokin did not exert any significant influence on the subsequent development of
American sociology. Parsons set up the dominant theoretical position in modem
American sociology. Before the publication of The Structure o f Social Action in 1937,
modem American sociology had been virtually equated with methods or methodologies.
As we have seen, the models of the morally practical and the technically practical almost
eliminated the need for the theoretical. In this respect, Parsons was outstanding; he
helped American sociologists revitalize their interest in the theoretical.
Parsons was critical for his times, because most sociologists were busy doing
empirical research. These empirical sociologists assumed that theory is a metaphysical or
mystical remnant that should be expunged from the establishment of scientific sociology.
By contrast. Parsons argued that all empirical researches already worked with reference
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to generalized theoretical categories. Thus, from his early career. Parsons began to
propose “generalized analytic theory” against a variety o f empiricism (positivistic
empiricism, particularistic empiricism, and intuitionist empiricism) as well as idealism.
Parsons’ term “generalized analytic theory” could be thought o f as a sociologization o f
the transcendentalist version of the theoretical. Just as this version tried to retain the
spiritual dimension o f man and society while criticizing the harsh materialism o f the
Enlightenment, so Parsons wanted to retain the spiritual or normative dimension of
human beings while criticizing the extremes o f positivism and behaviorism. Parsons
argued that positivism was inappropriate for the study o f human beings because it used
the models o f the physical sciences which deal with an inanimate matter. Further,
Parsons rectified the basic tenet o f the theoretical, one that there is a necessary relation
between the structure o f mind and its external referents: “empirical reality.. .is a factual
order. Furthermore its order must be o f a character which is, in some sense, congruent
with the order of human logic” (Parsons 1968: 753). Parsons proposed the “action frame
o f reference” as an equivalent to Kant’s categories of time and space through which we
experience or organize things themselves. Concrete entities are “constructed entities, the
construction being determined by the structure of the frame o f reference employed”
(Parsons 1968: 754-755). In this sense, we can call Parsons a Neo-Kantian (Hinkle 1994:
53).
In the second period, American sociologists tried to preserve the liberal idea, but they
felt that traditional liberalism was deficient in securing order. Those who embraced the
morally practical and the technically practical kept working under the assumption o f the
liberal ideal o f autonomous individuals. Roughly up to the 1930s, they claimed that
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study on the normative dimension was not their jobs as genuine scientists because
genuine scientists transcended the normative dimension. But what they really did was to
defend American liberalism characterized by individualistic notion o f society and
reformative politics. To American Uberalists, the social system was established and
maintained by the voluntary consensus among individuals, and social problems could be
solved on the individual level. Thus, they concentrated on devising methods to measure
individual “attitudes.” But confronting a series o f social events during the 1930s such as
the Great Depression, the rise o f labor movement, and the rise of fascism and Nazism,
American sociologists became to feel that American liberalism was threatened. On the
social level, perceived threat was manifested as a “corporate liberalism,” characterized by
“administered markets and government regulation, with the rise, legitimation, and
institutionalization of the corporate-capitalist order, and hence with the dominant position
in the market o f the corporate sector o f the capitalist class” (Sklar, quoted in Woodiwiss
1993: 15). Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of action was devised before corporate
liberalism emerged as an alternative for traditional liberalism. As a result. Parsons
worked under the framework o f traditional liberalism. But since then Parsons began to
move away from traditional liberalism towards corporate liberalism. In this sense,
modem American sociologists in the second period had a strong normative interest in
securing American liberalism.
The third period (1945/50 to early 1960s) was characterized by prosperity in the
United States. The United States emerged from World War II as the most stable
industrial society in the world, and seemed to many to have solved the fundamental
problems o f social survival and growth. Socially, this period could be expressed as a
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great success o f corporate liberalism. The welfare state seemed to successfully
administer unstable markets through fiscal and monetary management, and the welfare
state also seemed to solve the problem o f economic inequality by income reallocations
through taxation. The welfare state extended its power to intervene deliberately in
society, and as a result, demanded a lot of technocrats armed with administrative skills to
rationally control society. Much of applied sociology developed in this social context.
Many modem American sociologists adopted the technically practical model of
knowledge that deployed statistics for the empirical studies o f social problems that the
welfare state demanded them to study.
Parsons’ functionalism idealized this, as reflected the prosperity of the domestic
economy as well as the hegemony o f America all over the world after World War II.
Parsons saw the stmcture of society as mutually supportive and tending toward a
dynamic equilibrium. His main concem was the maintenance o f order within the social
system. This equilibrium vision of society was Parsons’ intellectual response to the
“smooth” development o f American capitalism after World War II. As Martindale
(1966: 23) put it:
Only after the closing of the American frontier, the rise o f mass industry,
two world wars, and the Great Depression was the collective and its
problems brought to central focus in the American outlook as had long
been the case in Europe. The time was finally ripe for the major
development of a form o f sociological holism. Sociological holism
eventually emerged in American sociology under the name of
functionalism or, as it is sometimes called, structural functionalism.
Parsons’ functionalism showed some inherent conflict with the theory o f the welfare
state because the theory o f welfare state acknowledged that there existed “inherent social
'imbalances’ o f a sort that needs to be corrected, changed,” rather than to assumed that
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“there is, fundamentally, a self-maintaining social system" (Gouldner 1970: 348).
Parsons dealt with this conflict by proposing a cybernetic hierarchy among subsystems.
What is important to us is that Parsons adopted the transcendentalist version o f the
theoretical. Martindale (1966: 30) rightly pointed out that Parsons’ functionalism was a
revised version o f positivistic organicism, the modem rendition o f the transcendentalist
version of the theoretical:
Actually, sociological functionalism is a revised version o f positivistic
organicism.. .In contrast to the various branches o f social behaviorism, all
of which treated the individual and various o f his properties as primary
social realities, in a manner reminiscent o f the positivistic organicists, the
functionalists take some form of collectivity as the primary unit o f social
life. Sociological functionalism rests on the premise that social life is
organized into organic systems. It also assiunes that any item in the social
system is embedded in a functionally interdependent set o f relations within
the whole (Matindale 1966: 30).
Even though he did not give up the voluntaristic theory of action totally (Turner and
Beeghley 1974), Parsons shifted his interest from the voluntaristic actor to the normative
forces o f the social system (see Scott 1963, 1974). This shift already began when
Parsons published “Values, Motives, and Systems of Action’’ and The Social System in
1951. But it was not until 1956 in Economy and Society (coauthored with Smelser) that a
more elaborated explanation o f functionalism was developed (Brownstein 1982).
Parsons elaborated his theory in decidedly more functionalist and formalist terms.
Relying on his analytic realism. Parsons concentrated on building a systematic theory,
which assumed a systematic world of phenomena as its counterpart. From our
perspective. Parsons faithfully followed the basic tenet o f the theoretical that the order
and connection o f ideas is the same as the order and connection o f things. Thus, what is
important is to build the “order and connection’’ o f ideas. Individual idea or concept is
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not important unless it is systematically coimected to others that form the whole system
o f ideas. In this model, a concept should have coherence with the total system o f
assertions within which it belongs. It is thus collectivity, not individuality, that counts.
This holistic position hints that Parsons’ functionalism is an heir o f the transcendentalist
version o f the theoretical. Following the transcendentalist version o f the theoretical.
Parsons tried to invent sociological theory as “grasping the most abstract, fundamental,
and universal features of society and weaving them into a general theory that aspired to
comprehend all societies—past, present, and future ” (Seidman 1994: 112-113). Just as
ideas or forms are a transcendent and immaterial realm of ideal entities, so Parsons’
theory is “an autonomous, intellectual enterprise, unsullied by social interests or moral
advocacy, whose sole justification lay in the general truths that it inspired to reveal’’
(Seidman 1994: 113).
C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) criticized corporate liberalism as an ideology o f the
power elite from the perspective of a small-scale world o f small entrepreneurs and
farmers. He did not see the United States as a functionally integrated system or welladministered welfare society, but an exploiting system in which the power complex
dominated the middle and the mass. Mills also criticized both empirically-oriented
applied sociology and Parsons’ functionalism for justifying corporate liberalism. When
criticizing Lazasfeld’s “abstracted empiricism’’ and Parsons’ “grand theory,’’ Mills
utilized the realist version o f the morally practical. Starting early on in his career. Mills
was enormously influenced by pragmatism. From the perspective o f pragmatism, grand
theory or grand narrative is useless because neither counts for individuals. In the revised
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version o f his dissertation Sociology and Pragmatism, Mills (1964: 268) expressed this
below by quoting James.
Damn great Empires! including that o f the Absolute.. .Give me
individuals and their spheres o f activity.. .1 am against bigness and
greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces
that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of
the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing o f water,
and yet rending the hardest monuments o f man’s pride, if you give them
time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the
more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am against all big successes
and big results; and in favor o f the eternal forces of truth which always
work in the individual.
Mills accused grand theory of not connecting with substantive problems and thus
providing ideological support for the status quo. Mills also criticized trivialized
technically practical model o f knowledge then represented by Lazasfeld, and criticized
abstracted empiricism for its conducting o f trivial studies which were psychologistic in
orientation, and lacking any sense o f connection with the wider social structure.
The core, from which Mills criticized both grand theory and abstracted empiricism, is
one o f the basic tenets of the morally practical: contextualism. But Mills’ acceptance of
the morally practical is significantly different from the nominalist version o f the morally
practical. While the nominalist version was mainly concerned with the “situational”
feature o f contextualism. Mills’ version o f the morally practical was primarily concerned
with the “structural” feature o f contextualism. While the nominalist version tended to
concentrate on the micro level of social processes in which meaning is the most important
sociological problem. Mills paid more attention to “power,” and criticized the formalistic
aspect o f pragmatism, which disengaged itself from politics and pressing social issues.
The fourth period (early 1960s to mid-1980s) could be characterized by the crisis o f
the 1950s’ achieved modernity. In the 1950s, most mainstream sociologists held the
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triumphant belief that, for the first time in history, industrial society had solved the
fundamental problems of social survival and growth. But starting at some point in the
1960s, this belief began to disintegrate. Kumar (1978: 187) documented the ambience o f
the time as the following:
The ‘end o f ideology’ is itself denounced as an ideology, the ideology o f a
complacent, short-sighted and one-sided materialist society. There is the
discovery, or rediscovery, o f the dark side o f industrialism.. The
economic benefits o f industrialism are seen to be purchased at the cost o f
increasing ‘dis-economies’ to the society at large: pollution, crowding, the
exhaustion o f the natural fossil fuels on which the industrial economy
itself depends. The main currents of industrialization—rationalization and
bureaucratization—nm into an impasse, and increasingly large-scale
hierarchical organization seems productive mainly o f inefficiency and
irrationality.
This decline o f belief in triumphant industrialism was further ignited by the new
social movement: the civil rights movement, women’s liberation movement, the anti-war
student movement, the New Left, the hippie counterculture (“sex, drugs, and rock n’
roll”), and the gay-lesbian movement. These new social movements criticized corporate
liberalism in general and academic discourse in particular as a dominant ideology that
justified the white/Anglo-Saxon/Protestant/masculine/middle class/aged/heterosexual
worldview. These movements extended the subject o f knowledge and generated new
social knowledges such as African-American studies, feminism, lesbian and gay studies,
cultural studies, etc. But up to the early 1980s these new knowledges did not
fundamentally challenge the modernist framework o f American sociology that saw
scientific knowledge (the theoretical and the technically practical) as the primary model
o f knowledge. Most o f these new knowledges were produced outside o f mainstream
American sociology. Compared to other human studies, American sociology was
relatively slow to integrate these new forms o f knowledge.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

197
But some American sociologists tried to embrace these new knowledges. They
thought these new knowledges would endorse the realist version o f the morally practical.
Feminist sociology represented this trend. Modem feminism in general emerged from
the so-called second-wave women’s movement in the late 1960s through the 1970s; it
emerged as an interdisciplinary effort to theorize this movement in such fields as
philosophy, history, economics, anthropology, political science, psychology, literature,
religion, and sociology. Modem feminism appeared in several forms; the liberal, the
Marxist, the radical, the socialist, and the psychoanalytic feminism (see Tong 1989).
These different types o f feminism are “modem” insofar as they mimic the modem notion
o f science directly inherited from the Enlightenment tradition; rationalist foundationalism
and empirical cause-effect model.
Rationalist foundationalism tried to discover some fundamental foundations on which
society as well as tme human knowledge are systemically organized. Modem feminism
also tried to discover some fundamental foundations of gender inequality in society, on
which feminist knowledge is systemically organized. These fundamental foundations
had different names for different types of feminism; “a set o f customary and legal
constraints” for liberal feminism, “class system” for Marxist feminism, “patriarchal
system” for radical feminism, “dual system o f class and patriarchy” for socialist
feminism, and “Oedipal logic” for psychoanalytic feminism. According to this
foundationalism, gender inequality was a manifestation o f some fundamental laws
governing all social phenomena; therefore, modem feminists tried to establish an abstract
grand system o f knowledge on gender inequality, deducing from these some fundamental
laws.
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Modem feminists also believed that causes operate at the level o f measurable
variables. According to this, women were reduced to a measurable variable (gender).
Modem feminists wanted to add one more variable called gender in order to establish “a
general theory” that could explain the causes of gender inequality. Research was
designed using a deductive form of logic wherein theories and hypotheses were tested in
a cause-effect order. These empirical studies were considered a key task in developing
knowledge on gender inequality. Modem feminists believed that sexism and
androcentrism in scientific inquiry are the consequence o f science badly conducted, and
that better scientific knowledge on society will be achieved if feminists eradicated these
biases in scientific inquiry. Modem feminists mainly challenged the incomplete way
scientific methods were practiced, not modem Westem science itself.
The new social movements also provided a social ambience in which Parsons’
functionalism appeared untenable. Society could no longer be seen as an integrated
system. Instead, many emerged new trends in sociology that challenged Parsons’
functionalism. They are symbolic interactionism, dramaturgical analysis,
phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, exchange theory, conflict theory, etc.
These theories adopted new models of knowledge different from Parsons’ functionalism.
Broadly speaking, symbolic interactionism, dramaturgical analysis, phenomenological
sociology, and ethnomethodology followed the nominalist version o f the morally
practical that emphasized action (individuality) over stmcture (collectivity). They all
considered meaning the most important sociological problem and considered language
the primary source o f social meaning (Lemert 1979). They all followed the nominalist
version o f the morally practical: “these subjective-idealist theoretical orientations easily
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could have revived Cooley, Ellwood, and other American psychical interactionists with
whom they are metatheoretically continuous” (Lewis and Smith 1980: 247).
Symbolic interactionism is associated with Herbert Blumer who coined the term
“symbolic interactionism” in 1937. Blumer wrote a series o f articles attacking the
established sociological position, which were collected in 1969 in Symbolic
Interactionism: Perspective and Method. There Blumer presented the nominalist version
o f the morally practical. Blumer argued that society is made up o f active individuals who
have selves. Individual actors form society in the ongoing processes o f interacting with
each other; without consistent interaction between individual actors, society would stop
existing. Goffinan’s dramaturgical analysis embraced the nominalist version of the
morally practical. Against prevailing theoretical abstractions and research methods to
capture “reality,” Goffinan was concerned with how realities are socially constructed in
concrete interactions. Social order is the result of social interaction as well as the
foundation for on-going interaction. Phenomenological sociology took the nominalist
version o f the morally practical, and traced its roots in German philosopher Edmund
Husserl (1859-1938). In their book The Social Construction o f Reality (1966), Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckman developed Husserl’s insight into sociologically significant
inquiry. Berger and Luckman (1966: 18) asked “How is it possible that subjective
meanings become objective facilities?” They emphasized the subjective experience o f
the reality o f everyday life. “In contrast to Goffinan, whose actors appear to be reading
scripts which were written by others, Berger and Luckman’s actors improvise and create
their own scripts” (Wallace 1994:263). Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology also adopted the
nominalist version o f the morally practical. According to him, the social world is orderly
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organized, but this order is not “out there.” Rather, it is achieved by active participants
who share “common sense knowledge o f social structures.”
It should not be ignored that in this period there began the rapid development o f new
technologies in mass media represented by the launching of the Russian Sputnik in 1957.
The first landing on the moon in 1969 convinced people that the space age which
technologists and men o f science would lead had begun. With the sense o f crisis, a new
optimism armed with the technological determinism began to spread. In this context,
renewed concerns with social change emerged. Futurology became the fashion of the
time. Many social scientists, most o f whom were prominent announcers o f the “end o f
ideology” in the 1950s, presented post-industrial society as the future. Herman Kahn and
Anthony Wiener’s The Year 2000 (1967), Z. Brzezinski’s Between Two Ages: America's
Role in the Technotronic Era (1970), Peter Drucker’s The Age o f Discontinuity (1971),
and Daniel Bell’s The Coming o f Post-Industrial Society (1973) were the representative
books during those days. But among the post-industrial society theories. Bell’s theory
was the most representative. Daniel Bell, a sociologist and the Chairman o f the
Commission in the Year 2000, was intellectually an heir o f the Enlightenment thinkers
such as Turgot and Condorcet, and more directly o f the 19'*’ century evolutionists such as
Saint-Simon, Comte and Spencer. But unlike his forerunners who had conceived o f
industrial society as the last stage o f evolution of human history. Bell added one more last
stage to it: the post-industrial society. But the basic logic o f Bell’s post-industrial society
theory was the same as one o f the industrial society theory imagined by his intellectual
precursors. This optimistic belief in technological progress generated a social ambience
in which positivistic sociology equipped with the technically practical model of
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knowledge flourished. Positivistic sociology was confident with the sociologists’ ability
to understand, predict, and control men and society with scientific knowledge.
George Homans’ exchange theory and Randall Collins’ conflict theory represented
this positivistic orientation. They tried to synthesize the technically practical and the
transcendentalist version o f the theoretical. They are intellectual heirs o f Newton as far
as trying to explain everything in terms o f a few concise principles. In 1961 Homans
published Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Since then, exchange theory soon
became a widespread movement throughout the social sciences including sociology.
Exchange theory “gained not only major adherents but influential revisers.. and it deeply
affected sociological work in virtually every empirical field” (Alexnader 1987: 157).
What is important is that Homans tried to synthesize the technically practical and the
transcendentalist version o f the theoretical. In his previous work The Human Group
(1950), Homans was more concerned with empirical generalization. But in Social
Behavior, Homans went further than mere empirical generalization he wanted to explain
them in terms o f deductive reasoning:
The inevitable next step is to ask why the empirical propositions should
take the form they do, and this is to ask for explanations. Once you have
established that the height o f the tides varies with the phases o f the moon,
your next step is to ask why this proposition should hold good. And once
you have established that the higher a man’s rank in a group, the more
closely his activities conform to its norms, you will ask why it should be
so. The only way to get an answer is to borrow from somebody else’s
work, if you can, or invent for yourself, if you must, a set o f more general
propositions, still o f the same form as the empirical ones, from which you
can logically deduce the latter under specified given conditions. To
deduce them successfully is to explain them (Homans 1961: 9-10).
For this task, Homans borrowed higher-order propositions from the behaviorist
psychology o f B.F. Skinner and what he called “elementary economics.” But the
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fundamental logic Homans followed is the Newtonian synthesis ofreductionism (the
technically practical) and deductionism (the theoretical). Homans’ exchange theory
adopted Newtonian physics as the primary model o f science of social behavior or true
exchange. As Newtonian physics reduces organized wholes to their simplest units,
Homans’ exchange theory reduces the social to individual behaviors, and further,
individual human to individual animal behaviors. Individual animal behavior is the most
simplest unit of all behaviors, and thus, basic propositions about individual animal
behavior is generally applicable to all behaviors. Homans considered these basic
propositions as the First Principles in his deductive system. For Homans, these First
Principles are indemonstrable: “As we move towards more and more general
propositions, we reach, at any given time in the history o f science, propositions that
caimot themselves be explained” (Homans 1961: 26). As previously stated, the First
Principles should be invented or borrowed from other sciences. Homans called this
process o f borrowing or inventing the more general propositions “induction.” This
process is “an act of creation, which has no rules o f procedure that will ensure you
success” (Homans 1961: 10). In a sense, these First Principles do not guarantee an
empirical referent in the empirical world. In this sense, Homans can be seen as a
Platonist. But Homans was not content with induction because he wanted genuine
explanation. For Homans, explanation is “the process o f deriving the empirical
propositions from the more general ones” (Homans 1961: 10). Explanation has definite
rules o f logic. As Newtonian physics explains all phenomena in terms o f three laws o f
motion, Homans’ exchange theory tries to explain all social behavior in terms o f five
general psychological propositions about human behavior. Homans ambitiously claimed
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that “My strategy is that deductive explanations should be inductively arrived at"
(Homans 1961: 10).
In his work Conflict Sociology: Towards an Explanatory Science (1975), Randall
Collins also tried to change sociology into a science. Collins criticized both naïve
positivism which equates science with precise measurement and careful statement, and
the theoretical in sociology (functionalism) that searches for universals because
“phenomena that are truly universal cannot be explained in any testable fashion, but only
speculated about” (Collins 1975:6). For Collins, real science provides generalized
explanation. The essence o f science is the “capacity to give the conditions under which
some things happen rather than others'' (Collins 1975: 2). In other words, the real
explanation o f science provides conditions for variations in phenomena, but a
pseudoexplanation o f pseudoscience doesn’t. For Collins, real science achieves the
scientific ideal to explain everything in terms of a few concise principles. These
principles should be ceaselessly applied to other phenomena so their explanatory power
can be tested. Formulating some universal principles is not sufficient if it leaves “the
problem o f stating conditions under which things happen or do not happen.. .Without
such a statement o f conditions for variation, there is no proof that explanation is right,
that the way o f conceptualizing the phenomenon captures its essential features ”(Collins
1975: 6). For Collins (1975: 2-3), “the method o f validating a theory—of showing that
its explanations are true—ultimately depends on its capacity to act as an economical and
coherent filter for our experience in the broadest sense.” In this sense, Collins’ conflict
theory synthesized the technically practical and the transcendentalist version of the
theoretical. As the following statements show well:
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The scientific ideal is to explain everything, and to do it by making causal
statements which are ultimately based upon experience. The most
powerful scientific theory is the one that can get the most explanatory
mileage out o f the most concise body of principles. Science is a way o f
finding the conunon principles that transcend particular situations, of
extrapolating from things we know to things we do not know, a way of
seeing the novel as another arrangement o f the familiar (Collins 1975: 2).

Fundamental Assumption o f Modem
American Sociology
In sum, modem American sociology utilized all models of knowledge except the
aesthetic. While mainstream American sociology mainly adopted the technically
practical and the theoretical, critical sociology and interactionist sociology embraced the
morally practical. In this sense, we can identify three types of modem American
sociology. The following is a brief summary:
1)

The Technically Practical Version of Sociology (“Positivistic Sociology'):

Positivistic sociology was first developed by the “social forces group” in the first period
Small, Summer, Ward, and Ross adopted the model o f Newtonian physics, and like him.
they tried to find the universal laws o f society and man. The social forces group claimed
that there exist universal basic interest, desires or forces that impel people to do things,
and thus human behaviors could be explained in terms o f those basic social forces.
Positivistic sociology was further developed by neo-positivist sociologists in the second
period. George A. Lundberg represented this period. Unlike the social forces group,
neo-positivist sociologists did not adopt the model o f Newtonian physics that aimed to
find absolute universal laws. Rather, they adopted statistics as the primary model o f
knowledge, which aimed to formulate empirical generalization. Neo-positivist sociology
has dominated modem American sociology. In the fourth period, positivistic sociology
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also began to reemerge in George Homans’ exchange theory and Randall Collins’
conflict theory. Following Newtonian physics, they tried to explain all social behavior in
terms o f a few general propositions.
2)

The Morally Practical Version o f Sociology (“Critical Sociology” and

“Interactionist Sociology”): The morally practical was associated with the American
pragmatism o f Peirce, James and Dewey. Pragmatism in general accords unqualified
primacy neither to the individual nor to society, but a significant differentiation between
the nominalist version and the realist version could be found. The nominalist version of
pragmatism emphasized the power o f human agency to shape the world which is
indeterminate. By contrast, the realist version o f pragmatism emphasized the
contextually-bound realities which shape people’s lives. These two versions of
pragmatism had their counterparts in sociology. The nominalist version o f pragmatic
sociology (“interactionist sociology”) was first developed by Charles H. Cooley and
William I. Thomas in the first and second periods. Later, interactionist sociology was
developed into Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, Goffinan’s dramaturgy,
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, Berger and Luckman’s phenomenological sociology, etc.
Interactionist sociology tended to concentrate on the micro level of social processes in
which meaning is the most important sociological problem. The realist version of
pragmatic sociology (“critical sociology”) was first developed by George H. Mead and
Robert Park in the first and second periods. Later, critical sociology became associated
with C. Wright Mill’s radical sociology that paid a more attention to “power. ” Mills
criticized formalistic aspect o f pragmatism, which disengaged itself from politics and
pressing social issues. Through Mills, critical sociology developed to encompass a
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variety of critical thoughts associated with Marxism, feminism, gay-lesbian thoughts,
African-American thoughts, etc. Even though these critical thoughts relied to some
degree on Marxism, they did not accept the essentialist version o f the theoretical that
Marxism had.
3)

The Theoretical Version o f Sociology (“Functionalist Sociology”): Functionalist

sociology was developed by Talcott Parsons in the second and third periods. Beginning
early in his career. Parsons was very critical of the technically practical model o f
knowledge, what he called utilitarianism. Following the tradition o f positivistic
organicism. Parsons proposed a kind o f transcendentalist version o f the theoretical, and
tried to devise a systematic theory, which assumed a systematic world o f phenomena as
its counterpart. In this sense. Parsons faithfully followed the basic tenet o f the
theoretical, one that considers the order and connection o f ideas is the same as the order
and connection o f things. Thus, what is important is the “system” o f individuals, not the
individuals themselves. An individual idea or concept does not count unless it is
systematically coimected with the total system of assertions to which it belongs. Like
Plato’s Idea, Parsons’ system o f ideas is more “real” than individual things that do not
belong to it. Parsons’ functionalism was an expression o f the most abstract, fundamental,
and universal features o f society.
All these types o f modem American sociology shared the hostility against the
aesthetic model of knowledge even though the degree o f hostility differed from one to the
other. As a result, all these types of modem American sociology shared some
fundamental assumptions about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
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I) Ontology
a. The Nature o f the Social
Positivistic sociology in general assumed that the social world showed recurrent or
persistent patterns as the physical world did. Compared to neo-positivist sociology,
positivist sociology emphasized more deterministic character of the social world.
Positivist sociology assumed that the social world is orderly and integrated like a
machine whose parts operate according to mathematical laws of dynamics. Neo
positivist sociology saw the social world as recurrent patterns of interaction among
individuals, rather than as a reality 5uz generis. Neo-positivist sociology replaced
absolute laws with more modest empirical generalization, but it still assumed that
patterns o f interaction among individuals would show orderly organized characteristics.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology assumed that the social world
shows orderly recurrent or persistent patterns, which are not natural but made by human
beings. Interactionist sociology saw the social world as a negotiable fluid order that
ultimately resides in the interaction of individuals. Even though emphasizing the
“negotiable fluid” nature o f the social world, interactionist sociology does not question
the “orderly” nature of the social world. By contrast, critical sociology emphasized more
the “orderly” nature of the social world than the “negotiable fluid” nature of it. As a
result, critical sociology emphasized the temporal or historical dimension of social
patterns.
Functionalist sociology believed that the social world is as orderly and integrated like
a living organism. The social world is seen as a reality sui generis. All parts are orderly
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interconnected to form an integrated whole. The social world is a self-maintaining
system.

b. The Nature o f Man
Positivistic sociology believed that man is an animals whose behavior is mechanically
governed by the attainment o f pleasant experiences and the avoidance of painful ones.
Humans are “naturally” disposed to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. In this sense,
all humans are naturally identical, and hence stable and persistent interaction between
them is possible.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology drew the line between man and
animal. Possession o f a social self is the mark that separates man from animal; through a
social self, man becomes an agent o f interpretation, definition, and action within a social
field. Interactionist sociology emphasized that self-indication or self-reflectivity is
acquired through social process, thanks to which man can become an autonomous,
socially responsible actor who acts in a stable and predictable way. As a result, stable
and persistent interaction between humans who have selves is possible. While
interactionist sociology tacitly assumed ahistorical or universalistic notion o f self, critical
sociology argued that the nature o f self or identity differs from context to context. But
critical sociology also believed that occupying the same structural position necessarily
results in forming an identical self. For instance, people who occupy the same structural
position such as the working class should result in forming the same identity. As a result,
stable and persistent interaction between those who share the same structural position is
possible.
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Functionalist sociology believed that man shows recurrent or persistent patterns of
behaviors, because he is a system o f action with its four subsystems to satisfy four
functional requisites. Man is an autonomous self-sufficient being who is equipped with
four subsystems, whose action is determined by the interchange and coordination of these
four subsystems. Thus, stable and persistent interaction between those who are fully
socialized is possible.
2) Epistemology;
Positivistic sociology believed that social reality could be best represented when
values are not be involved in the research process. Sociological research is a value-free,
unbiased, and objective activity. Sociological researcher should occupy an objective
transcendental position free o f values. Positivistic sociology usually uses formal
languages as transparent tools to measure reality. Some o f them are variables,
hypotheses, units o f analysis, and causal explanations. Positivistic sociology usually
aims to develop generalizations that contribute to sociological theory which enables one
to better predict, explain, and understand some phenomena.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology believed that social reality could
be best represented when sociological researchers enter into the world o f the researched
and understand not just what the researched do but why they do what they do. To
interactionist sociology, the privileged position to represent reality is not an objective
transcendentalist position but the inner position o f the researched. Participant
observation along with focus groups will allow the researchers to study actions in terms
o f their subjective meaning to the researched. Critical sociology believed that everything
researchers do is value-loaded rather than value-neutral. In contrast to relativism, critical
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sociology believed that there is a structural vantage point from which the true “essence”
o f reality could be grasped. Methods should be devised so as to capture not only the
patterns but also their historical origins, development, and contradictory features because
truth is assumed to be total, not partial.
Functionalist sociology aimed to devise a general system of concepts so as to
represent universal features shared by all systems. Concepts do not have direct empirical
referents in the real world but analytic constructs. Thus when abstracting concepts from
the real world, value-involvement is unavoidable. What is at stake is to construct
concepts so as that they are logically related to each other in the propositions. Logical
integration o f propositions is the most important. In this sense, sociological researcher is
similar to a transcendent god. Sociological theory should be structured as a direct
representation o f the mind o f the sociologist. The general system of concepts should be
generally applicable to all systems.

3) Ethics/Politics
Positivistic sociology believed that human history is in a state of naturally determined
linear progress toward perfection. Man is naturally disposed to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain and s/he learns how to rationally do this according to the social system of
reward and punishment. In this sense, men should rationally restrain and deny their
immediate desires. Liberal society can be maintained by the market system which is
capable of performing coordination functions without the extensive operation o f the
coercive and constraining power o f the state. For these coordination functions, the
natural law o f the survival o f the fittest is important. The competitive individuals, the
fittest, lead society in general toward more survivable form in which the weakest
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naturally vanish. Consequently, all surviving members are similar or identical instances
o f a common humanity.
Both interactionist sociology and critical sociology argued that human history is open
and its progress depends on human acts. Nevertheless, both o f them shared the belief that
human history has tended to move toward a more progressive state. Self-restraining and
self-denying morals are needed, hiteractionist sociology emphasized that man can adjust
his/her desire to others’ expectation, thanks to the possession o f a self. This adjustment
requires man to repress or manage his/her own desire. Critical sociology emphasized that
man can overcome his/her own private interest, thanks to sharing the same structural
position in society. Politically, both interactionist sociology and critical sociology
advocated participatory democracy in which nobody is alienated from society.
Interactionist sociology tended to believe that the structural arrangement of society is
flexible enough to allow all members to actively participate in decision-making in
society. By contrast, critical sociology emphasized that the structural arrangement o f
society is too strong and unequal for some members to participate in decision-making in
society.
Functionalist sociology believed that history is in a state o f differentiation entailing
cultural or moral integration among parts, which has improved humanity. Humans are
supposed to restrain or deny their selves in order to serve the organic whole o f society.
Society should be in a state o f equilibrium in which all properly socialized members
perform their proper functions. If there are some dysfunctions, technocrats would cure
them with scientific knowledge. The bureaucratic state equipped with technocrats is the
neutral agent that does this.
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CHAPTER 5

THE EMERGENCE OF POSTMODERN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY
AS A RESPONSE TO THE AESTHETIC CHALLENGE
I have argued that sociology was based on the modem assumption o f the scientization
and moralization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Mainstream American
sociology such as functionalist sociology and positivistic sociology worked on the
assumption of the scientization o f ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. Non
mainstream American sociology such as critical sociology and interactionist sociology
worked on the assumption o f the moralization of ontology, epistemology, and
ethics/politics. Postmodern social theory challenged this fundamental assumption of
modem American sociology by way o f presenting the aestheticization o f ontology,
epistemology, and ethics/politics.
American sociology began to respond to this challenge from the late 1980s on. But
the responses to postmodemism differed among variations of American sociology.
Interactionist sociology in general actively embraced the aesthetic challenge. Some of
critical sociology also critically responded to the aesthetic challenge. By contrast, both
positivist sociology and functionalist sociology evaluated postmodemism in a negative
light. This chapter aims to review how each sociology responded to the aesthetic
challenge. In what follows, critical postmodem sociology and interactionist sociology
will be discussed in terms o f how each responded to the aesthetic challenge to the
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fundamental assumptions of sociology about ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics.
Then the resistance o f mainstream American sociology to the aesthetic challenge will be
discussed.

Critical Postmodern Sociology
Some o f critical sociology responded to the challenge o f the aesthetic with the
morally practical model o f knowledge, especially contextualism, from which critical
postmodern sociology emerged. Critical postmodern sociology did not accept the
poststructuralist notion o f language as a social ontology. The main reason is that the
poststructuralist notion o f language as being undecidable is somewhat alien to the core
idea of critical sociology: the contextually-bound realities that shape people’s lives.
Rather than accepting poststructuralist notion of language as a general ontology, critical
postmodern sociology tried to investigate the researched by situating it within its
sociocultural, political, economic contexts. By contrast, critical postmodern sociology is
more open to the methodological implication o f poststructuralism, and tries to situate
knowledge within social contexts in which real people live. There are roughly three
positions about this. David R. Dickens, who relied on the Frankfurt School and
pragmatism, paid attention to the fact that postmodern perspective exhibits striking
parallels with the project of classical European sociology. Ben Agger relied on the
Frankfurt School. And Steven Seidman relied on pragmatism.

1. David R. Dickens
Dickens embraced critical postmodemism rather than poststructuralist postmodemism
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because he was suspicious o f the significance o f poststructuralism in the emancipatory
project of Marxism in general and in sociology in particular (see Dickens 1990). Dickens
did not fully embrace poststructuralism because he saw some limits o f language-based
alternatives. According to him, poststructuralism distorted Saussure by emphasizing the
arbitrary and radically relational nature o f signs within linguistic systems over the
referential dimension o f signs. Dickens (1990: 155) pointed out that “there is a
fundamental disanalogy between texts and institutions which severely circumscribes the
extension o f radical linguistic critique to concrete historical processes.” If other
postmodern sociologists have tried to “aestheticize” sociology, Dickens has tried to
“sociologize” the postmodern. For him, the ideal o f sociology is the classical (European)
sociology. He argued that postmodern perspectives are virtually same as the project o f
classical sociology.
In its many guises postmodemism addresses the same sorts o f issues that
have fired the sociological imagination since the inception o f the
discipline in the nineteenth century. These issues include those
concerning the nature and extent o f large-scale structural transformations
in Westem societies, their corresponding effects on the nature o f social
interaction and on the constmction o f social identities, and the need for
new theoretical and methodological strategies. Seen in this way,
postmodem perspectives exhibit striking parallels with the project of
Marx, Weber, Simmel, Durkheim, Mead, and others in the classical
sociological tradition as they, too, struggled to find new ways to
understand the dramatic changes in social stmcture and everyday life
during their own time (Dickens and Fontana 1992:10-11).
Dickens called the first two issues a substantive-theoretical dimension including the
macro and the micro levels, and the third issue a methodological dimension, and he added
to these two dimensions a normative dimension which concems ethical and political
implications of the first two dimensions. Dickens paid attention to the fact that classical
sociologists struggled with all these three dimensions during their own time. To him.
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postmodem theorists also seemed to struggle with these three dimensions during
contemporary times. In this sense, Dickens considered postmodern social theory as both
continuity and discontinuity o f the project of classical sociology. To him, continuity
appeared mainly in critical postmodern social theory and discontinuity appears in
poststructuralist postmodern social theory. As I have discussed, critical postmodern
social theory followed the morally practical model o f knowledge while poststructuralist
postmodern social theory followed the aesthetic model o f knowledge. Dickens criticized
poststructuralist postmodern social theory which tended to equate the postmodern with
the aesthetic.
Although Dickens agreed to some extent with the aesthetic challenge to the
sociological notion o f the social that the social became flexible, fluid, and further, fragile
because mass-mediated culture became the new organizing principles o f society, he
argued that this predominance o f mass-mediated culture did not necessarily mean that
major modernist institutions such as capitalism, nation-state, and large-scale
bureaucracies totally lost their power to organize the social. His point is not to deny any
dramatic transformation o f traditional institutions, but to recognize the process of
reconfiguration o f these institutions as well as the process of cultural change. Dickens
(1996: 3 1) positively evaluated British or British-oriented postmodern social theorists
(Lash and Urry 1987; Harvey 1989; Featherstone 1991; Crook, Pakulski and Waters
1992) who “have documented the dramatic transformations in contemporary economics,
politics, science, religion, family life, and class, gender, and ethnic relations, in terms o f
their elective affinities with the rise of postmodern culture.” These postmodern social
theorists are critical postmodernists rather than poststructuralist postmodernists. They
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situated postmodernism in terms o f the historical and political-economic contexts in
which it is inscribed. In this sense, Dickens could be said to follow the morally practical
model o f knowledge. He believed that only when the predominance o f mass-mediated
culture is situated in terms o f the historical and political-economic contexts in which it is
inscribed, superficial grasp o f postmodernism could be avoided because contextualizing
o f cultural change would inform us o f both changes and continuities of culture.
Reconfiguration is perhaps a better term than fragmentation to describe
these recent trends as it recognizes both changes and continuities within
contemporary institutions and social relations as well as continuities and
changes between and among them, avoiding the simplistic dichotomy of
unbroken continuity versus radical rupture that characterizes current
debates concerning the legitimacy of postmodernism as a general
theoretical category (Dickens 1996: 31).
Dickens agreed to some extent with the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion
o f the individual that man is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous
instability mainly due to the bombardment o f mass-mediated communication. Dickens
tried to explain this change in terms o f classical sociology, especially Mead and Cooley’s
social psychology. Mead emphasized the context in which self or identity is formed:
“without social institutions o f some sort, without the organized social attitudes and
activities by which social institutions are constituted, there could be no fully mature
individual selves or personalities at all” (Mead 1962:262). Cooley analyzed the
displacement o f primary group relations by more impersonal secondary group relations in
modem societies. According to this tradition, what is important for the self and social
interaction is the nature o f institutions in which the individual is inscribed.
Poststructuralist postmodernists argued that modernist institutions became textualized by
electronically-mediated mass communication. Thus, the individual is free from any
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institutional constraints. What is more important is that poststructuralist postmodernists
argued that “There is no narrative logic inherent in the presentation o f images; they are
just randomly recombined as mechanical permutations” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 216).
Further, poststructuralist postmodernists argued that the “rapidly expanding number,
diversity, and pace o f these communications overwhelms the individual’s ability to
interpret their meaning rationally” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 216). If the subject is
constituted by discourses, then the postmodern subject is randomly constituted by
discourses of mass media. Dickens criticized this view. According to him, social
institutions are not totally textualized and postmodern media has its narrative logic which
is organized by pursuit o f accumulation of capital. The individual is not entirely replaced
by free-floating signifiers because modem institutions such as capitalism, the nation
state, and large-scale bureaucracies still work.
By focusing on communications apart from the social context o f their
production, postmodernists ignore the powerful material forces that shape
the communication process.. .postmodemists have lost sight o f the
political economic dimensions o f communication.. .The new information
technologies that are at the heart o f the postmodem condition cost money,
have developed within the logic o f capital, and are produced by
corporations interested primarily in accumulating capital (Harms and
Dickens 1996:219-220).
As a response to the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodologies, Dickens
(1994; 98) emphasized “the continuing need for critical, historical analysis o f
contemporary societies. Even those intrigued by such widely heralded postmodemist
themes as ‘the end o f the social’ and ‘the disappearance of man’ will hopefully view
these as topics for concrete empirical investigation rather than as metaphysical
manifestos to be accepted or rejected at face value.” Dickens proposed postmodemoriented cultural studies which substantively emphasized “the heightened importance.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218

even centrality, o f culture in the structuring and functioning o f everyday life in
contemporary ‘advanced’ societies...,” but which did not deny “the continuing
importance o f major modernist institutions such as capitalism, the nation-state, and largescale bureaucracies” (Dickens 1996: 31). From the start, cultural studies had
multidisciplinary roots in the Birmingham School. More importantly, multiperspectival
approaches are needed because the nature and the role of culture have become
increasingly complex in contemporary societies. Following Johnson (1987) and mainly
Kellner (1992), Dickens (1996:32) argued that “this research program is focused on three
interrelated sets o f issues: the production o f cultural texts; textual analysis of cultural
objects and their meanings; and the study o f lived culture and experiences.” The first
issue emphasizes the political economic dimension o f culture and how this shapes the
ideological contents o f its products. The second issue involves the implementation o f a
variety o f reading strategies, including semiotics, deconstructionism, and feminism. The
third methodological dimension o f postmodem-oriented cultural studies examines “how
individuals and groups connect their lived experiences to the cultural representations of
those experiences” (Dickens 1996: 33). In sum, cultural studies uses the
multiperspectival methodologies such as the political economy, variety o f textual
analysis, and ethnography, which were all used by the early British cultural studies.
Dickens’ postmodem-oriented cultural studies is a kind o f revitalization of the early
British cultural studies: “Like the classic Birmingham studies o f working-class
subcultures, a multiperspectival cultural studies approach attempts to trace the linkages
among the various levels, from the stmctural political economic through the textual to the
interpersonal, that together constitute the complicated terrain o f contemporary media
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studies” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 225). This project is also one of the core ideas of
classical European sociology.
Dickens presented a critical position about the aesthetic challenge to the normative
dimension because he did not believe that the decline o f the unilinear deterministic sense
o f temporality necessarily leads to the loss of sense o f temporality itself, and further, to
the morally and politically irresponsible conclusion that “anything goes.” He argued that
the decline o f unilinear deterministic sense of temporality ironically convinced us to be
more sensitive to differences and local contingencies. Dickens rejected both the
universalist ethics and easy-going amoral postmodern relativism. Ironically, personal
moral responsibility is needed. Dickens basically agreed with postmodemists that
difference, pluralism, and the incommensurability of culture and values should be
embraced, but he warned o f the danger of cultural populism. Cultural populism tended to
believe that in mass culture difference, pluralism, and the incommensurability o f culture
and values are already embraced. Thus, what is remaining is to enjoy mass media.
Dickens did not believe in this. Following the tradition o f cultural studies, he argued that
mass media culture is an ideology, even though fragmented or decentered, to stunt
political opposition. “Political resistance requires active work and organization, not just
‘killing time’” (Harms and Dickens 1996: 223).

2. Ben Agger
Unlike Dickens and Seidman, Agger is a self-proclaimed Marxist, who did not
abandon truth, reason, or justice as reconstructive ideals. He rejected some versions o f
postmodernism which abandon Marxism as well as radical politics. Nevertheless, he
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tried to embrace some politicized postmodernism which would revitalize Marxism as a
critical social theory in “fast capitalism” (Agger 1989). For Agger, critical theory aims to
radically change the domination of production over reproduction, which according to him
is the axial logic o f domination in civilization. Agger highly evaluated Marx as a critical
theorist who articulated concepts of exploitation and the alienation of labor in market
capitalism in the nineteenth century. According to him, the first-generation Frankfurt
critical theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse broadened Marx’s concepts of
exploitation and alienation o f labor into the category o f domination in late capitalism
characterized by the state intervention in economy and the rise o f the culture industry.
But the first-generation theory fell short in its lack o f political activism resulting from a
mandarin approach to culture industry, which lacked a grounding in everyday life. In this
sense, the first-generation Frankfurt critical theory ignored the popular. The firstgeneration Frankfurt critical theory also ignored feminism by defending paternal
authority as the source o f childhood ego autonomy. The second-generation critical
theory o f Habermas reformulated Marx’s capital/labor m otif in system/lifeworld terms so
as to theorize new social movements grounded in the lifeworld. But Habermas did not
pay sufficient attention to male supremacy and the popular. According to Agger,
feminism and postmodernism could fill in this gap in critical theory. Feminism
challenged male supremacy while postmodernism, especially critical postmodern cultural
studies, challenged the mandarinism of the Frankfurt critical theory (Agger 1992a, 1993).
Agger saw it as his mission to create a new version o f critical theory, a feminist
postmodern critical theory. For him, the core o f critical theory is a utopian vision that
allows people to see and hopefully moves them to act beyond what it is. What is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221

important here is the recognition that the social world is not absolutely determined. This
indeterminate natiure o f the social world is directly connected with the belief in the human
agency to change the social world. This idea is the core o f the morally practical. Agger
refuted the aesthetic in as far as it endorses nihilism, cynicism, fatalism, etc., which
eventually supports the status quo. For him, poststructuralism and some postmodern
cultural studies influenced by poststructuralism represent this apolitical stance. Agger's
acceptance o f poststructuralism is limited because he was suspicious o f the Saussurean
linguistics as ontology, epistemology, and ethics/politics. For him, Saussurean linguistics
metaphysically tends to desert human agency and significant politics based on the
subject. For him, the question of human agency and politics is not a metaphysical, but an
empirical issue. Among many arguments put forward by Derrida, Agger (1994, 1996)
only tended to accept the undecidability of the text as opening possibilities of new
interpretation. Agger wanted to see the relationship between the social and the individual
in terms o f dialectics, not in terms o f differance; he believed that the dialectical
difference between the social and the individual, and theory and practice is the best way
for a transformational project because it poses a utopian society as an alternative to the
present. Only when posing a utopian society could critical theory avoid normal
naturalization o f the present as the eternal.
Agger accepted some o f the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the
social when he characterized postmodern capitalism as fast capitalism. According to him
(1992b: 9), fast capitalism is “the second stage o f late or monopoly capitalism, in which it
is virtually impossible to disentangle the productive and reproductive, labor and text,
science and fiction, men and women, white and non-white, base and superstructure.” The
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main force of this transformation o f capitalism was the development o f new mass
commimication technologies such as TV, mainly through which the culture industry
developed and extended its influence on the everyday lives o f people. In this sense, the
social has become textualized. But Agger (1993:24) did not agree with the thesis of the
“total” textualization o f the social, arguing that “[t]he text is a world, although the world
is not all text.” He wanted to distinguish the world from the text even though he
recognized that it has become increasingly difficult to do so in postmodern capitalism
because o f fast capitalism or hyperreality. But as a Marxist, Agger wanted to locate the
deep structure belying hyperreality: “Although sign value is important in its own right,
we must not lose sight o f surplus value, which endures as the fundamental means of
exploitation, profit, and domination” (Agger 1993: 24). For him, this deep structure is
the exploitation o f labor power, whose nature has changed over time. During Marx’s era,
the exploitation o f labor power was centered around the realm o f production, which was
maintained by false consciousness. But in late capitalism when the Frankfurt critical
theorists worked, the logic o f capital was extended to other realms. The exploitation of
labor became (re)produced by domination, i.e., the deep internalization of alienation.
The state became the central agent for social control and large corporation the central
figure to impose endless consumption to masses. Still, exploitation and domination were
centered in visible institutions. But in postmodern capitalism, the situation seems to
change. The social seems to be decentered, flexible, and fragile enough to invite pluralist
democracy. But the basic logic o f capital is the same. What has changed is the degree o f
complexity o f exploitation and domination.
In postmodern capitalism domination, as Horkheimer, Adorno, and
Marcuse call it, is regionahzed, differentiated, and deconstructed inasmuch
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as system, in Habermas’ terms, colonizes the everyday lives o f people
everywhere. Upon casual inspection, these differential instances o f
domination appear to stem from separable sources—capitalism, patriarchy,
racism. But once we understand their common source in the hierarchies of
production over reproduction,.. .then we can theorize a complexly
integrated postmodernism that only appears to proliferate healthy
difference at every turn. Difference, like plurality, is marshaled
ideologically in order to demonstrate the system’s openness and fairness
(Agger 1993: 9).
According to Agger, pluralist democracy could not be achieved unless hierarchies of
domination are ameliorated or altogether eliminated. Differentiation under capitalism
leads only to quasi-difference because capitalism itself is a totalizing system which
penetrates every area o f life and thus destroys individuality and particularity: “What is
unique about postmodern capitalism is the way in which differentiation reproduces
homogeneity and hegemony, hence blocking world-historical transformation" (Agger
1993: 9-10). In this sense, “‘[r]eality’ is still real— it is grounded in historical structures
o f domination that can be unpacked, to use a popular deconstructive phase, around the
axial principles o f their structure and function” (Agger 1993: 15). It is too early to claim
the end o f the social (structured inequality). The social is still, even though complexly,
integrated according to the hierarchies o f production over reproduction.
Agger tried to refute the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the
individual because he believed that the thesis o f the death of the subject cannot be posed
metaphysically as some poststructuralist postmodemists do. According to
poststructuralism, the subject is narrated by language or discourse, not vice versa. Some
semiotic versions o f information society theory endorse the death o f the subject by
arguing that hyperreality o f culture industry makes people drifting signifiers. Agger
refuted this poststructuralist claim because he wanted to make the subject narrate
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language or discourse, not vice versa. Agger (1993:41) claimed that “[t]he degree o f
subjectivity’s eclipse is above all an empirical question,” and asked, “How much do
forces o f discipline and power imperil political imagination and agency?” (1993:41).
What is important is to “reckon empirically with the discursive and political contexts
within which individuals find themselves positioned” (Agger 1993: 41). But
unfortunately. Agger never empirically investigated the thesis o f the death o f the subject
in fast capitalism. Rather, he was busy in theorizing the possibility of agency. For this,
he relied on Marcuse who claimed that the decline o f the subject is associated with the
decline o f a bourgeois mode o f socialization rooted in patriarchal authority. Marcuse
argued that the generic atom directly becomes a social atom through the all-embracing
forces o f total administration. But Marcuse did not desert the possibility of the agency,
grounding agency on the objective character of human subjectivity, Eros, which is never
totally mainpulable by dominant ideology (Agger 1992b). Agger followed this notion o f
ineradicable subjectivity as a basis for agency. In fast capitalism, individuals are
bombarded by hyperreality, but they are not entirely exhausted because they have an
institutional basis for agency, Eros. Surplus repression is variable because the amount o f
libidinal repression historically varies. The possibility of the agency is everywhere
regardless of the amount o f libidinal repression. In this sense. Agger did not agree with
the aesthetic argument that man is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous
instability.
Agger basically embraced the aesthetic argument that there is no presuppositionless
representation o f social facts: “There is no ‘outside’ to language, no Archimedean point
o f epistemological privilege fi’om which we can be granted access to perfect lucidity
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through certain protocol statements, such as those o f mathematics” (Agger 2000: 56).
Thus, positivist notion of science as presuppositionless representation of social facts loses
its validity because science is not exempt from the discursive and rhetorical. In this
sense, the traditional distinction between science and literature is blurred (see Agger
1991). All stories including science and literature are perspectival, discursive, and
rhetorical, which aim to present a worldview and to persuade others o f it. But Agger did
not want to equate science with literature because he wanted to retain the public nature of
scientific story. For him, telling a literary story usually implies a more personal, even
inimitable recoimting o f events. In this sense, he was against Lyotard who deserted grand
narratives in favor of little narratives. No matter whether a story is big or small, all
stories are agendas, i.e., totalizations and structurations. It is a political decision whether
to choose a collective, big, public story or an individual, small, private story. He did not
ague “that we should abandon grand narratives but that we should refresh timeworn large
stories with new empirical evidence and better theorizing” (Agger 1993: 84).
Agger wanted to retain a comprehensive theoretical logic, which provides a total
explanation about the domination o f the productive over the reproductive. Total social
science is needed because the social is unequally structured according to the axial logic of
domination which is a ‘micro’ as well as ‘macro’ practice” (Agger 1993: 81). For this.
Agger tried to articulate feminism, postmodernism, and the Frankfurt critical theory.
Feminism addresses the body and the domestic labor, informing that the personal is the
political and the political is the personal. Postmodernism addresses the imagination or
philosophy o f history, informing the discursive nature o f nature-like reality. Critical
theory addresses popular culture, politically theorizing the culture industry. These three
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theories positively evaluate the devalued (woman and household, the imagination, and
the popular) by male supremacy, a modernist philosophy o f history, and cultural
mandarinism. According to Agger, these theories have different emphases, not different
logics. Thus, he wanted to create a feminist postmodern critical theory: “I am saying that
it is vitally important to formulate Marxism, feminism, and postmodernism as
articulations of an overarching critique o f domination or critical theory. The payoff of
this integration is the explanation of a host of interrelated phenomena in terms o f a
singular theoretical logic, hence affording new social movements a common selfunderstanding and, just possibly, common political strategies” (Agger 1993:65). The
singular logic is the domination o f production over reproduction:
The underlying structural principle o f modernist civilization, then, is
expressed in a range o f hierarchies o f production over reproduction, from
capital/labor to men/women, white/colored, science/art, material/ideal,
West/East, North/South, labor/text, exchange value/use value, and many
others. What these hierarchies have in common is the subordination o f
activities heretofore regarded as nonproductive or reproductive to a
productivist rule of value— for example, in a capitalist society exchange
value, or in a sexist society men’s work (Agger 1993:95).
In this sense. Agger endorsed the ideal o f totality: “I retain Marx’s idea that there is
an underlying structural logic to postmodern capitalism that can be expressed
theoretically to explain all domination” (Agger 1993: 87). One o f the main merits o f the
totality theory is that it “explains all modernist dominations, from class to gender and
race” (Agger 1993:104). The basic logic o f domination is also relational in the sense
that it well understands that “domination happens relationally, between people and
among groups” (Agger 1993: 104-105). The most important thing is that the basic logic
o f domination is transformational “in the sense that it suggests a dynamic process
whereby reproducers recognize that they are in fact producers and thus mobilize
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themselves to wrest both discourse and material power from those who have heretofore
arrogated privilege to themselves. In other words, the production/reproduction hierarchy
always contains the potential for its deconstruction via coming to consciousness, new
public discourse, and organized social movements” (Agger 1993: 105).
On the transformational nature o f the logic. Agger met a politicized Derrida (see
Agger 1991, 1994). According to Agger, Derrida challenges metaphysics o f presence
based on the binary oppositions o f the subjects (presence) and the others (negative mirror
images o f presence), presenting the thesis o f undecidability, “the tendency o f texts to
exclude (‘defer’) problems that they cannot solve in their own terms” (Agger 1994: 501).
Derrida’s deconstruction is not nihilistic nor destructive because it valorizes and gives
voices to the otherness by subverting the dichotomies o f presence/alterity.
Far from being nihilist, Derrida wants to reveal the hidden assumptions o f
systems in order to open public dialogue about them; far from refrising
values, Derrida wants more talk of values, albeit talk rendered humble and
dialogical by the acknowledgement that no text or argument can achieve
“foundation.” Thus, .. .deconstruction is a necessarily political way o f
reading writings (and all discourses) that exploits writing’s undecidability,
difference, and deferral to produce a new version o f "the text" and thus a
new world (Agger 1994: 503).
Agger extended Derrida’s deconstruction to a multidisciplinary or pandisciplinary
radical cultural studies. Although Agger endorsed the Frankfurt School’s fresh empirical
analysis o f the structural contradictions and crisis tendencies o f capitalism, he did not
concentrate on larger structural analysis of capitalism. Rather, he concentrated on a
politicized deconstructive reading and writing which aims to deconstruct the role of
cultural texts and practices in the imposition o f false needs through commodified cultural
consumption. He had a different notion o f text distinguished from the depoliticized
poststructuralism which proclaims the death o f the subject in the text, emphasizing the
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dialectical relationship between the author and the text: “It [a social theory o f text] views
the text as a deliberate authorial product; it also views the text as having an internal
logic—language game—that imposes its own meaning on the text. Thus, texts can be
viewed as an interplay between authorial intent and the structuring logic o f language
game in use” (Agger 2000: 16). Agger (1992a: 1) hated “a vacuous methodology for
reading cultural texts that has no real political grounding.” Especially, he was very
critical o f “the poststructuralism methodologized into deconstruction in American literary
departments” (1992a: 2) which “engage in self-referential discussion that legitimize their
common enterprise rather than solve real empirical and political problem” (1992a: 154).
According to Agger (1992a: 153), Americanized literary deconstructionism has tended to
become “a cult—an endlessly self-reproducing series of ungrounded readings not
anchored in the framework of an overarching social theory and political practice.”
Americanized literary deconstructionism “neglects the difference between theory and
literature, utterly substituting the former for the latter and thus losing any practical con
text within which literary theory could do useful work in deconstructing the
theory/literature duality as well as literary texts themselves for their imbedded
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature o f class, gender, race and all the rest”
(1992a: 155). Unlike this deconstructionism, a political deconstructionism that Agger
envisioned engages in the politics o f ideological contestation: “Deconstruction helps us
find, decode and then rewrite ideology that increasingly takes the form o f Baudrillard’s
simulations and not the straightforward texts o f religion and bourgeois economic theory
readily debunked by Marx” (1992a: 155). In fast capitalism where “the boundary
between text and world is fading fast” (Agger 1989: 16) and writing merely tends to
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“reflect and thus reproduce the given order o f things” (Agger 1989: 17), the critique of
ideology is more difficult because there seems to be nothing outside of text.
Deconstruction tries to deconstruct text as the given order o f things, relating text to its
context of production and reception: “we must read into and out o f particular simulations
of popular culture, engaging with them on the quotidian level of their production and
reception, which we theorize in terms o f larger structural principles of social and
economic reproduction” (Agger 1992a: 182).
Agger wanted to deconstruct cultural products as well as contribute to counterhegemonic political practice. Then how is it possible? From what position? There is no
Archimedean position to guarantee the validity o f deconstructive critique o f hegemonic
ideology and to construct a counter-hegemonic political practice. Agger (1992a: 182183) proposed a (auto)biography as an alternative starting point toward a radical cultural
studies:
We are products o f our time and place—men, women, the middle class,
Anglo-Americans, academics. For me as a man fully to comprehend the
political possibilities o f a feminist deconstruction I must position myself in
terms o f the fields o f difference constituted hierarchically around the issue
o f gender. 1 must reflect on my own conditioning as man and on what I
actualize in the way o f manly behavior in order to understand how our
culture positions women subordinately with respect to men. Similarly, for
me to engage in cultural criticism and media analysis I have to reflect on
the ways in which I have been constituted by cultural works and practices
that are typical o f my generation, social class, gender and national
heritage. Surely, the fact that I watched the infamous family sitcoms of
the 1950s and 1960s affected the ways in which I understood my own
family dynamics as well as formed my relations with women, which I had
to redo in the meantime.
Cultural studies is, thus, a kind of self-criticism. A researcher o f cultural studies
starts from his/her autobiograhy and connects it with more politically oriented theory.
Reading and writing him/herself is internally connected with reading and writing culture.
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Thus, without changing him/herself, the researcher of cultural studies cannot change
people. In the process o f research, the researcher problematizes the taken-for-granted
images, including his/her ego: “In the process o f cultural problematization we
problematize ourselves, understanding and thus changing ourselves as the cultural
conduits we have become” (Agger 1992a: 183). In this sense, autobiography revitalizes
author-present writing which is against both positivist writing and nihilistic
deconstructionist writing. This author-present writing is one o f the features o f what
Agger called “public sociology” (Agger 2000).
Agger accepted the aesthetic challenge to the sociological, especially positivist,
notion o f temporality. Agger (1993: 23) argued that we should abandon “the idea that we
can remake the world through social engineering,” and also rejected deterministic
Marxism which believes that the future can be politically preordained. The teleological
optimism precludes people necessary to bring about a better world. He argued that we
need the philosophy of history which holds open the possibility o f fundamental social
change. Like Habermas, Agger did not think that the emancipatory project of the
Enlightenment should be abandoned because he wanted to direct the change of society to
a “dominationless society” (1992a: 146) in which true cultural needs such as “unfettered
self-expression as well as substantive political-economic autonomy” (1992a: 150) will be
fulfilled. To Agger, this dominationless society (postmodemity) is a utopia from which
the present society would be criticized:
It is my argument here that we should treat postmodemity as a utopian
category.. .1 argue that postmodernism, conceived within the
eschatological or “critical” framework o f Marxist critical theory, does not
betray Marxism but extends Marxism into the late 20'*^ century,
formulating postmodemity as the latter-day version o f Marx’s socialism.
In particular, postmodern critical theory is the first narrative to pose a
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possible utopian future not as a determinate outcome o f nature-like social
laws but rather as one conceivable discursive accomplishment among
many (Agger 1996: 37).
Morally, Agger accepted that free flow of bodily desire is needed. But unlike some
postmodemists who oppose biology (body, play) to sociology (society, work). Agger
wanted to merge play and work, or nonproductive / creative and productive work in
people’s own daily lives (Agger 1992b). According to him, some postmodemists
wrongly emphasize the pleastwe of texts in the realm of consumption, naturalizing the
division of production and consumption. According to this scheme, free flow of bodily
desire is possible only in the realm o f consumption. According to Agger, this position is
similar to neoliberalism which endorses multiculturalism in the realm o f consumption.
He argued that this position deepens alienation and domination. Following Marcuse,
Agger proposed “erotization o f labor” as an ideal o f good life. Erotization o f labor means
that “a type o f work can become the creative and productive self-extemalization o f
polymorphous erotic individuals who have been freed from surplus repression imposed
by capitalism” (Agger 1992b: 93). This ideal cannot be achieved without restructuring
work structure.
Politically, Agger also accepted that the traditional politics based on the self-same
subject is out o f date, but he did not endorse the politics of difference:
Although cultural pluralism is to be defended against occidental
ethnocentrism, it is hardly a valid utopian constmct when it amounts to lip
service on the part o f the dominant group and does not promote real
difference. Difference theory is certainly correct to defend the claims of
individuals and groups against the state. But the narrowing of difference
theory into a politics o f subjectivity tends to ignore the structural and
institutional nature o f politics today.. Although the ultimate aim of
politics is to liberate subjectivity, this is not to be achieved via a program
o f self-transformation involving therapies and technologies of adjustment,
from twelve-step programs o f aerobics (Agger 1993:71).
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Thus, politics which links personal problems with public issues is needed because
liberation involves both subjective and institutional transformation. Textual politics
should be coimected with institutional politics. It is not enough to deconstruct texts for a
radical transformation. In addition to it, the effort to transform institutions o f textuality
such as university and culture industry is needed so that people’s communicative
competence and access to public discourse are improved. This demands some coalition
among the dominated, forming a collective movement. This coalition comes from the
underlying structural logic o f domination o f production over reproduction.

3. Steven Seidman
Seidman did not seem to take the aesthetic challenge seriously because he thought
that there are only two kinds of knowledge model in sociology: sociological theory and
social theory (Seidman 1991b). Sociological theory has two versions: (neo-)frmctionalist
sociology which embraced the theoretical and positivistic sociology which embraced the
technically practical. (Neo-)functionalist sociology, what Seidman called “philosophical
sociology,” has been preoccupied with “a series o f highly abstract, socially remote issues
such as the micro-macro link, the interrelationship between agency and structure, action
and order, and structure and culture” (Seidman 1994:4). Similarly, positivistic
sociology, what Seidman called “scientific sociology,” has fallen into remote and socially
pointless issues by aiming to “explain the social laws o f the universe or to reduce society
to a set o f general principles that, like physics, can be formulated in mathematical
equations and formulas” (Seidman 1994:5). As an alternative for these sociological
theories, Seidman proposed “social theory.” Seidman wanted to revitalize sociology as a
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moral public practice to aim to promote public enlightenment and action. This vision of
sociology as a moral public practice is in fact one o f the core ideas o f the morally
practical. Seidman wanted to revitalize this tradition which emphasizes the power of
human agency to shape history. This power does not come from the a priori abstract
reason, but from the practical reason embedded in its contemporary social conflicts and
public debates. As Seidman (1994: 2) put it:
Sociology must recover its role as public educator. I urge a recentering of
sociological theory in public debates and conflicts. Instead o f sociological
discourses being driven by disciplinary conventions and disputes, theorists
should take their problems, themes, and language o f argumentation from a
public world o f social and political conflict. Sociologists need to recover
the moral impulse o f their role, to see themselves less as scientists and
more as public educators engaging the issues o f the day. I imagine a
sociology that can sustain its rich tradition of conceptual and empirical
analysis while recovering its public role and authority. If we abandon the
false promise o f science to achieve objective and universal knowledge, if
we accept our role as storytellers or social critics, we can revitalize
sociology and contribute to the strengthening o f a democratic public
culture.
What is at stake here from our perspective is that Seidman ignored the aesthetic
model of knowledge, presenting the binary opposition o f sociological theory and social
theory, in which sociological theory has been positively positioned over social theory.
According to Seidman, the main result o f this binary opposition is the isolation o f
sociology from the public. Seidman seemed to believe that this problem could be solved
by reversing this binary hierarchy. Seidman found the revitalization o f social theory in
postmodernism. Seidman connected postmodernism with the development o f new social
movements rather than with the large-scale transformation o f traditional institutions:
“postmodern social discourse emerged, at least in part, from the development o f the new
social movements. The intellectual and social historical meaning o f postmodernism in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

234

the U.S. needs to be grasped in relation to the evolution of these movements” (Seidman
1991c: 183-184). As a result, Seidman rarely talked about institutional changes.
Seidman responded to the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social
from the perspective of the morally practical. Embracing the lead o f the British cultural
studies, Seidman saw the social as texts: “[sjocial realities are approached as a field of
signs, meanings, or, if you will, texts.. .This suggests a view o f the social as deeply
cultural or as organized by signs and meaning patterned in relations o f identity and
difference” (1996a: 9). But Seidman was critical o f some poststructuralist textualism in
which the term “social” is mainly negative. “The tendency in Foucault to collapse all
social control into domination and in Baudrillard to flatten the social universe into an
undifferentiated manipulated, dominated mass is both sociologically naïve and politically
suspect.. .In Baudrillard and Lyotard, ‘the social’ remains an underdeveloped concept”
(Seidman 1994: 231). Compared to some anarchistic poststructuralism, the British
cultural studies escaped the danger o f textualism by introducing the idea that [tjexts are
produced by social practices in particular institutional contexts which have histories”
(Seidman 1996a: 9). Thus, texts are not a field o f free play o f differences in which no
constrains exist. Texts are not a flattened universe (a self-referential system). Rather,
texts are conceptualized “as positioned both in relation to other texts—the principle of
intertextuality—and in relation to social practices and conflicts— gender-based, class
based, and so on—that produce texts and affected by them.” (Seidman 1996a: 9).
Seidman situated this textualization o f the social within information society or consumer
society. Seidman seemed to believe that contemporary society o f America has undergone
a large-scale structural transformation and thus is qualitatively different from modem
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America, but he did not give any convincing evidence for a large-scale structural
transformation. Following the semiotic version o f information society theory or
consumer society theory, Seidman (1996a: 11) just seemed to believe that “the new
positioning o f the mass media, the saturation of daily life by commerce and
commodification, the new technologies o f information, and the foregrounding o f cultural
politics” signal “perhaps a second ‘great transformation’ in post-Renaissance western
societies.” Seidman seemed to take the great transformation for granted without giving a
comprehensive argument about it. Thus, Seidman argued that this great transformation
urged French postmodern theory and cultural studies to make a semiotic turn from which
social realities are considered to be a field of signs, meanings or texts. Therefore, the
traditional core categories that have enabled sociologists and Marxists to do systematic
analyses of society have become obsolete: they are “classes, economic dynamics,
bureaucracy, occupations, status groups, market exchanges, population dynamics, and
network structures” (Seidman 1996a: 11). These categories are assumed to be “the
organizing social principles or key variables ” (Seidman 1996a: 9). In these systematic
analyses of society, culture is seen as “discrete, isolated values, beliefs, attitudes,
identities, or ideologies” (Seidman 1996a: 10). This old attitude does not fit a second
great transformation in post-Renaissance western societies.
Seidman responded to the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the
individual from the perspective o f the morally practical. American sociology “assumes
the individual as a foundation o f social life as figures the self as an internally coherent,
rationally calculating agent” (Seidman 1996a: 12). But according to him, this
methodological individualism is not only a betrayal o f classical sociology’s original
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project as “a critique o f the notion o f a presocial self and a critique of the idea o f ‘society’
as a creation o f a rational subject” (Seidman 1996a: 13), but also is incongruent to the
contemporary Western societies in which mass media saturates individuals. Contrary to
modem American sociology, Seidman (1996a: 12) imagined “the individual as socially
produced; as occupying multiple, contradictory psychic and social positions or
identities.” Seidman tried to understand how the structural transformation of Western
societies had impact on the conventional notions of self and identity. He considered the
development o f new mass communication technologies as the most spectacular index o f
that structural transformation, and recognized that mass media contains many discourses
and practices and that the self is complexly constructed through these many discourses
and practices. Thus, the subject is considered to occupy contradictory psychic and social
positions and identities. In the contemporary Western societies, the self is not the modem
subject who “is figured as ego-and-present-centered and programmed (seemingly by
nature) to be goal-directed, strategically rational, and social, that is, compelled to interact
or engage in social exchange” (Seidman 1996a: 13). Rather, the self is a social product
who is constructed through a variety of discourses and practices o f mass media.
Seidman willingly embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology.
Seidman criticized sociological theory as a “foundational” discourse, borrowing the term
“foundationalism” from Rorty. Rorty (1979: 293) characterized foundationalism as the
demand for “some transcendental standpoint outside our present set of representations
from which we can inspect the relations between those representations and their objects.”
According to Seidman (1991b: 133), sociological theory has served this task: “We have
assigned ourselves the task o f defining and defending the basic premises, concepts, and
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explanatory models o f sociology. We have assumed the role of resolving disciplinary
disputes and conceptual conflicts by presuming to be able to discover a universal
epistemic rational that provides objective, value-neutral standards of conflict resolution.”
According to him, this vision o f sociological theory is a kind o f human science that the
Enlightenment project and modem Westem civilization have defined. Seidman (1996a:
700) attacked the thesis of value-neutrality: “It is the compulsion to erase epistemological
and social differences—a compulsivity concealed behind the sacred canopy of
Enlightenment and progress but also exposed by the very ‘othemess’ it calls forth—that
is the political unconscious o f the human sciences.” Thus, Seidman (1991b: 136)
proposed to abandon the modemist justifications o f conceptual strategies and to accept
local, pragmatic rationales for conceptual approaches; “Instead o f asking what is nature
o f reality or knowledge in the face of conflicting conceptual strategies— and therefore
going metatheoretical— I suggest we evaluate conflicting perspectives by asking what are
their intellectual, social, moral, and political consequences.” In addition to
foundationalism, Seidman also criticized the quest for a totalizing general theory.
General theory assumes that the researcher can transcend local and particularistic points
o f view so as to reach the universal tmth. He argued that general theory cannot avoid
being local and ethnocentric. As Seidman (1992: 68-69) put it:
I recommend abandoning the project of developing general theories such
as historical materialism, stmctural-functionalism, or French or American
stmcturalism. I also have doubts about the value o f more narrowly
focused general theories o f (say) the state, social movements,
modernization, or crime. It seems to me that general theories cannot
escape being culture-bound or ethnocentric because o f their sociohistorical
embeddedness.. .Moreover, general theories are more likely than local,
contextual social analyses to promote essentializing, reified identities, to
promote and legitimate social hierarchies, to repress social differences and
particularities, and to ignore the interests o f marginalized populations or
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simply to be irrelevant to their struggles and aims. Finally, general
theories mask their will to shape history. They contribute to the de
politicization o f the public sphere by trying to transfigure moral and
practical struggles into analytical or metatheoretical struggles.
Following Foucault, Seidman claimed that the claim to truth is inextricably an act of
power—a will to form humanity. What is more important is that this will to power is
subject to particular cultural and power struggles. In this sense, science is not a general
theory which is objective and universal because it is intimately connected to particular
interests at a specific juncture o f time and space. As an alternative for foundationalism
and general theory, Seidman (I99lb: 138) proposed social theory as the social narrative.
The postmodern social narrative I advocate is event-based and therefore
careful about its temporal and spatial boundaries. By event-based, I mean
that the primary reference points o f postmodern narratives are major social
conflicts or developments. As event-based narratives, postmodern social
analyses also would be densely contextual. Social events always occur in
a particular time and space, related to both contemporary and past
developments in a specific social space.. Individual societies evolve their
own unique configurations and historical trajectories, which are best
analyzed historically, not fi'om the heights o f general theory.
Modemist narratives are characterized by the flat, unidimensional language of
domination and liberation whose main consequence is to repress and marginalize
differences. Thus, Seidman argued that these narratives should be replaced by “the
multivocal notion o f multiple, local heterogeneous struggles and a many-sided experience
of empowerment and disempowerment” (Seidman I99lb: 142). Thus, epistemological
pluralism is inevitable. Seidman envisioned the active intervention o f social theory in the
pressing public issues that would influence the lives of people.
From a postmodern pragmatic standpoint, it would not be sufficient
simply to invoke general values (e.g., fi-eedom, democracy, solidarity,
order, material comfort, pleasure) or moral imperatives (e.g., that
individuals should be treated with respect or dignity or should be treated
as ends) either to justify or to criticize current social arrangements or to
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recommend changes. Social criticism must go beyond pointing to the
deficiencies o f current realities from some general moral standpoint. It
would be compelled to argue out its standpoint through an analysis that is
socially informed and pragmatic (Seidman 1991b: 142).
In fact, this vision has been developed by critical theories. Seidman wanted to
revitalize this tradition, stripping it o f essentialism. Seidman (1996a) found one of the
ideals o f social research in the tradition o f British cultural studies. Cultural studies has
recognized the nexus o f power/knowledge and encouraged the “organic intellectual” who
speaks “from a specific social location addressing events or developments as a particular
conjimcture” and who “is always socially and politically situated” (18). This
embeddedness motivates public engagement and makes possible an effective intellectual
intervention. Seidman also argued that sociology should embrace the formation of new
domains o f social knowledge such as communications, gender studies, comparative
literature, queer theory, postcolonial studies, etc. (see Seidman 1995,1996b). On
methods, Seidman argued that sociology should embrace other methods utilized
especially by the humanities. Foucauldian genealogy and archeology are useful for the
study of “the making o f bodies, desires, and identities,” “power / knowledge regimes,”
and “dynamics o f normalization, discipline, and surveillance.” Psychoanalytic theory is
useful for the study o f “the social formation o f subjectivity, gender identity, male
domination, and sexuality which focuses on the interplay between psyche and society and
on interpsychic dynamics” (14). This argument for trans- or multi-disciplinarity attacks
the rigidity o f disciplinarity o f modem American sociology. In fact, Seidman (1996b:
711) proposed a postdisciplinary culture o f human studies:
These fields o f knowledge [new domains o f social knowledge] point to the
institutional consolidation o f hybrid knowledges that underscores the
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blurring o f the lines among the human sciences, literature, rhetoric, ethics,
and philosophy and between scholarship and partisanship.
Seidman did not accept the aesthetic argument that the sense o f temporality is lost in
the postmodern world, arguing that the sense o f loss of temporality is an effect o f the
Eurocentric discourse: “Both the great modernist narratives o f progress and the
counterenlightenment motif of decadence are decidedly Eurocentric” (Seidman 1991b:
140). What is needed is to investigate the enormous social complexities and
heterogeneous struggles and strains within a specific society at a specific time. The
moral implication is that the individual should rely on local values or traditions because
there is no transcendent or universal moral standards. What is important here is that the
individual has multiple identities and group affiliations. This position assumes a
radically pluralistic society in which heterogeneous struggles with multiple possibilities
for empowerment exist: “My o ^ view is sympathetic with Rorty’s affirmation of
contemporary Western societies while pushing his liberalism in a decidedly stronger
pluralistic and democratic direction” (Seidman 1991c: 184). This radical pluralism
comes from Seidman’s discontent with the traditional liberalism which has concealed the
compulsion to erase social differences. Against this, Seidman argued that difference
should not be negated for the formation o f identity. In this sense, Seidman accepted the
aesthetic notion o f politics.

Interactionist Postmodern Sociology
Only interactionist postmodern sociology can be called “postmodern” in the strict
sense that it embraced the aesthetic challenge enthusiastically. As I have argued,
interactionist sociology emphasized the “indeterminate” nature o f the world, which
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allows humans to make their destinies. Some interactionist sociologists easily found that
poststmcturalism has a very similar view, and soon began to embrace it. The most
distinctive feature o f interactionist postmodern sociology is to accept the poststructuralist
model o f language as both social ontology and sociological methodology. In different
words, interactionist postmodern sociology willingly textualized both the social and the
individual. Embracing a semiotic version o f information society theory or consumer
society theory, interactionist postmodern sociology claimed that discourses of mass
communication were producing visual language, replacing the earlier forms o f literacy
based on orality and the print media. Interactionist postmodern sociology did not accept
critical postmodern social theory, and as a result it talked rarely about a decline in
political efficacy of the modem nation state and economic transformations in production
processes and workplace organization. Even if it does, it concentrates on how
electronically-mediated mass communications influence nation-state and economy. The
most representative are Laurel Richardson, Norman K. Denzin, and Patricia T. Clough.
They all used to work within the interactionist sociology, but has rapidly moved towards
poststructuralist postmodern social theory.

1.

Laurel Richardson

Richardson accepted the aesthetic challenge mainly in terms o f the
epistemological/methodological challenge: “I am attracted to postmodernism as a
‘sensibility,’ a way o f looking at and operating in the world. The core o f that sensibility
is the doubt that any discourse has a privileged place, any method/theory a universal and
general claim to authoritative knowledge” (Richardson 1993: 77-78). Unlike Aristotle
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and Kant who divided knowledge into three, Richardson divided knowledge into two
modes: the logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode. From my perspectives, the
logico-scientific mode parallels the theoretical and the technically practical while the
narrative mode parallels the morally practical: “The logico-scientific mode looks for
universal truth conditions, whereas the narrative mode looks for particular connections
between events. Explanation in the narrative mode is contextually embedded, whereas
logico-scientific explanation is abstracted from spatial and temporal contexts”
(Richardson 1990: 118). Reminding o f Derrida’s deconstructive strategy of a bipolar
opposition, Richardson argued that the logico-scientific mode o f knowledge has been
privileged over the narrative mode in the Western intellectual history and that what is
needed is to deconstruct this hierarchy. According to Richardson, the core of
postmodernism is the new notion o f language: “Language is not simply transparent,
reflecting a social reality that is objectively out there. Rather, language is a constitutive
force, creating a particular view o f reality” (1991a: 3). This poststructuralist notion o f
language undermines the logico-scientific mode: the poststructuralist notion of language
reveals that the privileged truth o f the logico-scientific mode is connected with a
particular view o f reality. Richardson presented a feminist-poststructuralist theorizing
and writing as an alternative. Richardson wanted to transform sociology by revitalizing
the narrative mode in sociology.
To the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social, Richardson did not
present a comprehensive response. Richardson seemed to just take for granted the
inappropriateness o f the traditional sociological notion o f the social. The most important
reason for this is that Richardson accepted the poststructuralist notion o f language in
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constituting social reality. Because o f the indeterminate nature o f language, the social
world is fluid, often contradictory and ambiguous, in which diversified discourses
compete. But Richardson did not totally give up the sociological notion o f the social.
Richardson observed that the social reality is unequally arranged in terms o f class,
gender, race/ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, martial status, etc. As a result, there are
many collectivities which sociological categories can embrace. For instance, there is a
set of single women involved with married men (Richardson 1985). This set can be seen
as a sociological group because it as a collectivity shares some common lived
experiences, which gives it the possibility to act collectively.
To the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the individual, Richardson
also did not present a comprehensive response. The reason is the same; Richardson
accepted that language constitutes the subject. Richardson (1991a: 13) argued that
“Subjectivity.. . —like the social world—is fluid, often contradictory and ambiguous,
rather than fixed and unified, and subjectivity, like the social world, is a site where
discourses compete.” Discourses cannot avoid using narrative: “Narrative displays the
goals and intentions of human actors; it makes individuals, cultures, societies, and
historical epochs comprehensible as wholes; it humanizes time; and it allows us to
contemplate the effects o f our actions, and to later the directions o f our lives” ( 1990:
117). The human subject has lived experience o f discourses through the mind and body:
“the mind and body split does not work as a meaning-making paradigm” (Richardson
1999: 79). But Richardson (1992:26) emphasized that “lived experience is lived in a
body.” As a result, bodily experience is influenced by, for instance, poetry devices such
as “line length, meter, cadence, speed, alliteration, assonance, connotation, rhyme and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244

off-rhyme, variation and repetition” (1992: 26). This character of bodily experience
makes it difficult for the subject to form a self-identical identity.
Richardson’s main merit lies in her response to the aesthetic challenge to the
sociological methodology. Richardson rejected the binary opposition o f
science/narrative, fact/fiction, plain language/rhetoric, objectivity/subjectivity, etc.,
tracing how this binary opposition historically occurred since the seventeenth century.
Richardson claimed that this historical separation was completed in the nineteenth
century: “By the nineteenth century, literature and science stood as two separate domains.
Literature was aligned with art and culture. It contained the values of ‘taste, aesthetics,
ethics, humanity, and morality’ and the rights to metaphoric and ambiguous language.
Given to science was the belief that its words were objective, precise, unambiguous,
noncontextual, nonmetaphoric” (Richardson 1991a: 4). But this “historical separation of
literature and science is not immutable” (Richardson 1991a: 4). Embracing the
poststructuralist notion o f language, Richardson challenged this binary opposition: “All
language has grammatical, narrative, and rhetorical structures which ‘create value,
bestow meaning, and constitute (in the sense of imposing form upon) the subjects and
objects that emerge in the process o f inquiry.’ There is no such thing as a neutral
language” (Richardson 1991a: 3). According to this, it is untenable that “language is
intrinsically irrelevant to the scientific enterprise and that science writing is neutral and
transparent” (Richardson 1991a: 6). Scientific inquiry also uses language, and thus, it
cannot be objective: “All social scientific writing depends upon narrative structure and
narrative devices” (Richardson 1990:117). In this sense, “Social science writing
including sociology is socio-historically constructed” (Richardson 1991a: 10) and “truth
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daim s are suspected o f making and serving particular interests in local, cultural, and
political struggles” (Richardson 1993: 78). The result is that “[o]nce the epistemic veil of
privileged truth is lifted, feminism, Afro-American, gay, and other routinely discountedas-ideology discourses rise to the same epistemological status as dominant discourses”
(1993: 78).
Then, isn’t there any privileged writing for sociology? Richardson did not go that far.
Richardson wanted to privilege lived experience o f people. Richardson paid attention to
the fact that ordinary people organize their lives in terms o f narrative:
Narrative is the primary way through which humans organize their
experiences into temporally meaningful episodes. People link events
narratively. “Narrative meaning is created by noting that something is a
“part” o f a whole and that something is a “cause” o f something else. The
meaning o f each event is produced by its temporal position and its role in
a comprehensible whole (Richardson 1990: 118).
What is important here is that “Narrative explanation means that one person’s
voice—the writer’s—speaks for others ” (Richardson 1990: 130). The narrative that most
ordinary people are using is characterized by the following:
People make sense o f their lives, for the most p art.. in terms o f specific
events, such as giving birth, and sequences o f events, such as the life-long
impact o f parenting a damaged child. Most people do not articulate how
the sociological categories o f race, gender, class, and ethnicity have
shaped their lives or how the larger historical processes such as the
demographic transition, service economies, and the Women’s Movement
have affected them (Richardson 1990: 130).
Sociologists are basically the same, but “[sjociologists tell the collective stories of
constituencies to which they may not even belong” (Richardson 1990:130).
A collective story tells the experience o f a sociologically constructed
category o f people on the context of larger sociocultural and historical
forces. The sociological protagonist is a collective. I think o f similarly
situated individuals who may or may not be aware o f their life affinities as
coparticipants in a collective story. My intent is to help construct a
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consciousness of kind in the minds o f the protagonists, a concrete
recognition o f sociological bondedness with others, because such
consciousness can break down isolation between people, empower them,
and lead them to collective action on their behalf (Richardson 1997: 14).
For this reason, telling a collective story entails a practical-ethnical issue: “how can
we use our skills and privileges to advance the case o f the non-privileged” (1990: 131).
Richardson argued that collective story could have a privileged place within a liberating
(liberated) sociology: “This narrative tells the collective story of the disempowered, not
by judging, blaming, or advising them, but by placing their lives within the context of
larger social and historical forces and by directing energy toward those social structures
that perpetuate injustice” (Richardson 1997: 19). According to Richardson, a feministpostmodern sociology can tell this type o f collective story. Feminism has been driven by
political practice which aimed to dismantle the subordination o f woman. Feminism has
tried to situate the women’s lives within the context o f larger social and historical forces,
arguing that the personal is the political. Contemporary deessentialized and
deuniversalized feminism willingly embraced postmodernism which argued that
theorizing must be grounded in explicitly historical and cultural ways (Richardson
1991b).
Richardson believed that collective story should be closer to lived experiences of
people, move them, make them engage in interpretive labors, and thus, empower them.
Richardson argued that poetry, rather than prose, is more appropriate for this double task
and she tried to represent lived lives poetically (see Richardson 1992).
Poetry depends upon the silences and pauses o f speech and is closer to
oral representation that is prose. As a result, poetry is, arguably, closer to
lived experiences and more likely to affect its readers and listeners.
Poetry is both visual and oral, both speakable and readable. Poetic
representation commands itself to multiple and open readings in ways that
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conventional prose does not; it engages its readers in frankly interpretive
labors (Richardson 1991c: 177).
To the aesthetic argument o f the loss o f sense o f temporality, Richardson responded
negatively because it betrays the commonplace fact that “Everywhere people experience
and interpret their lives in relationship to time. Time is the quintessential basis for and
constraint upon the human experience. And, everywhere, humans make sense o f their
temporal worlds through the narrative” (1990:124). O f course, Richardson rejected the
grand narrative that uses the linear notion o f temporality. But the attack on the linear
notion of temporality does not necessarily mean that humankind lost sense of
temporality. On morality, Richardson did not elaborate much. But we can get a moral
implication from Richardson’s works. Richardson seemed to reject traditional morality
because it is based on the binary opposition o f the mind and body. The self-restraining
morality is achieved only at the cost o f bodily experience. Richardson wanted to vitalize
lived experience. On politics, Richardson was critical o f the traditional politics of
assimilation and acculturation. In fact, the politics o f inclusion operates on the binary
opposition o f inclusion and exclusion. Richardson challenged the politics of assimilation
and acculturation which is buttressed by modem sociological story. For instance, a
modernist story used the guiding concepts o f assimilation and acculturation when telling
about Native Americans: “For the acculturation story, the writing problem was the
description o f past culture. Indian life had no future, and the present was interpreted in
light o f this futurelessness as pathology and disintegration. The political action
consistent with this metaphor was to send Native American children to Anglo boarding
schools, to create urban relocation projects, to undermine tribal tradition ”(Richardson
1990:132). Richardson criticized this story. Richardson argued that what is needed is to
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tell the other story to the disempowered: “For the contemporary resistance narrative,
however, the writing problem concerns the future: the resistance o f indigenous people to
exploitation in their struggle to preserve ethnic identity. The writing describes the
resistance in the present to preserve the past for the future. Political action consistent
with this narrative is intervention to prevent cultural genocide” (Richardson 1990: 132).

2.

Norman K. Denzin

Denzin tried to synthesize feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and
postmodernism through the axial principle of C. Wright Mill’s pragmatism. For Denzin,
Mills is important because “Mills argued that as new realities and new images appear on
the horizon, the old Enlightenment ideologies o f liberalism and socialism are in the
process o f collapsing. Fearing that a Cheerful Robot would become a predominant social
type. Mills argued that we need to study ‘the types o f men, women and children that this
postmodern age is producing.’ We will require, he said, different theories, methods and
different ways of looking at this new historical moment” (Denzin 1993a: 179). Denzin
believed that feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism are
following Mills’ lead: “Taking their lead from Mills, feminist scholars (Meaghan Morris,
Dorothy Smith, Patricia Clough), scholars of color (bell hooks, Cornell West, Stuart Hall,
Patricia Collins), poststructural theorists (Barthes, Foucault, Derrida) and avowed
theorists o f the postmodern (Jameson, Lyotard, Baudrillard), postmodern theorists now
attempt to write and theorize this historical moment Mills identified.” For Denzin, these
new theorists are important because they analyzed the nature o f new realities and new
images in postmodern era. Denzin (1991b: ix) argued that “classical sociological ways o f
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representing and writing about society require radical transformation” because they are
inappropriate for representing and writing about new realities and new images. For this
transformation, Denzin enthusiastically embraced the aesthetic challenge to American
sociology. Denzin (1992: 24) was critical about mainstream American sociologists who
have been preoccupied with the abstract sociological problem of macro-micro links:
“What’s at issue is hegemony and control o f a theoretical paradigm that would speak for
all o f sociology. Beneath this search for power are individual careers, prestige,
publications, and the power to determine what passes as knowledge within a discipline.”
Against this depoliticized abstract project, Denzin (1996a: xxiv), following pragmatic
tradition, wanted to start from the worlds o f lived experiences and to use “pragmatically
gained knowledge as a tool for social criticism.” But Denzin distinguished himself from
traditional pragmatists who worked decades before, calling his pragmatism a media and
communication centered pragmatism. Following the semiotic version o f information
society theory or consumer society theory, this pragmatism accepted “the proposition that
the image of reality has replaced reality” (Denzin 1996a: xx). Denzin concentrated on
the nature of the image o f reality and its impact on the social and the individual.
Following a politicized version ofDerridean deconstruction, Denzin tried to deconstruct
the “images” o f the repressive arrangements o f class, gender, race and ethnicity, that
electronically-mediated mass communications represent as the real.
Denzin embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social.
According to Denzin (1991b: 23), the sociological notion of the social as a totality is a
sociological fiction: “ordinary sociology’s society, society-at-large, is a sociological
fiction; society in the abstract is neither visible nor countable. It exists in the texts that
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sociologists and others write about it.” Denzin defied all reified notion o f the social and
proposed a new notion of the social which is virtually same as the poststructuralist notion
o f language. The postmodern world is a world where symbols and meaning freely
circulate within a system and have no apparent concrete anchoring in reality. The
postmodern world consists o f systems o f representation, not systems o f real things. In the
postmodern world, everything becomes what Denzin (1991a: 17) defined as cultural:
“Culture refers to the taken-fbr-granted and problematic webs o f significance and
meaning that human beings produce and act on when they do things together.” Denzin
did not believe that these meanings are neutral because he believed that they are “shaped
and moulded by larger culture-and-meaning-making institutions o f society-at-large”
(1991a: 17). In the postmodern world, the main institution to shape and mould meanings
is electronically-mediated mass communications. The language o f electronicallymediated mass communications is similar to the Derridean notion o f language as a
process o f deferral and delay. The language of electronically-mediated mass
communications does not represent the real but produce texts which are always parts o f
other texts. The texts contain contradictory features because there is no author to
organize them coherently. Likewise, the culture o f postmodern society that the language
of electronically-mediated mass communications produces cannot avoid containing some
contradictory features.
It seems difficult to find any recurrent or persistent patterns o f social behaviors
because culture as a text appears to be seamless: “A text is never a finite entity, with
fixed boundaries, for a text always spills over into other texts” (Denzin 1991a: 25).
Denzin implicitly wanted to make society like a text. But Denzin observed that there are
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many determinant signifîers to freeze a text. Socially, they are master signifiers such as
gender, social class, race and ethnicity. The discourses of electronically-mediated mass
communications produces a variety of texts that arrange gender, social class, race and
ethnicity in a way to (re)produce an unequal system o f the social.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the
individual. Like other texts, the human being is constituted by a variety o f discourses
that electronically-mediated mass communications deliver. The discourses o f
electronically-mediated mass communications are mainly visual, which displace the
earlier forms o f literacy based on orality and the print media. The visual discourses of
electronically-mediated mass communications introduce a new set o f media logics and
media formats;
These new formats alter the person’s relationships to tlie “real” and the
technologies o f the real. They maintain a narrative and epistemological
commitment to the simulational logic o f the third stage o f the sign. They
serve to tum the individual into a new cultural object; an object who
produces cultural knowledge and cultural texts via the new informational
formats (Denzin 1991b: 8).
Following Baudrillard, Denzin (1991b: vii) argued that “members o f the
contemporary world are voyeurs adrift in a sea of symbols. They know and see
themselves through cinema and television.” Thus, the individual in the postmodern
world seems to be free o f any kinds of constraints. But Denzin did not forget to mention
that new media formats are simultaneously new vehicles for the (re)production o f official
ideology. The individual is (re)produced as the postmodern self whose ingredients “are
given in three key cultural identities, those derived from the performances that define
gender, social class, race and ethnicity. The patriarchal, and all too often racist
contemporary cultures o f the world ideologically code the self and its meanings in terms
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o f the meanings brought to these three cultural identities” (Denzin 1991b: viii). Visual
discourses o f electronically-mediated mass communications are ideological in so far as
they try to reify the subjects, giving some specific fixed essences to the subjects. The
individual seems to freely enjoy the representation o f mass media, but s/he is in fact
caught in ideological discourses. Nevertheless, Denzin did not believe that the individual
became a cultural dope because alongside media representation the individual lives in the
worlds o f lived experiences. “The postmodern self,” thus, “has become a sign of itself, a
double dramaturgical reflection anchored in media representations on the one side, and
everyday life on the other” (Denzin 1991b: viii). Thus, the relation between media
representations and lived experiences is an empirical, not ontological problem. In this
sense, Denzin wanted to preserve the dialectical relationship between lived experiences
and experiences mediated by mass communications such as TV and cinema.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology. First of
all, he refuted the modernist epistemology that assumed the privileged position o f
absolute spectator: “any hint o f objectivity predicated on the privileged position o f the
absolute spectator must be relinquished” (Denzin 1991b: xi). Following Derrida, Denzin
called this epistemology a metaphysics of presence that assumes that speech and writing
are direct mirrors to thought, speakers and writers are fully present to themselves, and
texts are pure. This realist epistemology is false because “things do not exist independent
o f the representations in social texts” (Denzin 1993b: 149). The logocentric search for a
fixed presence is doomed to fail due to the nature o f language as a process o f deferral and
delay. Denzin distinguished two models o f interpretation in human disciplines: “The first
seeks to decipher, unravel, and discover the truth, the origins, the centers, the essences.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253

the inner structures, and the obdurate meanings that operate within and shape particular
forms o f experience, interactional sites, social texts, and social institutions” (Denzin
1991b: 153). According to him, the classical and neo-classical version o f sociology as a
science of society followed this model. The other model followed Derridean
deconstruction: “It seeks.. to examine how current textual practices (including theory
and research) reify structures, subjects, and social experiences. It proposes to deconstruct
these practices so as to reveal how they keep in place a politically repressive picture of
the social that is out o f touch with the world as it is lived, and experienced” (Denzin
1991a: 153). Denzin actively embraced the second position because he wanted to make
sociology civic sociology, “a form of radical democratic social practice” (Denzin 1996b:
747).
Denzin extended deconstructive methods to cultural studies: “Viewing human
experience as a social text, cultural studies attempts to deconstruct and unravel the
ideological meanings that are coded into taken-fbr-granted meanings that circulate in
everyday life” (1991a: 17). Denzin (1992: 81) defined cultural studies as follows: “Such
an approach examines three interrelated problems: the production, distribution,
consumption, and exchange o f cultural objects and their meanings; the textual analysis of
these objects, their meanings, and the practices that surround them; and the study o f lived
cultures and lived experiences which are shaped by the cultural meanings that circulate in
everyday life.” The first problem was addressed in the Frankfurt School’s culture
industry thesis; it involved “issues o f ideology and the political economy (semiosis) of
signs, including how these signs are worded or photographed, where they circulate, who
buys them, and so fbrth. The systems o f discourse that shape the meanings brought to
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any cultural object must also be examined” (Denzin 1992: 81). The second problem was
dealt with in the early British cultural studies; it examines “how a text constitutes (hails)
an individual as a subject in a particular ideological moment and site.” A variety of
reading strategies such as feminist, semiotic, hermeneutic, deconstructive, psychoanalytic
reading strategies can be used. The third problem was dealt with mainly in the British
subculture studies and the American interactionist ethnographic studies; it examines
“how interacting individuals connect their lives to these ideological texts and make sense
o f their experiences in terms o f the texts’ meanings” (Denzin 1992: 82). What is
important here is that Denzin has focused on the last two problems. In many articles,
Denzin did excellent textual analyses using Derridean deconstructive reading and writing.
Denzin has also focused on ethnographic works dealing with how interacting individuals
connect their lived experiences to the cultural representations o f those experiences. By
contrast, Denzin has relatively ignored the first problem. Even when Denzin addressed it,
he did not study the political economy o f the sign. Rather, he focused on the systems o f
discourse. For instance, in Hollywood Shot by Shot (1991), Denzin analyzed eight
systems o f discourses which shaped the presentation o f the alcoholic, relatively ignoring
the political economy. For Denzin, structures of meaning seem to be more important
than structures of political economy. Later, Denzin (1996: xv) added two more problems
to the definition o f cultural studies: “those transnational cultural and representational
practices which produce and reproduce new fonns o f control, desire and terror in
everyday life”; and “new forms o f textual representations that illuminate and critique
those practice.” In this new definition, Denzin emphasized the globalization o f the
culture industry. Denzin recognized that through the global network, new global cultural
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forms and practices have begun to have impact on the local cultural forms and practices.
But Denzin did not locate this globalization o f the culture industry within the new
development o f capitalism. In this sense, Denzin omitted to consider the political
economy as a method, which I believe is a serious default in his cultural studies.
Denzin also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the normative dimension.
Embracing the aesthetic attack on the linear sense o f temporality, Denzin argued that
“[e]ach historical moment can be taken on its own terms, and situated within its particular
cultural, sexual, racial, social, moral, economic, and political order o f things” (Denzin
1991b: 49). On morality, Denzin (1991b: 5) argued that “[c]ultural eclecticism has
become a way o f life.” People have increasingly become conspicuous consumers who try
to verify their existence through diversified consumption. This way o f life is
contradictory to the liberal ideal o f morality characterized by self-denying ethics. He
defied this kind o f conservative, commercialized version o f morality, and advocated “a
radical, non-violent pluralism that represses no one and liberates all” (Denzin 1991b:
154). On politics, Denzin (1992: 161) criticized the Chicago School model o f democratic
politics which privileges the heroic individuals who “create their own value through
action and by assuming full responsibility for the consequences o f their own conduct.”
Social inequality and conflicts are seen as a result o f lack o f communication among
people, and thus, they are considered to be eradicated if there is full communication
among people. There is a sharp division between the public and the private: the public
sphere includes economy and politics while the private includes family, friendship, and
leisure activities. The public is a field in which the firee and open communication of
informed citizens construct the public good. The institutions o f civil society such as
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media, school, social sciences, etc. will present the knowledge necessary for the public to
make correct decisions in any problematic situation. The state is supposed to speak on
behalf of its citizens. But according to Denzin, this traditional politics has served as a
dominant ideology to perpetuate the status quo: “an economic division of labor organized
for private profit rather than human need; a gender-based division of labor ‘that separates
privatized childrearing firom recognized and remunerated work’; gender and racesegmented paid labor markets that generate a marginalized underclass’; and a world
political economy and system of nation-states that ‘engage in crisis management in the
form o f segmented social welfare concessions and subsidized war production” (Denzin
1992: 145). This politics is now outmoded; new politics is needed because o f the
postmodern condition depicted above. Denzin (1996a: xxiii) described this new politics,
the post-pragmatic politics, as thus:
This post-pragmatism will dispense with the liberal desire to sustain a
fiction between the public and the private. It will seek a radical
democratization o f gender, race and ethnic relations. It will deconstruct
the ideological means that surround these relationships, including the
“bourgeois concepts o f individualism, interpersonal relations, education,
productivist values and natures.” It will analyze the discursive and
interactional forms these relationships assume within organizational, class
and interpersonal structures. This post-pragmatism will critically attach
itself to the postmodern family, the media and popular culture, cyberspace,
science, protest movements, national identities, and race and gender as the
critical sites for interpretive-political work. It will push hard at the
boundaries and intersections of public science and the media, seeking
science and the media as the dominant discourses o f power and control in
contemporary life.

3. Patricia T. Clough
Like other interactionist postmodern sociologists, Clough accepted mainly
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poststructuralist postmodern social theory rather than critical postmodern social theory.
The main reason is that Clough wanted to understand the modernist division between
nature and technology, the body and the machine, the real and the virtual, the living and
the inert “in terms o f differantial relationships rather than oppositional or even dialectical
ones” (Clough 2000a: 11). Here no element is ontologically privileged. She seemed to
believe that critical postmodern social theory followed the dialectical model o f base and
superstructure. Compared to other interactionist postmodern sociologists, she has some
peculiar characteristics. Firstly, Clough considered poststructuralism as an
epistemological shift as well as an ontological shift: “against the usual treatment of
poststmcturalism as provoking an epistemological shift, I want to suggest that
poststmcturalism’s reach to the future o f thought is in its ontological implications”
(Clough 2000a: S). This means that she clearly situated poststmcturalism within the age
o f teletechnology. In this sense, she followed the semiotic version o f the information
society theory. Secondly, Clough connected poststmcturalism with Lacanian
psychoanalysis when she explained the constitution of the subject identity and social
reality. She claimed that the Oedipal complex functions as the dominant narrative logic
informing the constmction of the subject’s identity and social reality. According to her,
the Oedipal logic constitutes the masculine subject as a unified, rational, autonomous
figure by replacing irrationality onto the figure o f the other. This masculine subject
constmcts the realist narrative through which the realist notion o f social reality is
produced. She wanted to deconstmct this Oedipal logic. In this sense, feminism is
inherent in her project (see 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994). Lastly, Clough connected
the change from modem to postmodern era with the change o f theorizing writing from
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narrativities to teletechnologies: “while I would argue that our classical theorists gave
lasting form to the discipline o f sociology, as well as influenced every discipline o f the
human sciences, and that they did so by theorizing the rise of industrialization and the
mechanization o f the mode o f capitalist production, I also would argue that poststructural
theorists have instigated a profound transformation o f these same disciplines, by
theorizing writing in terms o f information/communication media technologies, especially
telecommunications. In this sense, poststructural thought has always threatened to
displace classical sociological theory” (Clough 1996: 722-723).
Clough embraced the aesthetic challenge to the sociological notion o f the social.
Following Derrida, she rejected the traditional ontology o f presence. According to her,
the sociological notion o f the social is based on the traditional ontology of presence,
which is held by the Oedipal logic. The Oedipal logic endorses the traditional ontology
o f presence by producing realist narrative whose author is a unified, rational, autonomous
subject: “the desire o f the realist narrative is an oedipal desire with which the past is
rewritten and the present is desired to the end(s) o f the subject’s self-knowledge, his
unified self-development” (Clough 1992a: 22). Against the traditional ontology o f
presence, she presented preontology, or what Derrida called “hauntology.”
1 want to suggest that the ontological implications o f poststmcturalism
cross through the ontology o f presence, put origins and authenticity under
erasure, making ontology impossible or only impossibly so. The shift in
ontological perspective that poststmcturalism implies makes ontologizing
impossible but imperative, necessary for thinking Being anew, that is, for
bringing Being back to the opening o f ontology, to the preontological, and
thereby inviting a rethinking o f technicity as well. Poststmcturalism, I
want to suggest, offers an ontological perspective in which nature and
technology, the body and the machine, the real and the virtual, the living
and the inert are given in diffêrantial relationships, each inextricable from
the other” (Clough 2000a: 6).
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What is at stake is that Clough situated the ontology o f presence within the modem
era and the preontology within the age of teletechnology or telecommunication.
By teletechnology I mean to refer to the realization o f technoscience,
technoculture, and technonature—that is, to the full interface of computer
technology and television, promising globalized networks of information
and communication whereby layers of electronic images, texts, and sounds
flow in real time, so that the speeds o f the territorialization,
deterritorialization, and reterritorialization o f social spaces, as well as the
adjustment to the vulnerabilities of exposure to media event-ness, are
beyond any user’s mere decision to tum “it” on or off (Clough 2000a: 3).
Telecommunications challenges the sociological notion o f the social based on the
traditional ontology o f presence. Telecommunications undermines the sociological
category o f social stmcture: “telecommunications plays a large part in .. .the
deconstmction of the ‘principally co-ordinated space.. .inside which all traditional
sociological categories have been once securely allocated”’ (Clough 1996: 723). As a
result, telecommunications introduces a new notion o f the social based on preontology.
The sociological notion o f the social is based on the sharp division between the public
and the private spheres, the family and the state, the economy and the state. Autonomy
o f each institution is the core idea of the sociological notion o f the social. But with the
development o f teletechnology, this notion o f the social has lost its referent. The
boundaries become blurred. But this does not mean that the social disappeared.
What is expected instead is various reterritorializations in the
reconfiguration o f social spaces conditioned by the transnationalization of
capital and the globalization of teletechnology, such that the transnational
or the global are better understood as nodes in various networks alongside
the local, the singular, the immanent. As the relevant distinction for
political economy is no longer that between circulating capital and fixed
capital but rather between capital effected by state apparatuses and capital
effected by multinationals and globalization, the functions o f nation-states
and the aims for their interrelationship in terms o f a transnationalism are
being revised (Clough 2000b: 384).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260

This new notion o f the social is very similar to one that the aesthetic assumes.
Clough (2000a: 4) argued that “matter-energy flows” are displacing the structural. Using
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms “territorialization,” “deterritorialization, and
“reterritorialization,” she valorized the aesthetic argument that the structural is in flux.
She saw the traditional notion o f the social in a negative light because she believed that
the Oedipal logic “holds together the structural configuration o f family and national
ideologies, the state and civil society, and the private and the public spheres” (Clough
2000a: 12). Clough (1996: 727) argued that telecommunications deconstructed the
traditional notion of the social: “the difference between production and consumption has
been displaced; so too the distinction between the private and public spheres is all but
erased.”
Clough believed that the sociological notion o f the subject, which derived out of
modernist social-structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and
the civil society, and the public and private spheres, lost its significance. The core idea is
that the subject becomes what the aesthetic assumes, a free-flowing matter. Following
Lacanian psychoanalysis, she argued that the modem subject as a unified, rational,
autonomous being was constituted as the resolution o f the Oedipus complex in which the
position of the subject, masculinity or femininity, is fixed. In the Oedipal logic, the
position o f the masculine subject is fixed as being “a unified, rational, autonomous figure
by displacing irrationality onto the figure of the other: the woman, the colonized subject,
the raced subject, and the homosexual” (Clough 1996: 724). But the development of
telecommunications undermines the Oedipal logic, and further, its discursive product, the
modem masculine subject. According to Clough, the multiple, diffuse subjectivity o f
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telecommunications escapes the Oedipal logic: ‘T he logic o f telecommunications is not
narratively organized around a subject.. .The logic is not about before-during-after.
Given its seemingly endless flow o f information and images, telecommunications is
organized w ith .. .the logic o f underexposed-exposed-overexposed”; “Its
[telecommunications’] unconscious cannot be found in projecting a unified subject
through displacement onto others. The unconscious o f telecommunications is more in the
felt constancy o f its flow o f information and images. The unconscious o f
telecommunications is in the way its stills and extends time that is already consumed or
socialized” (Clough 1996: 726, 728). The logic o f underexposed-exposed-overexposed
does not concern representation. Rather, what matters is “the capacity and speed o f the
circuits o f information in which the subject is no longer the centering (or decentering)
figure and therefore no longer the site of an unconscious not-knowing” (Clough 1996:
726). What is at stake here is that telecommunications functions as an agent o f
socialization: “The socialization processes of the institutions once enclosed in the private
sphere o f civil society have been generalized. Telecommunications can no longer be
conceived as a technological extension o f the human being that is engaged in the
perfecting o f the subject, socializing and educating the individual. Rather,
telecommunication increasingly submits socialization and education to the requirements
o f technology” (Clough 1996: 727). Telecommunications changed the nature o f the
subject: “the subject is only one point (or even multiple points) in the network of always
already transmitted information” (Clough 1996: 727). In the Oedipal logic, the
unconscious o f the subject is located under the subject because the Oedipal logic
displaces the lack o f the subject onto the other. But in the logic o f underexposed-
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exposed-overexposed, “the unconscious is always already everywhere in the flow of
images and information. Only the intensities of the flow can change, can be changed”
(Clough 1996: 730).
Clough embraced the aesthetic challenge to sociological methodology, arguing that
the traditional methodology o f sociology is imbued with narrativity intrinsically
associated with the Oedipal logic. She criticized empirical science which masquerades
itself as a factual representation o f empirical reality by using the realist narrativity, a
production of projected or displaced unconscious desire. She held that “all factual
representations of empirical reality, even statistical representations, are narratively
constructed” (Clough 1992a: 2). All narratives, including the scientific one, conceal
within them the writing subject’s unconscious desire which desires to disavow the writing
subject’s loss of the mother and to fix its sexual identity through the crude anatomical
opposition. Therefore, reality outside the narrative does not exist, nor does factual or
neutral reality exist outside the narrative; all realities written by narratives are sexual.
Clough (1992a: 4) argued that the researcher’s authority as an author is fantasmatically
constructed by “defensive fantasies in which a coherence o f identity is imagined in order
to disavow and supplement the failure o f identity.” According to her, narrativity
intrinsically associated with the Oedipal logic has dominated the human sciences
including sociology: “[n]arrative has functioned.. .to constitute the authorial subject as a
unified, rational, autonomous figure by displacing irrationality onto the figure o f the
other: the woman, the colonized subject, the raced subject, and the homosexual” (1996:
724).
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Clough sought to find anti-Oedipal or pre-Oedipal narrativity in telecommunications
because she believed that telecommunications erupts the Oedipal narrativity. She seemed
to suggest to follow the pre- or anti-Oedipal logic o f telecommunications. Writing
experiments such as the ones of Carolyn Ellis, Laurel Richardson, and Allen Shelton are
strategies to re-find the social in the telecommunications age. Their writings take
sociology into the “network imagination of telecommunications.” In a sense, they mimic
the logic o f telecommunications which is characterized by the following: “The personal
story does not begin in order to end with the unified, autonomous, rational subject all of
one piece. The personal story is always a breached autobiographical form”; “Cuts in the
writing allow for play with the timing of the appearance and disappearance of images and
information, the switching on and off of representations, subjects and voices, histories,
events and situations. The particular, the local, or the contingent are evoked without the
illusion that their appearance makes the global disappear once and for all” (Clough 1996:
729). She was very cautious when she evaluated experimental writing. Sociology has
usually followed the unconscious of the human sciences, but postmodern critique o f
sociology and the development o f telecommunications technologies challenged
sociology’s usual way o f defining/writing the social. The link of power and knowledge
becomes obvious, and sociologists’ self-reflexivity based on the unified, autonomous,
rational subject or on scientific community is no longer available. What should
sociologists do? Just keep on with conventional writing? Or follow the logic of
telecommunications? In this dilemma, experimental writing can be seen as a transitional
alternative to re-find the social. Clough (1996: 730) argued as follows: “I propose that
we focus on these writings because they are symptomatic o f our interregnum between the
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past o f the human sciences and the future o f what Seidman calls the postdisciplinary
discourses o f culture. Having already abandoned the science/nonscience binary, while
transgressing the border separating the empirical conventions o f the social sciences from
the literary and the rhetorical, these writings demand a new form o f criticism.” Like
other postmodern sociologists, Clough proposed a transdisciplinary studies which
combines social science and literary criticism. Literary criticism is significant when it
makes apparent the entanglement of desire, power, and academic discourse. She argued
that African-American feminists. Third World feminists, feminist post-colonial critics,
and queer theorists inform us that academic discourse is interwoven with an author’s
unconscious desire to disavow an author’s loss and to control/shape the world according
to an author’s ideal unified imago at the cost o f other differences o f race, class, sexuality,
ethnicity, nationality, and gender. These studies theorize across the border o f social
science and literary criticism in order to reclaim previously assimilated cultural histories
as well as revise notions of fantasy and unconscious desire.
Clough proposed a deconstructive reading (and writing) as a main method, which is
based on new “understanding of all texts as deployments or distributions o f persons,
places, events, and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge” (Clough 1992a: 132).
She tried to deconstruct canonical texts which utilized realist narrativity that combines
authorized knowledge with a fantasy o f a unified masculine subject identity. The
masculine author is sexually biased, but it masquerades itself as a unified subject who
factually represents the empirical reality. The aim o f Clough’s strategy is to deconstruct
this fantasmatic subject and to analyze how the text deploys or distributes persons,
places, events, and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge.
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Clough also embraced the aesthetic challenge to the normative dimension. The core
idea is to escape the Oedipal logic. Clough attacked the linear notion of temporality,
which is endorsed by the Oedipal logic, and also criticized the self-denying or self
restraining morality, which is driven by the unconscious desire to disavow the subject’s
loss and to fantasmatically construct its unified imago at the cost o f others. She also
rejected traditional politics based on essentialist identity, attacking the modernist
assumption that real experiences o f real people exist outside of discourse. From this
perspective, she criticized even modem feminist politics for utilizing the identity politics
that argues that all members o f the same oppressed group share a common identity.
Thus, she aimed to deconstruct identity politics, investigating how many identities are
discursively produced in relation to hegemonic discourses. For instance, the meanings o f
women are discursively produced under specific conditions, and thus, they can be
changed. In this sense, she concentrated on textual politics. She held that hegemonic
discourses enframe the psychic structure of the subject, regulate the sense o f reality for
the subject, and establish texts (deployments or distributions o f persons, places, events,
and perspectives in relations o f power/knowledge) through (historically) conflating
themselves with realist narrativity. In this sense, discourse is a site for the production of
knowledge/power. Thus, deconstructive reading of hegemonic discourses also means an
effort to rearrange a certain political, economical arrangement.

Critics o f Postmodern Sociology
Generally speaking, mainstream American sociology represented by positivistic
sociology and functionalist sociology has ignored the aesthetic challenge to the
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fundamental assumptions o f modem American sociology. Mainstream American
sociology has been busy in making sociology a genuine science o f humanity and society.
But some mainstream American sociologists began to be interested in the aesthetic
challenge. But their interest in the aesthetic challenge was different from one of
postmodem American sociologists who embraced the aesthetic challenge in order to
broaden the horizon o f sociology. Unlike them, some mainstream American sociologists
tried to defend modem American sociology as a genuine science o f humanity and society
against the aesthetic challenge. These mainstream American sociologists believed that
the new condition called the postmodem could be investigated through traditional
methodologies. Thus, according to them, there is no need to invent new strategies to
study the postmodem. In what follows, I will briefly discuss how these mainstream
American sociologists responded to the aesthetic challenge. Jeffrey Alexander will be
considered as an exemplar o f functionalist sociology. Jonathan Tumer will be thought as
an exemplar o f positivistic sociology.

1. Jeffrey Alexander
Functionalist sociology represented by Parsons’ functionalism had been dead until
neofunctionalism emerged in the midst of 1980s. Jeffrey Alexander played an important
role in revitalizing functionalist sociology. Through Theoretical Logic in Sociology'
(1982) and Neofunctionalism (1985), Alexander presented “multidimensionality” as the
criterion o f good sociological theory, elaborating on Parsons’ functionalism. Like
Parsons who wanted to make the analytic reference, Alexander used the idea of
equilibrium as a reference point. Alexander believed that both the social and the
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individual are multidimensional and thus sociological inquiry also should be
multidimensional. Thus, what is at stake is to construct a “general theory” to grasp this
multidimensional nature o f the social and the individual.
Alexander’s general theory embraced the transcendental version of the theoretical
which emphasizes the capacity o f the mind to ascend from the illusory world o f the
particulars to the real world of the universals. As Alexander (1992: 325) put it in a
modest tone: “To advocate the necessity for general theory is to uphold the possibility of
universal thought. Universalism rests upon the capacity of actors to decenter themselves,
to understand that the world does not revolve around themselves, that they are not its
creators, that they can study ‘it’ in a relatively personal way.” He wanted to make
sociological theory a general theory:
Sociological theory can be legitimate and socially important enterprise
only if it can make a claim to reason.. To make a claim to reason.. .is to
suggest that sociological theory can achieve a perspective on society
which is more extensive and more general than the theorist’s particular
lifeworld and the particular perspective o f his or her social group. If this
is not possible, there is no such tiling as theory, whether social or
sociological (Alexander 1991: 147).
Then, how can a sociologist transcend his/her own particular perspective so as to
form more extensive and general theory? Alexander recognized that theory can not
achieve “the view from nowhere.” Nevertheless, Alexander (1991: 147) argued that
theory achieves “a view from ‘somewhere else,’ a place that is neither the theorist’s own
personal world nor the world entirely outside.” Alexander (1991:147-148) described
“somewhere else” as follows:
In the life o f the university, this place is sustained by the intellectual
disciplines, which exert stringent demands for the impersonal expression
o f personal commitments that Weber called value-rationality. These
disciplines have been created historically by what can be called broadly
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the tradition o f reason, which has developed very gradually and unevenly
and in many different civilizations over thousands o f years. In
microsociological terms, this tradition is sustained by the decentering of
moral and cognitive understanding that underlies socialization, as Piaget
and Parsons have shown. In macrsociological terms, the tradition of
reason is institutionalized when civil society guarantees universal rights to
particular groups according to the rule of an impersonal law.
Alexander considered the capacity to achieve “somewhere else” as an index of
maturity in both the individual (micro level) and civilization (macro level). The earlier
the individual, the more s/he is centered. Likewise, “The earlier the human society, the
more its members experience centeredness” (Alexander 1992: 325). By contrast, the
more mature the individual, the more decentered s/he is. Likewise, the later the human
society, the more its members experience decenteredness. In this sense, decentering
one’s own self and own civilization is an index o f maturity because it enables us to go
beyond our own particular positions and to comprehend the world and self in a
universalistic and impersonal way. Alexander considered positivism and empiricism as
an extreme version of decentering and Romanticism and idealism as an extreme version
o f recentering. Positivism and empiricism eliminated reason, arguing that scientists
experience themselves as mirroring nature. He called this “absent reason.” Alexander
posited poststructuralism as a contemporary extension o f neo-romantic countermovement
against this absent reason, originating from Romanticism and idealism in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. The common feature o f this countermovement is its refusal of
universalism or the value o f general theory and its contextualism whose epistemological
implication is conventionalism and skepticism. Alexander opposed both positivism and
empiricism on the one hand, and contextualism on the other hand.
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With this view on general theory, Alexander responded to the aesthetic challenge to
American sociology. Alexander did not accept a positivist position that scientific
knowledge is exempt from any ideological implication. This argument is understanable
because Alexander did not use the term ideology as the Marxian notion o f false
consciousness. Rather, it is a Geertzian notion o f ideology which refers to a symbolic
system that functions to interpret the world in a manner that provides meaning and
motivation. Alexander distinguished four distinctive theoretical-cum-ideological periods
in postwar thought. First is modernization theory and romantic liberalism, which covers
the period from end o f World War II to later 1960s. Modernization theory is a general
theory in as far as it presented a general claim that “there are functional not merely
idealistic exigencies that push social systems toward democracy, markets, and the
universalization o f culture, and that shifts toward ‘modernity’ in any subsystem create
considerable pressures on the others to respond in a complementary way” (Alexander
1995: 11). Modernization theory is an ideology insofar as it endorsed romantic liberalism
which emphasizes real individuals and incremental change over a collective historical
subject and revolutionary change. Second is antimodemization theory and heroic
radicalism, which covers the period from later 1960s to end o f 1970s. Antimodemization
theory is a general theory in as far as it presented a general claim that serious “reality
problems” betray modernization theory. Antimodemization theory is an ideology in as
far as it endorsed heroic radicalism which emphasized a collective historical subject and
revolutionary change over real individuals and incremental change. Third is postmodern
theory and comic detachment, which covers the period from early 1980s to mid-1990s.
Postmodern theory is a general theory in as far as it produced new middle range models
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o f culture, science and epistemology, social action, gender and family relations, and
economic life. Postmodern theory is an ideology in as far as it endorsed comic
detachment: “Because good and evil cannot be parsed, the actors—protagonists and
antagonists—are on the same moral level, and the audience, rather than being
normatively or emotionally involved, can sit back and be amused” (Alexander 1995: 27).
Alexander (1995:29) argued that “the departure from postmodernism has already
begun.” An upcoming theoretical-cum-ideological period is neo-modemization or
reconvergence theory and the combination o f the narrative forms o f its predecessors.
Neo-modemization or reconvergence theory is an heir o f early modernization theory.
Neo-modemism is an ideology as far as it reinflated the emancipatory narrative o f the
market. Alexander was basically positive to this transformation, but under the condition
that we should avoid the totalizing conceit: “Institutional stmctures like democracy, law,
and market are functional requisites if certain social competencies are to be achieved and
certain resources to be acquired; they are not, however, either historical inevitabilities or
linear outcomes, nor are they social panaceas for the problems of non economic
subsystems or groups” (Alexander 1995:46).
As we know from what we have discussed so far, Alexander did not accept the
aesthetic challenge to American sociology. On the aesthetic challenge to the sociological
notion of the social, he argued that “[m]odemization theory (e.g. Parsons 1964) stipulated
that great civilizations o f the world would converge towards the institutional and cultural
configurations o f Westem society. Certainly we are wimessing something very much
like this process today, and the enthusiasm it has generated is hardly imposed by Westem
domination” (Alexander 1995:42). He rarely talked about the aesthetic challenge to the
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sociological notion o f the individual. He did not seem to be interested in how mass
communications influence the construction o f the self and social interaction. On the
aesthetic challenge to the sociological methods, Alexander did not accept the crisis o f
representation because he believed that Westem civilization has developed universal
criteria. In this sense, he defended scientific sociology: “one must distinguish between
different kinds of narratives—between stories that are literary and political, on the one
hand, and scientific on the other. Science differs from other narratives because it
commits the success of its story to the criterion o f truth. For every scientific narrative we
are compelled to ask, “Do we know whether it is true?” (Alexander 1991: 149).
Alexander also did not agree with postmodernists who claim that we lost the sense o f
temporality. Alexander pointed out that “[e]very historical period needs a narrative that
defines its past in terms of the present, and suggests a future that is fundamentally
different, and typically ‘even better,’ than contemporary time” (Alexander 1995:10).
Alexander did not believe in the inevitable linear development of history, but still
believed that the human race has moved toward market and democracy. On morality,
Alexander accused postmodemism of being fatalistic, private, particularistic, fragmented,
and local. Alexander believed that Westem civilization had achieved universal morality
that transcends fatalistic, private, particularistic, fragmented, and local morality. On
politics, Alexander endorsed liberalism equipped with institutional stmctures such as
democracy, law, and market.

2. Jonathan Tumer
Since the 1980s, positivistic sociology has flourished independent of the influence o f
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postmodernism. Especially, in the course o f 1980s rational choice theory emerged as a
dominant version of positivistic sociology. The core idea o f positivistic sociology is to
create a natural science of society. Most positivistic sociologists did not take the
aesthetic challenge to American sociology seriously. They usually ignored it. But some
o f them began to think postmodemism seriously. Jonathan Tumer is one o f the
representatives. Tumer (1985, 1990, 1992) actively defended positivism. His main aim
was to tum sociology into precise science like the natural sciences. For this, pre- or nonscientific elements should be diminished in sociology. According to Tumer, there are
four basic approaches to building sociological theory; metatheorizing schemes, analytical
schemes, propositional schemes, and modeling schemes. Metatheorizing schemes are
concemed with “the basic presuppositions that should guide theoretical activity.. .What
is the nature of human activity, human interaction, human organization? What is the most
appropriate set o f procedures for developing theory and what kind o f theory is possible?
V/hat are the central issues or critical problems on which sociological theory should
concentrate? And so on” (Tumer 1992:167). Metatheorizing schemes also address a
history of ideas associated with classical sociologists. According to Tumer (1992: 168),
metatheorizing “is not theory and it is not easily used in actual theorizing.” Analytical
schemes involve “the constmction o f abstract systems o f categories that presumably
denote key properties of the universe and cmcial relations among these properties”
(Tumer 1992: 168). Analytical schemes include two basic approaches: naturalistic
analytical schemes and sensitizing analytical schemes. Naturalistic analytic schemes
assume that “the ordering o f concepts in the scheme represents an ‘analytic accentuation’
o f the ordering o f the universe; as a consequence o f this isomorphism, explanation is
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usually seen as involving the discovery o f the lace o f an empirical event in the scheme”
(Tumer 1992: 168). Sensitizing analytic schemes argue that “the system o f concepts can
only be sensitizing, and at best, can only provide general guidelines for interpreting
empirical events” (Tumer 1992:168-169). Propositional schemes “revolve around
statements that connect variables to one another. That is, propositions state the form o f
the relation between two or more variable properties o f the social universe” (Tumer
1992: 169). Propositional schemes include three types: axiomatic, formal, and empirical.
Axiomatic theorizing “involves deductions, in terms o f a precise calculus, from abstract
axioms that contain precisely defined concepts to an empirical event. Explanation
consists of determining if an empirical event is ‘covered’ by one or more axioms”
(Tumer 1992: 169). Formal theorizing is “watered-down axiomatic theorizing” in which
abstract laws are articulated and deductions to empirical events are made. In forma
theorizing, “[ejxplantion consists of visualizing an empirical event as an instance or
manifestation o f the more abstract law” (Tumer 1992:169-170). Empirical theorizing
uses empirical generalization as a kind o f axiom. Finally, modeling schemes use a visual
picture for mapping properties o f the social universe and their relations. Modeling
schemes include abstract-analytic models and empirical-causal models: “Abstractanalytical models develop context-free concepts” and “represent their relations in a visual
picture”; “Empirical-causal models are usually statements o f correlation among measured
variables, ordered in a linear and temporal sequence” (Tumer 1992: 171).
Tumer (1992: 174) criticized naturalistic analytical schemes and metatheorizing for
tending “to be too philosophical and detached from the actual workings o f the world.
They become overly reified and either concemed with their architecture or obsessed with
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their scholastic capacity to ‘resolve’ philosophical issues.” Tumer (1992: 172) argued
that the best approach to theory-building in sociology is “a combination o f sensitizing
analytical schemes, abstract formal propositions, and analytical models.” To Tumer, this
best approach is positivism as defined below:
Start with sensitizing schemes, propositions, and models, and only then
move on to the formal collection o f data or to metatheorizing and schemebuilding. In this way, it will be possible to generate scientific knowledge
about the social universe, with the result that sociology can take its place
among the natural sciences (Tumer 1992: 175).
Tumer was very optimistic about the development of positivist sociology as true
science. In fact, this article o f 1992 was a part o f Postmodernism and Social Theory: The
Debate over General Theory edited by Steven Seidman and David G. Wagner. In this
article, Tumer did not mention even a word about postmodemism. By 1992, Tumer still
maintained his confidence in positivist sociology, which had been atmounced in 1990.
There is very creative and synthetic work currently being done at both the
micro and macro level, as well as in efforts to link these. Most o f this
work builds on the early masters, employs formalism, and states
propositions that are testable. Moreover, I sense that positivistic sociology
is on the verge o f developing laws and models that are equivalent o f those
in the natural sciences and that will bring us closer to Comte’s original
dream .. The relativistic, solipsistic, particularistic, anti-positivistic, and
meta-istic (to invent a word) character o f theory is no longer a challenge to
debate. Increasingly, it is something to be ignored (Tumer 1990: 388389).
But this optimistic hope has not come tme. As we know, postmodemism, which
might be characterized by being relativistic, solipsistic, particularistic, anti-positivistic,
and meta-istic, has been massively influential within the social sciences and humanities.
Tumer could not ignore postmodemism any more, but he could not fully accept it.
Instead, Tumer tried to rewrite postmodemism in terms o f positivist Sociology-
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In “A Formalization of Postmodern Theory” (Allan and Tumer 2000), Tumer tried to
do this task. Tumer (365) clearly claimed that “our goal is to provide an example o f what
can be done from a positivistic point o f view.” Following Jameson, Tumer (365) defined
social postmodemism as “a critical form o f theorizing that is concemed with the unique
problems that are associated with culture and subjectivity in late capitalist societies." He
rightly pointed out that all postmodemists address two issues of culture and subjects.
According to his view on positivism, he started with sensitizing schemes about two issues
o f culture and subjects, which most postmodem theorists have provided: increasing
importance o f culture, destabilization and dereification of culture, increasing significance
o f the self, and decreasing viability o f the individual subject. And then, he tried to
translate these postmodemists’ claims into “propositions that highlight the key forces that
are hypothesized to be part of a ‘postmodem condition’” (364). He did this job well.
Postmodernists’ claims are changed into propositions whose empirical plausibility seems
to be assessable. He did not assess the empirical plausibility of each proposition because
it is beyond the scope o f a single article. Rather, he hoped that his work would stimulate
others to refine the propositions and to bring data to bear on the claims o f postmodem
theory.
Nevertheless, Tumer (381) tried to present a preliminary assessment by outlining the
postmodem condition in a visual picture as follows.
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Advanced Capitalism

The Consequences

High volume/velocity/scope
markets fueled by advertising

Increased significance o f cultural
over material structures

Increased commodification o f
objects, people, and most
importantly, cultural symbols

Detachment o f culture from groups.
local time and place

Rapid movement and
déconcentration o f capital
Compression o f time and space via
transportation and communication
technologies

------ ►

Destabilization o f cultural symbols
and their capacity to provide
meanings
Increased salience o f the individual
over groups and collectivities
Increased reflexivity o f self

Dominance o f technologies o f
reproduction (i.e., imaging
technologies) over technologies o f
production

Decreased viability, stability, and
coherence o f self

According to Turner, postmodern theory assumed that the forces on the left cause the
outcomes listed on the right. He pointed cut that postmodemism is strongest “when the
forces on the left are highlighted, because these do indeed seem to be empirically true"
(380). But he suspected “whether the outcomes listed on the right o f the figure are
empirically true" (381) even though postmodemists believed that the outcomes are
inevitable. Thus, he suggested that fi'om a positivist’s point of view these outcomes
should “be considered hypotheses that have varying degrees of plausibility but that have
not been systematically examined empirically” (381). Tumer (381) asked, “Are these
empirically plausible? And, if so, to what degree?” He answered that we need more
data.
Tumer rarely talked about postmodem challenge to sociological methodologies
because he believed that the positivist methodology he outlined is still the best way to
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study postmodern condition. He also did not pay attention to the normative implication
of postmodemism, which is in a sense inevitable because positivist inquiry, by nature,
does not care about ethics and politics. To positivist inquiry, ethics and politics are preor un-scientific assumptions which should be diminished in science.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUDING REMARKS: FURTHER IMPLICATION OF
POSTMODERN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY
Some scholars consider postmodemism to be a fad of the 1980s (Alexander 1995;
Callinicos 1990; Faberman 1991; Frow 1995; Huber 1995; Rosenau 1992). But I believe
that postmodemism is more than a fad and I agree with some sociologists’ argiunent that
a postmodem perspective exhibits striking parallels with the project of classical European
sociology (Dickens and Fontana 1992: 10-11; Smart 1993: 28; Wagner 1994: vix).
Embracing their arguments. I point out some parallels between postmodem social theory
and classical European sociology in terms o f three dimensions: ontology, epistemology,
and ethics/politics.
First is the ontological dimension. On the macro level, in the classical era, market
economy or capitalism began to emerge with the rise of the nation-state and in
postmodern era, global market system has emerged with the development o f multi-or
trans-national organizations. On the micro level in the classical era modem individuals,
who were freed from traditional institutions such as extended family. Catholic Church,
the feudal economy, and monarchy, were emerging. These new individuals were mainly
the property less/rootless masses. In the postmodem era, the postmodern subjects, who
are freed from any kind o f fixed sources o f identity such as class, age, gender, race.
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ethnicity, and sexual orientation, have emerged mainly due to the dedifferenting impact
of electronically-mediated media on the social and the individual.
Second is the epistemological dimension. In the classical era, there was a strong
sense of epistemological break with the traditional epistemology. With regard to the
position to truth claims, the scientific epistemology was struggling with the religious
epistemology. In the postmodern era, there is also a strong sense o f epistemological
break with the modernist epistemology. With regard to the position to truth claims, the
non-positivist, non-foimdational epistemology is struggling with the positivistic
epistemology. In the classical era, new scientific methods to study society were
struggling with the traditional ones. In the postmodern era, multidisciplinary approaches
to society are struggling with the disciplinary approach.
Third is the normative dimension. In the classical era, ethics and politics based on
alleged universal laws were struggling with traditional ethics and politics based on the
Catholic God. One of the main interests o f the classical era was how to homogenize the
newly emerging propertyless/rootless masses into useful laborers. With regard to this,
liberalism and communism struggled with each other. Liberalism wanted to base its
ethics and politics on the rational individual while communism strove to ground its ethics
and politics on the collectively shared values. The question was whether rationality was
individual or collective. In the postmodern era, ethics and politics based on differences
are struggling with modernist ethics and politics based on sameness. One of the main
concerns o f postmodern ethics and politics was how to live together without
repressing/silencing/marginalizing the differences.
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In this sense, the postmodern perspective or situation invited sociology. But
American sociology was quite unwilling to accept this invitation. American sociologists
hardly paid attention to postmodern debates until the mid-1980s. Up till the early 1980s
the debate on postmodemism remained almost exclusively confined to more humanistoriented sciences. Instead o f sociologists, English literary critics and artists were able to
be sensitive to the structural transformation o f Westem societies. In a sense, English
literature became more sociological than sociology. One of the main reasons for this
irony might be the deadlock o f imagination in which American sociology was kept
because it has been so obsessed with the issue o f how to make sociology a science. The
primary model o f science that modem American sociology adopted was the technically
practical. It has become clear that the technically practical derived from the nineteenthcentury thermodynamics. Lyotard (1984: 55) explained this in terms o f Laplace’s fiction
o f the demon: “he [the demon] knows all o f the variables determining the state of the
universe at a moment t, and can thus predict its state at a moment t’> t. This fiction is
sustained by the principle that physical systems, including the system o f systems called
the universe, follow regular pattems, with the result that their evolution traces a regular
path and gives rise to ‘normal’ continuous functions (and to futurology...).” As Lyotard
pointed out, the advent o f quantum theory and microphysics has made this model
obsolete. But mainstream American sociology has stuck to this model. This fixation to
the old model is partly explained by the demands o f the state and large corporations
which funded sociologists. The main concern o f the funding agencies was how to
administrate or discipline people in the name of scientific efficiency. American
sociology began to bloom institutionally right after it embraced the technically practical
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as the main model o f sociology, especially after World War II (see Tumer and Tumer
1990). But the cost was very high. American sociology has been shut off from the “real
world.” Instead o f reading/writing the “real” change o f America, American sociology
has striven to achieve the analytic synthesis of narrowly-oriented empirical data.
Following the ideal o f natural science proposed by the technically practical, American
sociology has tried to create a natural science of society. In addition, American sociology
has striven to establish the grand abstract system o f theory deduced from some
fundamental axioms. Embracing the transcendentalist version of the theoretical,
functionalist sociology has been preoccupied with a series o f highly abstract issues such
as the micro-macro link, the interrelationship between agency and structure, action and
order, and stmctme and culture (see Seidman 1994). These two mainstream trends of
American sociology has repressed and marginalized other voices such as the morally
practical and the aesthetic, resulting in the poverty of imagination in American sociology.
While American sociology has been obsessed with this scientific project, French
intellectuals were busy transgressing the traditional boundaries o f the theoretical, the
practical, and the aesthetic. Why did new thoughts such as structuralism,
poststmcturalism, and postmodemism originate and develop in Europe and not in
America? I draw a hint from Seidman (1994: 195): “In France, we look less to the
narrow academic disciplines o f the social sciences to locate the major breakthroughs in
the human studies than to broader movements o f thought that have an interdisciplinary,
public character.” I believe that the core o f French thought came from the aesthetic
model o f language. In the New French social theory, poststructuralist linguistics has
replaced the nineteenth-centiuy thermodynamics model, liquidating the validity o f the
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notion o f a stable system and opening up an indeterminate micro-world. As
poststructmalist postmodern social theorists have shown, poststructuralist linguistics is
successful at analyzing micropolitics focusing on mass culture, sexuality, subjectivity,
desire, power, narrativity, textuality, etc.
American sociology has rarely paid attention to these issues because they are difficult
to quantify. In this sense, the aesthetic challenge might be thought to be a new
opportunity for American sociology. As I have shown in chapter 5, postmodern
American sociology has embraced this aesthetic challenge fairly well, by acknowledging
that linguistic forms are constitutive o f culture, sexuality, subjectivity, desire, power, etc.
Postmodern American sociology accepted that linguistic forms create the conditions that
locate the social inside the social texts, not within the institutions. The main reason is
that traditional institutions lost their former power to constitute the social. Instead, freefloating images produced by electronically-mediated mass communications are in a
ceaseless double process o f creation and destruction o f the social in the texts. As a result,
textual politics gained power: if we want to change how things are, we must change how
things are written.
I believe that this position has some merit, but I would like to add one thing that
postmodern American sociology seems to relatively ignore. Following poststructuralist
postmodern social theory, interactionist postmodern American sociology over
emphasizes the textual aspect of the social. Poststructuralist postmodern social theory is
usually highly abstract; it tends to overemphasize the polysémie nature o f texts, erasing
the economic and social contexts in which texts are produced, distributed, consumed, and
reproduced. As a result, poststructuralist postmodern social theory is highly textual or
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cultural rather than material or institutional. Interactionist postmodern sociology tends to
repeat this fallacy. O f course, only a few people would deny that the social has become
cultural or textual in a postmodern era. Even positivistic sociologist such as Jonathan
Tumer recognized it as I have shown in the previous chapter. But this would not
necessarily mean that institutional analysis is out-of-date because only a quite few people
could also ignore the Marxist argiunent that the main force o f changing the social into the
cultural is the movement o f capital. As Jameson (1984b: xx) put it: “The dynamic of
perpetual change is, as Marx showed in the Manifesto, not some alien rhythm within
capital—a rhythm specific to those noninstrumental activities that are art and science—
but rather is the very ‘permanent revolution’ o f capitalist production itself.” Capital has
accumulated until it has become an image, which seems to move according to the logic of
poststructuralist linguistics. But this would not mean that we don’t have to study
institutional change which made capital into an image.
Critical postmodern sociology tries to fill this gap, but it tends to emphasize only one
aspect o f Marxist political economy. First o f all, Marxist political economy has a special
way of addressing a large-scale institutional change by tracing the change of
accumulation o f capital (for instance, see Brenner 1998; Mandel 1975). Marxist political
economy emphasizes the crisis and change inherent in capitalism, seeing capital as value
looking for accretion, for surplus-value. The basic drive of capitalism is to accumulate
capital: “what characterizes capitalism is precisely the compulsion to accumulate, that is
‘enlarged reproduction’” (Mandel 1990: 61). Marx saw the inevitability o f periodic
crises o f overproduction mainly due to the fact that “the owners o f the means of
production are organized separate firms which compete with each other for shares o f the
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market” (Mandel 1990: 82). Thus, Marxist political economy investigates how the mode
o f accumulation o f capital changes over time.
Marxist political economy also emphasizes the importance o f the historical and
political economic contexts in which the cultural or the textual is produced, distributed,
consumed, and reproduced because it believes that the historical and political economic
contexts determine the way that the cultural or the textual is produced, distributed,
consumed, and reproduced.
Critical postmodern sociology has relatively ignored the first aspect of political
economy while emphasizing the second aspect. I doubt it is possible to situate the
cultural within certain historical and political economic contexts without investigating the
new mode o f acciunulation of capital. But critical postmodern sociology, which I
presented in the previous chapter, has not provided a systematic analysis o f a new mode
o f accumulation o f capital. I believe that critical postmodern sociology should integrate
the two aspects o f political economy.
Many have argued that multi- or trans-disciplinary or multiperspectival approaches
are needed in postmodern era. I believe that the core of these approaches is the synthesis
o f poststructuralist linguistics and Marxist political economy. I claim that this synthesis
does not come from an abstract methodological interest in integrating the micro and the
macro. Rather, it comes from the sensibility that the postmodern world is not only a
world of play o f differences, but also a Sadean world in which the strong exploits the
weak ever efficiently. Poststructuralist linguistics is excellent at analyzing the
aestheticized world o f everyday life, but is relatively weak at investigating the
institutionally-structured social injustice. Political economy situates the structured social
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injustice within the economic and social contexts in which it is produced, distributed,
consumed, and reproduced. In this sense, Marxist political economy is especially needed
for analyzing the movement o f capital which brings out a world full o f tyranny and
injustice. I hope that postmodern American sociology extends its horizon so as to be
sensitive to the real issue o f social injustice by utilizing both poststructuralist linguistics
and political economy.
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